1. 07 10月, 2015 5 次提交
  2. 06 10月, 2015 1 次提交
    • D
      x86/xen/p2m: hint at the last populated P2M entry · 98dd166e
      David Vrabel 提交于
      With commit 633d6f17 (x86/xen: prepare
      p2m list for memory hotplug) the P2M may be sized to accomdate a much
      larger amount of memory than the domain currently has.
      
      When saving a domain, the toolstack must scan all the P2M looking for
      populated pages.  This results in a performance regression due to the
      unnecessary scanning.
      
      Instead of reporting (via shared_info) the maximum possible size of
      the P2M, hint at the last PFN which might be populated.  This hint is
      increased as new leaves are added to the P2M (in the expectation that
      they will be used for populated entries).
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Vrabel <david.vrabel@citrix.com>
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.0+
      98dd166e
  3. 02 10月, 2015 4 次提交
    • B
      x86/headers/uapi: Fix __BITS_PER_LONG value for x32 builds · f4b4aae1
      Ben Hutchings 提交于
      On x32, gcc predefines __x86_64__ but long is only 32-bit.  Use
      __ILP32__ to distinguish x32.
      
      Fixes this compiler error in perf:
      
      	tools/include/asm-generic/bitops/__ffs.h: In function '__ffs':
      	tools/include/asm-generic/bitops/__ffs.h:19:8: error: right shift count >= width of type [-Werror=shift-count-overflow]
      	  word >>= 32;
      	       ^
      
      This isn't sufficient to build perf for x32, though.
      Signed-off-by: NBen Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443660043.2730.15.camel@decadent.org.ukSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      f4b4aae1
    • S
      x86/mm: Set NX on gap between __ex_table and rodata · ab76f7b4
      Stephen Smalley 提交于
      Unused space between the end of __ex_table and the start of
      rodata can be left W+x in the kernel page tables.  Extend the
      setting of the NX bit to cover this gap by starting from
      text_end rather than rodata_start.
      
        Before:
        ---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
        0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000          16M                               pmd
        0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81600000           6M     ro         PSE     GLB x  pmd
        0xffffffff81600000-0xffffffff81754000        1360K     ro                 GLB x  pte
        0xffffffff81754000-0xffffffff81800000         688K     RW                 GLB x  pte
        0xffffffff81800000-0xffffffff81a00000           2M     ro         PSE     GLB NX pmd
        0xffffffff81a00000-0xffffffff81b3b000        1260K     ro                 GLB NX pte
        0xffffffff81b3b000-0xffffffff82000000        4884K     RW                 GLB NX pte
        0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff82200000           2M     RW         PSE     GLB NX pmd
        0xffffffff82200000-0xffffffffa0000000         478M                               pmd
      
        After:
        ---[ High Kernel Mapping ]---
        0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffff81000000          16M                               pmd
        0xffffffff81000000-0xffffffff81600000           6M     ro         PSE     GLB x  pmd
        0xffffffff81600000-0xffffffff81754000        1360K     ro                 GLB x  pte
        0xffffffff81754000-0xffffffff81800000         688K     RW                 GLB NX pte
        0xffffffff81800000-0xffffffff81a00000           2M     ro         PSE     GLB NX pmd
        0xffffffff81a00000-0xffffffff81b3b000        1260K     ro                 GLB NX pte
        0xffffffff81b3b000-0xffffffff82000000        4884K     RW                 GLB NX pte
        0xffffffff82000000-0xffffffff82200000           2M     RW         PSE     GLB NX pmd
        0xffffffff82200000-0xffffffffa0000000         478M                               pmd
      Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
      Acked-by: NKees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443704662-3138-1-git-send-email-sds@tycho.nsa.govSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      ab76f7b4
    • L
      x86/kexec: Fix kexec crash in syscall kexec_file_load() · e3c41e37
      Lee, Chun-Yi 提交于
      The original bug is a page fault crash that sometimes happens
      on big machines when preparing ELF headers:
      
          BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffc90613fc9000
          IP: [<ffffffff8103d645>] prepare_elf64_ram_headers_callback+0x165/0x260
      
      The bug is caused by us under-counting the number of memory ranges
      and subsequently not allocating enough ELF header space for them.
      The bug is typically masked on smaller systems, because the ELF header
      allocation is rounded up to the next page.
      
