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  1. 07 11月, 2019 3 次提交
    • T
      blkcg: add tools/cgroup/iocost_coef_gen.py · 2868b62d
      由 Tejun Heo 提交于 
      commit 8504dea783b044cab620acbaef87b86ee84646fe upstream.

Add a script which can be used to generate device-specific iocost
linear model coefficients.
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: NJiufei Xue <jiufei.xue@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      2868b62d
    • T
      blkcg: implement blk-iocost · abd942b2
      由 Tejun Heo 提交于 
      commit 7caa47151ab2e644dd221f741ec7578d9532c9a3 upstream.

This patchset implements IO cost model based work-conserving
proportional controller.

While io.latency provides the capability to comprehensively prioritize
and protect IOs depending on the cgroups, its protection is binary -
the lowest latency target cgroup which is suffering is protected at
the cost of all others.  In many use cases including stacking multiple
workload containers in a single system, it's necessary to distribute
IO capacity with better granularity.

One challenge of controlling IO resources is the lack of trivially
observable cost metric.  The most common metrics - bandwidth and iops
- can be off by orders of magnitude depending on the device type and
IO pattern.  However, the cost isn't a complete mystery.  Given
several key attributes, we can make fairly reliable predictions on how
expensive a given stream of IOs would be, at least compared to other
IO patterns.

The function which determines the cost of a given IO is the IO cost
model for the device.  This controller distributes IO capacity based
on the costs estimated by such model.  The more accurate the cost
model the better but the controller adapts based on IO completion
latency and as long as the relative costs across differents IO
patterns are consistent and sensible, it'll adapt to the actual
performance of the device.

Currently, the only implemented cost model is a simple linear one with
a few sets of default parameters for different classes of device.
This covers most common devices reasonably well.  All the
infrastructure to tune and add different cost models is already in
place and a later patch will also allow using bpf progs for cost
models.

Please see the top comment in blk-iocost.c and documentation for
more details.

v2: Rebased on top of RQ_ALLOC_TIME changes and folded in Rik's fix
    for a divide-by-zero bug in current_hweight() triggered by zero
    inuse_sum.
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Newell <newella@fb.com>
Cc: Josef Bacik <jbacik@fb.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com>
Signed-off-by: NJens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
[Joseph: fix confilcts with ioc_rqos_throttle()]
Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: NJiufei Xue <jiufei.xue@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      abd942b2
    • T
      cgroup: add cgroup_parse_float() · cb2f6e75
      由 Tejun Heo 提交于 
      commit a5e112e6424adb77d953eac20e6936b952fd6b32 upstream.

cgroup already uses floating point for percent[ile] numbers and there
are several controllers which want to take them as input.  Add a
generic parse helper to handle inputs.

Update the interface convention documentation about the use of
percentage numbers.  While at it, also clarify the default time unit.
Signed-off-by: NTejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: NJiufei Xue <jiufei.xue@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: NJoseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
      cb2f6e75
  3. 01 11月, 2019 1 次提交
    • D
      sched/fair: Fix low cpu usage with high throttling by removing expiration of cpu-local slices · 192fa322
      由 Dave Chiluk 提交于 
      commit de53fd7aedb100f03e5d2231cfce0e4993282425 upstream.

It has been observed, that highly-threaded, non-cpu-bound applications
running under cpu.cfs_quota_us constraints can hit a high percentage of
periods throttled while simultaneously not consuming the allocated
amount of quota. This use case is typical of user-interactive non-cpu
bound applications, such as those running in kubernetes or mesos when
run on multiple cpu cores.

This has been root caused to cpu-local run queue being allocated per cpu
bandwidth slices, and then not fully using that slice within the period.
At which point the slice and quota expires. This expiration of unused
slice results in applications not being able to utilize the quota for
which they are allocated.

The non-expiration of per-cpu slices was recently fixed by
'commit 512ac999 ("sched/fair: Fix bandwidth timer clock drift
condition")'. Prior to that it appears that this had been broken since
at least 'commit 51f2176d ("sched/fair: Fix unlocked reads of some
cfs_b->quota/period")' which was introduced in v3.16-rc1 in 2014. That
added the following conditional which resulted in slices never being
expired.

if (cfs_rq->runtime_expires != cfs_b->runtime_expires) {
        /* extend local deadline, drift is bounded above by 2 ticks */
        cfs_rq->runtime_expires += TICK_NSEC;

Because this was broken for nearly 5 years, and has recently been fixed
and is now being noticed by many users running kubernetes
(https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/67577) it is my opinion
that the mechanisms around expiring runtime should be removed
altogether.

This allows quota already allocated to per-cpu run-queues to live longer
than the period boundary. This allows threads on runqueues that do not
use much CPU to continue to use their remaining slice over a longer
period of time than cpu.cfs_period_us. However, this helps prevent the
above condition of hitting throttling while also not fully utilizing
your cpu quota.

