1. 15 1月, 2020 2 次提交
    • F
      ICX: PCI: Add support for Immediate Readiness · aa7729ab
      Felipe Balbi 提交于
      commit d6112f8def514e019658bcc9b57d53acdb71ca3f upstream.
      
      PCIe r4.0, sec 7.5.1.1.4 defines a new bit in the Status Register:
      
        Immediate Readiness – This optional bit, when Set, indicates the Function
        is guaranteed to be ready to successfully complete valid configuration
        accesses at any time following any reset that the host is capable of
        issuing Configuration Requests to this Function.
      
        When this bit is Set, for accesses to this Function, software is exempt
        from all requirements to delay configuration accesses following any type
        of reset, including but not limited to the timing requirements defined in
        Section 6.6.
      
      This means that all delays after a Conventional or Function Reset can be
      skipped.
      
      This patch reads such bit and caches its value in a flag inside struct
      pci_dev to be checked later if we should delay or can skip delays after a
      reset.  While at that, also move the explicit msleep(100) call from
      pcie_flr() and pci_af_flr() to pci_dev_wait().
      Signed-off-by: NFelipe Balbi <felipe.balbi@linux.intel.com>
      [bhelgaas: rename PCI_STATUS_IMMEDIATE to PCI_STATUS_IMM_READY]
      Signed-off-by: NBjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NLin Wang <lin.x.wang@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJeffle Xu <jefflexu@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      Acked-by: NCaspar Zhang <caspar@linux.alibaba.com>
      aa7729ab
    • C
      mm, memcg: throttle allocators when failing reclaim over memory.high · 6202ab24
      Chris Down 提交于
      commit 0e4b01df865935007bd712cbc8e7299005b28894 upstream.
      
      We're trying to use memory.high to limit workloads, but have found that
      containment can frequently fail completely and cause OOM situations
      outside of the cgroup.  This happens especially with swap space -- either
      when none is configured, or swap is full.  These failures often also don't
      have enough warning to allow one to react, whether for a human or for a
      daemon monitoring PSI.
      
      Here is output from a simple program showing how long it takes in usec
      (column 2) to allocate a megabyte of anonymous memory (column 1) when a
      cgroup is already beyond its memory high setting, and no swap is
      available:
      
          [root@ktst ~]# systemd-run -p MemoryHigh=100M -p MemorySwapMax=1 \
          > --wait -t timeout 300 /root/mdf
          [...]
          95  1035
          96  1038
          97  1000
          98  1036
          99  1048
          100 1590
          101 1968
          102 1776
          103 1863
          104 1757
          105 1921
          106 1893
          107 1760
          108 1748
          109 1843
          110 1716
          111 1924
          112 1776
          113 1831
          114 1766
          115 1836
          116 1588
          117 1912
          118 1802
          119 1857
          120 1731
          [...]
          [System OOM in 2-3 seconds]
      
      The delay does go up extremely marginally past the 100MB memory.high
      threshold, as now we spend time scanning before returning to usermode, but
      it's nowhere near enough to contain growth.  It also doesn't get worse the
      more pages you have, since it only considers nr_pages.
      
      The current situation goes against both the expectations of users of
      memory.high, and our intentions as cgroup v2 developers.  In
      cgroup-v2.txt, we claim that we will throttle and only under "extreme
      conditions" will memory.high protection be breached.  Likewise, cgroup v2
      users generally also expect that memory.high should throttle workloads as
      they exceed their high threshold.  However, as seen above, this isn't
      always how it works in practice -- even on banal setups like those with no
      swap, or where swap has become exhausted, we can end up with memory.high
      being breached and us having no weapons left in our arsenal to combat
      runaway growth with, since reclaim is futile.
      
      It's also hard for system monitoring software or users to tell how bad the
      situation is, as "high" events for the memcg may in some cases be benign,
      and in others be catastrophic.  The current status quo is that we fail
      containment in a way that doesn't provide any advance warning that things
      are about to go horribly wrong (for example, we are about to invoke the
      kernel OOM killer).
      
      This patch introduces explicit throttling when reclaim is failing to keep
      memcg size contained at the memory.high setting.  It does so by applying
      an exponential delay curve derived from the memcg's overage compared to
      memory.high.  In the normal case where the memcg is either below or only
      marginally over its memory.high setting, no throttling will be performed.
      
      This composes well with system health monitoring and remediation, as these
      allocator delays are factored into PSI's memory pressure calculations.
      This both creates a mechanism system administrators or applications
      consuming the PSI interface to trivially see that the memcg in question is
      struggling and use that to make more reasonable decisions, and permits
      them enough time to act.  Either of these can act with significantly more
      nuance than that we can provide using the system OOM killer.
      
      This is a similar idea to memory.oom_control in cgroup v1 which would put
      the cgroup to sleep if the threshold was violated, but it's also
      significantly improved as it results in visible memory pressure, and also
      doesn't schedule indefinitely, which previously made tracing and other
      introspection difficult (ie.  it's clamped at 2*HZ per allocation through
      MEMCG_MAX_HIGH_DELAY_JIFFIES).
      
      Contrast the previous results with a kernel with this patch:
      
          [root@ktst ~]# systemd-run -p MemoryHigh=100M -p MemorySwapMax=1 \
          > --wait -t timeout 300 /root/mdf
          [...]
          95  1002
          96  1000
          97  1002
          98  1003
          99  1000
          100 1043
          101 84724
          102 330628
          103 610511
          104 1016265
          105 1503969
          106 2391692
          107 2872061
          108 3248003
          109 4791904
          110 5759832
          111 6912509
          112 8127818
          113 9472203
          114 12287622
          115 12480079
          116 14144008
          117 15808029
          118 16384500
          119 16383242
          120 16384979
          [...]
      
      As you can see, in the normal case, memory allocation takes around 1000
      usec.  However, as we exceed our memory.high, things start to increase
      exponentially, but fairly leniently at first.  Our first megabyte over
      memory.high takes us 0.16 seconds, then the next is 0.46 seconds, then the
      next is almost an entire second.  This gets worse until we reach our
      eventual 2*HZ clamp per batch, resulting in 16 seconds per megabyte.
      However, this is still making forward progress, so permits tracing or
      further analysis with programs like GDB.
      
      We use an exponential curve for our delay penalty for a few reasons:
      
      1. We run mem_cgroup_handle_over_high to potentially do reclaim after
         we've already performed allocations, which means that temporarily
         going over memory.high by a small amount may be perfectly legitimate,
         even for compliant workloads. We don't want to unduly penalise such
         cases.
      2. An exponential curve (as opposed to a static or linear delay) allows
         ramping up memory pressure stats more gradually, which can be useful
         to work out that you have set memory.high too low, without destroying
         application performance entirely.
      
      This patch expands on earlier work by Johannes Weiner. Thanks!
      
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix max() warning]
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix __udivdi3 ref on 32-bit]
      [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix it even more]
      [chris@chrisdown.name: fix 64-bit divide even more]
      Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190723180700.GA29459@chrisdown.nameSigned-off-by: NChris Down <chris@chrisdown.name>
      Acked-by: NJohannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
      Cc: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
      Cc: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
      Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org>
      Cc: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NXu Yu <xuyu@linux.alibaba.com>
      Reviewed-by: NXunlei Pang <xlpang@linux.alibaba.com>
      Reviewed-by: NYang Shi <yang.shi@linux.alibaba.com>
      6202ab24
  2. 02 1月, 2020 10 次提交
  3. 27 12月, 2019 28 次提交