      This patch modifies the code in fill_up_crash_elf_data() by using
      walk_system_ram_res() instead of walk_system_ram_range() to correctly
      count the max number of crash memory ranges. That's because the
      walk_system_ram_range() filters out small memory regions that
      reside in the same page, but walk_system_ram_res() does not.
      
      Here's how I found the bug:
      
      After tracing prepare_elf64_headers() and prepare_elf64_ram_headers_callback(),
      the code uses walk_system_ram_res() to fill-in crash memory regions information
      to the program header, so it counts those small memory regions that
      reside in a page area.
      
      But, when the kernel was using walk_system_ram_range() in
      fill_up_crash_elf_data() to count the number of crash memory regions,
      it filters out small regions.
      
      I printed those small memory regions, for example:
      
        kexec: Get nr_ram ranges. vaddr=0xffff880077592258 paddr=0x77592258, sz=0xdc0
      
      Based on the code in walk_system_ram_range(), this memory region
      will be filtered out:
      
        pfn = (0x77592258 + 0x1000 - 1) >> 12 = 0x77593
        end_pfn = (0x77592258 + 0xfc0 -1 + 1) >> 12 = 0x77593
        end_pfn - pfn = 0x77593 - 0x77593 = 0  <=== if (end_pfn > pfn) is FALSE
      
      So, the max_nr_ranges that's counted by the kernel doesn't include
      small memory regions - causing us to under-allocate the required space.
      That causes the page fault crash that happens in a later code path
      when preparing ELF headers.
      
      This bug is not easy to reproduce on small machines that have few
      CPUs, because the allocated page aligned ELF buffer has more free
      space to cover those small memory regions' PT_LOAD headers.
      Signed-off-by: NLee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
      Cc: Jiang Liu <jiang.liu@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Stephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
      Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
      Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
      Cc: kexec@lists.infradead.org
      Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443531537-29436-1-git-send-email-jlee@suse.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      e3c41e37
    • A
      arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h: fix build failure · a523841e
      Andrey Ryabinin 提交于
      With KMEMCHECK=y, KASAN=n:
      
        arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c:673:3: error: implicit declaration of function `memcpy' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
        arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.c:139:2: error: implicit declaration of function `memcpy' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
        arch/x86/include/asm/desc.h:121:2: error: implicit declaration of function `memcpy' [-Werror=implicit-function-declaration]
      
      Don't #undef memcpy if KASAN=n.
      
      Fixes: 769a8089 ("x86, efi, kasan: #undef memset/memcpy/memmove per arch")
      Signed-off-by: NAndrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
      Reported-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      Reported-by: NSedat Dilek <sedat.dilek@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      a523841e
  4. 01 10月, 2015 8 次提交
    • D
      Use WARN_ON_ONCE for missing X86_FEATURE_NRIPS · d2922422
      Dirk Müller 提交于
      The cpu feature flags are not ever going to change, so warning
      everytime can cause a lot of kernel log spam
      (in our case more than 10GB/hour).
      
      The warning seems to only occur when nested virtualization is
      enabled, so it's probably triggered by a KVM bug.  This is a
      sensible and safe change anyway, and the KVM bug fix might not
      be suitable for stable releases anyway.
      
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NDirk Mueller <dmueller@suse.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      d2922422
    • P
      Revert "KVM: SVM: use NPT page attributes" · fc07e76a
      Paolo Bonzini 提交于
      This reverts commit 3c2e7f7d.
      Initializing the mapping from MTRR to PAT values was reported to
      fail nondeterministically, and it also caused extremely slow boot
      (due to caching getting disabled---bug 103321) with assigned devices.
      Reported-by: NMarkus Trippelsdorf <markus@trippelsdorf.de>
      Reported-by: NSebastian Schuette <dracon@ewetel.net>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.2+
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      fc07e76a
    • P
      Revert "KVM: svm: handle KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED in svm_get_mt_mask" · bcf166a9
      Paolo Bonzini 提交于
      This reverts commit 54928303.
      It builds on the commit that is being reverted next.
      
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.2+
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      bcf166a9
    • P
      Revert "KVM: SVM: Sync g_pat with guest-written PAT value" · 625422f6
      Paolo Bonzini 提交于
      This reverts commit e098223b,
      which has a dependency on other commits being reverted.
      
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.2+
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      625422f6
    • P
      Revert "KVM: x86: apply guest MTRR virtualization on host reserved pages" · 606decd6
      Paolo Bonzini 提交于
      This reverts commit fd717f11.
      It was reported to cause Machine Check Exceptions (bug 104091).
      
      Reported-by: harn-solo@gmx.de
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.2+
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      606decd6
    • M
      x86/efi: Fix boot crash by mapping EFI memmap entries bottom-up at runtime, instead of top-down · a5caa209
      Matt Fleming 提交于
      Beginning with UEFI v2.5 EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE was introduced
      that signals that the firmware PE/COFF loader supports splitting
      code and data sections of PE/COFF images into separate EFI
      memory map entries. This allows the kernel to map those regions
      with strict memory protections, e.g. EFI_MEMORY_RO for code,
      EFI_MEMORY_XP for data, etc.
      
      Unfortunately, an unwritten requirement of this new feature is
      that the regions need to be mapped with the same offsets
      relative to each other as observed in the EFI memory map. If
      this is not done crashes like this may occur,
      
        BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at fffffffefe6086dd
        IP: [<fffffffefe6086dd>] 0xfffffffefe6086dd
        Call Trace:
         [<ffffffff8104c90e>] efi_call+0x7e/0x100
         [<ffffffff81602091>] ? virt_efi_set_variable+0x61/0x90
         [<ffffffff8104c583>] efi_delete_dummy_variable+0x63/0x70
         [<ffffffff81f4e4aa>] efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x383/0x392
         [<ffffffff81f37e1b>] start_kernel+0x38a/0x417
         [<ffffffff81f37495>] x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c
         [<ffffffff81f37582>] x86_64_start_kernel+0xeb/0xef
      
      Here 0xfffffffefe6086dd refers to an address the firmware
      expects to be mapped but which the OS never claimed was mapped.
      The issue is that included in these regions are relative
      addresses to other regions which were emitted by the firmware
      toolchain before the "splitting" of sections occurred at
      runtime.
      
      Needless to say, we don't satisfy this unwritten requirement on
      x86_64 and instead map the EFI memory map entries in reverse
      order. The above crash is almost certainly triggerable with any
      kernel newer than v3.13 because that's when we rewrote the EFI
      runtime region mapping code, in commit d2f7cbe7 ("x86/efi:
      Runtime services virtual mapping"). For kernel versions before
      v3.13 things may work by pure luck depending on the
      fragmentation of the kernel virtual address space at the time we
      map the EFI regions.
      
      Instead of mapping the EFI memory map entries in reverse order,
      where entry N has a higher virtual address than entry N+1, map
      them in the same order as they appear in the EFI memory map to
      preserve this relative offset between regions.
      
      This patch has been kept as small as possible with the intention
      that it should be applied aggressively to stable and
      distribution kernels. It is very much a bugfix rather than
      support for a new feature, since when EFI_PROPERTIES_TABLE is
      enabled we must map things as outlined above to even boot - we
      have no way of asking the firmware not to split the code/data
      regions.
      
      In fact, this patch doesn't even make use of the more strict
      memory protections available in UEFI v2.5. That will come later.
      Suggested-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
      Reported-by: NArd Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
      Signed-off-by: NMatt Fleming <matt.fleming@intel.com>
      Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
      Cc: Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
      Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: James Bottomley <JBottomley@Odin.com>
      Cc: Lee, Chun-Yi <jlee@suse.com>
      Cc: Leif Lindholm <leif.lindholm@linaro.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
      Cc: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
      Cc: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443218539-7610-2-git-send-email-matt@codeblueprint.co.ukSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      a5caa209
    • T
      x86/process: Unify 32bit and 64bit implementations of get_wchan() · 7ba78053
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      The stack layout and the functionality is identical. Use the 64bit
      version for all of x86.
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Reviewed-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
      Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Sasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
      Cc: Wolfram Gloger <wmglo@dent.med.uni-muenchen.de>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150930083302.779694618@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      7ba78053
    • T
      x86/process: Add proper bound checks in 64bit get_wchan() · eddd3826
      Thomas Gleixner 提交于
      Dmitry Vyukov reported the following using trinity and the memory
      error detector AddressSanitizer
      (https://code.google.com/p/address-sanitizer/wiki/AddressSanitizerForKernel).
      
      [ 124.575597] ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on
      address ffff88002e280000
      [ 124.576801] ffff88002e280000 is located 131938492886538 bytes to
      the left of 28857600-byte region [ffffffff81282e0a, ffffffff82e0830a)
      [ 124.578633] Accessed by thread T10915:
      [ 124.579295] inlined in describe_heap_address
      ./arch/x86/mm/asan/report.c:164
      [ 124.579295] #0 ffffffff810dd277 in asan_report_error
      ./arch/x86/mm/asan/report.c:278
      [ 124.580137] #1 ffffffff810dc6a0 in asan_check_region
      ./arch/x86/mm/asan/asan.c:37
      [ 124.581050] #2 ffffffff810dd423 in __tsan_read8 ??:0
      [ 124.581893] #3 ffffffff8107c093 in get_wchan
      ./arch/x86/kernel/process_64.c:444
      
      The address checks in the 64bit implementation of get_wchan() are
      wrong in several ways:
      
       - The lower bound of the stack is not the start of the stack
         page. It's the start of the stack page plus sizeof (struct
         thread_info)
      
       - The upper bound must be:
      
             top_of_stack - TOP_OF_KERNEL_STACK_PADDING - 2 * sizeof(unsigned long).
      
         The 2 * sizeof(unsigned long) is required because the stack pointer
         points at the frame pointer. The layout on the stack is: ... IP FP
         ... IP FP. So we need to make sure that both IP and FP are in the
         bounds.
      
      Fix the bound checks and get rid of the mix of numeric constants, u64
      and unsigned long. Making all unsigned long allows us to use the same
      function for 32bit as well.
      
      Use READ_ONCE() when accessing the stack. This does not prevent a
      concurrent wakeup of the task and the stack changing, but at least it
      avoids TOCTOU.
      
      Also check task state at the end of the loop. Again that does not
      prevent concurrent changes, but it avoids walking for nothing.
      
      Add proper comments while at it.
      Reported-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Reported-by: NSasha Levin <sasha.levin@oracle.com>
      Based-on-patch-from: Wolfram Gloger <wmglo@dent.med.uni-muenchen.de>
      Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Reviewed-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Reviewed-by: NDmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
      Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>
      Cc: Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
      Cc: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
      Cc: kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
      Cc: Wolfram Gloger <wmglo@dent.med.uni-muenchen.de>
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20150930083302.694788319@linutronix.deSigned-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      eddd3826
  5. 30 9月, 2015 2 次提交
  6. 29 9月, 2015 1 次提交
  7. 28 9月, 2015 4 次提交
  8. 25 9月, 2015 7 次提交
    • D
      KVM: disable halt_poll_ns as default for s390x · 920552b2
      David Hildenbrand 提交于
      We observed some performance degradation on s390x with dynamic
      halt polling. Until we can provide a proper fix, let's enable
      halt_poll_ns as default only for supported architectures.
      
      Architectures are now free to set their own halt_poll_ns
      default value.
      Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      920552b2
    • P
      KVM: x86: fix off-by-one in reserved bits check · 58c95070
      Paolo Bonzini 提交于
      29ecd660 ("KVM: x86: avoid uninitialized variable warning",
      2015-09-06) introduced a not-so-subtle problem, which probably
      escaped review because it was not part of the patch context.
      
      Before the patch, leaf was always equal to iterator.level.  After,
      it is equal to iterator.level - 1 in the call to is_shadow_zero_bits_set,
      and when is_shadow_zero_bits_set does another "-1" the check on
      reserved bits becomes incorrect.  Using "iterator.level" in the call
      fixes this call trace:
      
      WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 17000 at arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c:3385 handle_mmio_page_fault.part.93+0x1a/0x20 [kvm]()
      Modules linked in: tun sha256_ssse3 sha256_generic drbg binfmt_misc ipv6 vfat fat fuse dm_crypt dm_mod kvm_amd kvm crc32_pclmul aesni_intel aes_x86_64 lrw gf128mul glue_helper ablk_helper cryptd fam15h_power amd64_edac_mod k10temp edac_core amdkfd amd_iommu_v2 radeon acpi_cpufreq
      [...]
      Call Trace:
        dump_stack+0x4e/0x84
        warn_slowpath_common+0x95/0xe0
        warn_slowpath_null+0x1a/0x20
        handle_mmio_page_fault.part.93+0x1a/0x20 [kvm]
        tdp_page_fault+0x231/0x290 [kvm]
        ? emulator_pio_in_out+0x6e/0xf0 [kvm]
        kvm_mmu_page_fault+0x36/0x240 [kvm]
        ? svm_set_cr0+0x95/0xc0 [kvm_amd]
        pf_interception+0xde/0x1d0 [kvm_amd]
        handle_exit+0x181/0xa70 [kvm_amd]
        ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x68b/0x1730 [kvm]
        kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x6f6/0x1730 [kvm]
        ? kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x68b/0x1730 [kvm]
        ? preempt_count_sub+0x9b/0xf0
        ? mutex_lock_killable_nested+0x26f/0x490
        ? preempt_count_sub+0x9b/0xf0
        kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x358/0x710 [kvm]
        ? __fget+0x5/0x210
        ? __fget+0x101/0x210
        do_vfs_ioctl+0x2f4/0x560
        ? __fget_light+0x29/0x90
        SyS_ioctl+0x4c/0x90
        entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x73
      ---[ end trace 37901c8686d84de6 ]---
      Reported-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Tested-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      58c95070
    • P
      KVM: x86: use correct page table format to check nested page table reserved bits · 6fec2144
      Paolo Bonzini 提交于
      Intel CPUID on AMD host or vice versa is a weird case, but it can
      happen.  Handle it by checking the host CPU vendor instead of the
      guest's in reset_tdp_shadow_zero_bits_mask.  For speed, the
      check uses the fact that Intel EPT has an X (executable) bit while
      AMD NPT has NX.
      Reported-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Tested-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      6fec2144
    • P
      KVM: svm: do not call kvm_set_cr0 from init_vmcb · 79a8059d
      Paolo Bonzini 提交于
      kvm_set_cr0 may want to call kvm_zap_gfn_range and thus access the
      memslots array (SRCU protected).  Using a mini SRCU critical section
      is ugly, and adding it to kvm_arch_vcpu_create doesn't work because
      the VMX vcpu_create callback calls synchronize_srcu.
      
      Fixes this lockdep splat:
      
      ===============================
      [ INFO: suspicious RCU usage. ]
      4.3.0-rc1+ #1 Not tainted
      -------------------------------
      include/linux/kvm_host.h:488 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
      
      other info that might help us debug this:
      rcu_scheduler_active = 1, debug_locks = 0
      1 lock held by qemu-system-i38/17000:
       #0:  (&(&kvm->mmu_lock)->rlock){+.+...}, at: kvm_zap_gfn_range+0x24/0x1a0 [kvm]
      
      [...]
      Call Trace:
       dump_stack+0x4e/0x84
       lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0xfd/0x130
       kvm_zap_gfn_range+0x188/0x1a0 [kvm]
       kvm_set_cr0+0xde/0x1e0 [kvm]
       init_vmcb+0x760/0xad0 [kvm_amd]
       svm_create_vcpu+0x197/0x250 [kvm_amd]
       kvm_arch_vcpu_create+0x47/0x70 [kvm]
       kvm_vm_ioctl+0x302/0x7e0 [kvm]
       ? __lock_is_held+0x51/0x70
       ? __fget+0x101/0x210
       do_vfs_ioctl+0x2f4/0x560
       ? __fget_light+0x29/0x90
       SyS_ioctl+0x4c/0x90
       entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x16/0x73
      Reported-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      79a8059d
    • D
      x86/asm: Force inlining of cpu_relax() · 0b101e62
      Denys Vlasenko 提交于
      On x86, cpu_relax() simply calls rep_nop(), which generates one
      instruction, PAUSE (aka REP NOP).
      
      With this config:
      
        http://busybox.net/~vda/kernel_config_OPTIMIZE_INLINING_and_Os
      
      gcc-4.7.2 does not always inline rep_nop(): it generates several
      copies of this:
      
        <rep_nop> (16 copies, 194 calls):
             55                      push   %rbp
             48 89 e5                mov    %rsp,%rbp
             f3 90                   pause
             5d                      pop    %rbp
             c3                      retq
      
      See: https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=66122
      
      This patch fixes this via s/inline/__always_inline/
      on rep_nop() and cpu_relax().
      
      ( Forcing inlining only on rep_nop() causes GCC to
        deinline cpu_relax(), with almost no change in generated code).
      
            text     data      bss       dec     hex filename
        88118971 19905208 36421632 144445811 89c1173 vmlinux.before
        88118139 19905208 36421632 144444979 89c0e33 vmlinux
      Signed-off-by: NDenys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1443096149-27291-1-git-send-email-dvlasenk@redhat.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      0b101e62
    • G
      perf/x86: Change test_aperfmperf() and test_intel() to static · 7e5560a5
      Geliang Tang 提交于
      Fixes the following sparse warnings:
      
       arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_msr.c:13:6: warning: symbol
       'test_aperfmperf' was not declared. Should it be static?
      
       arch/x86/kernel/cpu/perf_event_msr.c:18:6: warning: symbol
       'test_intel' was not declared. Should it be static?
      Signed-off-by: NGeliang Tang <geliangtang@163.com>
      Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4588e8ab09638458f2451af572827108be3b4a36.1443123796.git.geliangtang@163.comSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      7e5560a5
    • A
      x86/sched/64: Don't save flags on context switch (reinstated) · 3f2c5085
      Andy Lutomirski 提交于
      This reinstates the following commit:
      
        2c7577a7 ("sched/x86_64: Don't save flags on context switch")
      
      which was reverted in:
      
        512255a2 ("Revert 'sched/x86_64: Don't save flags on context switch'")
      
      Historically, Linux has always saved and restored EFLAGS across
      context switches.  As far as I know, the only reason to do this
      is because of the NT flag.  In particular, if something calls
      switch_to() with the NT flag set, then we don't want to leak the
      NT flag into a different task that might try to IRET and fail
      because NT is set.
      
      Before this commit:
      
        8c7aa698 ("x86_64, entry: Filter RFLAGS.NT on entry from userspace")
      
      we could run system call bodies with NT set.  This would be a DoS or possibly
      privilege escalation hole if scheduling in such a system call would leak
      NT into a different task.
      
      Importantly, we don't need to worry about NT being set while
      preemptible or across page faults.  The only way we can schedule
      due to preemption or a page fault is in an interrupt entry that
      nests inside the SYSENTER prologue.  The CPU will clear NT when
      entering through an interrupt gate, so we won't schedule with NT
      set.
      
      The only other interesting flags are IOPL and AC.  Allowing
      switch_to() to change IOPL has no effect, as the value loaded
      during kernel execution doesn't matter at all except between a
      SYSENTER entry and the subsequent PUSHF, and anythign that
      interrupts in that window will restore IOPL on return.
      
      If we call __switch_to() with AC set, we have bigger problems.
      Signed-off-by: NAndy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
      Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
      Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
      Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
      Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
      Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
      Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
      Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/d4440fdc2a89247bffb7c003d2a9a2952bd46827.1441146105.git.luto@kernel.orgSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
      3f2c5085
  9. 23 9月, 2015 4 次提交
  10. 21 9月, 2015 2 次提交
  11. 20 9月, 2015 1 次提交
  12. 18 9月, 2015 1 次提交
    • I
      kvm: svm: reset mmu on VCPU reset · ebae871a
      Igor Mammedov 提交于
      When INIT/SIPI sequence is sent to VCPU which before that
      was in use by OS, VMRUN might fail with:
      
       KVM: entry failed, hardware error 0xffffffff
       EAX=00000000 EBX=00000000 ECX=00000000 EDX=000006d3
       ESI=00000000 EDI=00000000 EBP=00000000 ESP=00000000
       EIP=00000000 EFL=00000002 [-------] CPL=0 II=0 A20=1 SMM=0 HLT=0
       ES =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300
       CS =9a00 0009a000 0000ffff 00009a00
       [...]
       CR0=60000010 CR2=b6f3e000 CR3=01942000 CR4=000007e0
       [...]
       EFER=0000000000000000
      
      with corresponding SVM error:
       KVM: FAILED VMRUN WITH VMCB:
       [...]
       cpl:            0                efer:         0000000000001000
       cr0:            0000000080010010 cr2:          00007fd7fe85bf90
       cr3:            0000000187d0c000 cr4:          0000000000000020
       [...]
      
      What happens is that VCPU state right after offlinig:
      CR0: 0x80050033  EFER: 0xd01  CR4: 0x7e0
        -> long mode with CR3 pointing to longmode page tables
      
      and when VCPU gets INIT/SIPI following transition happens
      CR0: 0 -> 0x60000010 EFER: 0x0  CR4: 0x7e0
        -> paging disabled with stale CR3
      
      However SVM under the hood puts VCPU in Paged Real Mode*
      which effectively translates CR0 0x60000010 -> 80010010 after
      
         svm_vcpu_reset()
             -> init_vmcb()
                 -> kvm_set_cr0()
                     -> svm_set_cr0()
      
      but from  kvm_set_cr0() perspective CR0: 0 -> 0x60000010
      only caching bits are changed and
      commit d81135a5
       ("KVM: x86: do not reset mmu if CR0.CD and CR0.NW are changed")'
      regressed svm_vcpu_reset() which relied on MMU being reset.
      
      As result VMRUN after svm_vcpu_reset() tries to run
      VCPU in Paged Real Mode with stale MMU context (longmode page tables),
      which causes some AMD CPUs** to bail out with VMEXIT_INVALID.
      
      Fix issue by unconditionally resetting MMU context
      at init_vmcb() time.
      
      	* AMD64 Architecture Programmer’s Manual,
      	    Volume 2: System Programming, rev: 3.25
      	      15.19 Paged Real Mode
      	** Opteron 1216
      Signed-off-by: NIgor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
      Fixes: d81135a5
      Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
      ebae871a