This theoretically allows a machine to use slightly more than its
allotted quota in some periods. This overflow would be bounded by the
remaining quota left on each per-cpu runqueueu. This is typically no
more than min_cfs_rq_runtime=1ms per cpu. For CPU bound tasks this will
change nothing, as they should theoretically fully utilize all of their
quota in each period. For user-interactive tasks as described above this
provides a much better user/application experience as their cpu
utilization will more closely match the amount they requested when they
hit throttling. This means that cpu limits no longer strictly apply per
period for non-cpu bound applications, but that they are still accurate
over longer timeframes.

This greatly improves performance of high-thread-count, non-cpu bound
applications with low cfs_quota_us allocation on high-core-count
machines. In the case of an artificial testcase (10ms/100ms of quota on
80 CPU machine), this commit resulted in almost 30x performance
improvement, while still maintaining correct cpu quota restrictions.
That testcase is available at https://github.com/indeedeng/fibtest.

Fixes: 512ac999 ("sched/fair: Fix bandwidth timer clock drift condition")
Signed-off-by: NDave Chiluk <chiluk+linux@indeed.com>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Reviewed-by: NPhil Auld <pauld@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NBen Segall <bsegall@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: John Hammond <jhammond@indeed.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Kyle Anderson <kwa@yelp.com>
Cc: Gabriel Munos <gmunoz@netflix.com>
Cc: Peter Oskolkov <posk@posk.io>
Cc: Cong Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
Cc: Brendan Gregg <bgregg@netflix.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1563900266-19734-2-git-send-email-chiluk+linux@indeed.comSigned-off-by: NShanpei Chen <shanpeic@linux.alibaba.com>
Acked-by: NMichael Wang <yun.wang@linux.alibaba.com>
      192fa322
  5. 30 10月, 2019 9 次提交
  7. 18 10月, 2019 1 次提交
  9. 12 10月, 2019 3 次提交
  11. 21 9月, 2019 1 次提交
  13. 16 9月, 2019 5 次提交
  15. 29 8月, 2019 1 次提交
    • T
      x86/CPU/AMD: Clear RDRAND CPUID bit on AMD family 15h/16h · e063b03b
      由 Tom Lendacky 提交于 
      commit c49a0a80137c7ca7d6ced4c812c9e07a949f6f24 upstream.

There have been reports of RDRAND issues after resuming from suspend on
some AMD family 15h and family 16h systems. This issue stems from a BIOS
not performing the proper steps during resume to ensure RDRAND continues
to function properly.

RDRAND support is indicated by CPUID Fn00000001_ECX[30]. This bit can be
reset by clearing MSR C001_1004[62]. Any software that checks for RDRAND
support using CPUID, including the kernel, will believe that RDRAND is
not supported.

Update the CPU initialization to clear the RDRAND CPUID bit for any family
15h and 16h processor that supports RDRAND. If it is known that the family
15h or family 16h system does not have an RDRAND resume issue or that the
system will not be placed in suspend, the "rdrand=force" kernel parameter
can be used to stop the clearing of the RDRAND CPUID bit.

Additionally, update the suspend and resume path to save and restore the
MSR C001_1004 value to ensure that the RDRAND CPUID setting remains in
place after resuming from suspend.

Note, that clearing the RDRAND CPUID bit does not prevent a processor
that normally supports the RDRAND instruction from executing it. So any
code that determined the support based on family and model won't #UD.
Signed-off-by: NTom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: NBorislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Chen Yu <yu.c.chen@intel.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: "linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "linux-pm@vger.kernel.org" <linux-pm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: "x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/7543af91666f491547bd86cebb1e17c66824ab9f.1566229943.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.comSigned-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      e063b03b
  17. 07 8月, 2019 2 次提交
    • J
      Documentation: Add swapgs description to the Spectre v1 documentation · 7634b9cd
      由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于 
      commit 4c92057661a3412f547ede95715641d7ee16ddac upstream

Add documentation to the Spectre document about the new swapgs variant of
Spectre v1.
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      7634b9cd
    • J
      x86/speculation: Enable Spectre v1 swapgs mitigations · 23e7a7b3
      由 Josh Poimboeuf 提交于 
      commit a2059825986a1c8143fd6698774fa9d83733bb11 upstream

The previous commit added macro calls in the entry code which mitigate the
Spectre v1 swapgs issue if the X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_* features are
enabled.  Enable those features where applicable.

The mitigations may be disabled with "nospectre_v1" or "mitigations=off".

There are different features which can affect the risk of attack:

- When FSGSBASE is enabled, unprivileged users are able to place any
  value in GS, using the wrgsbase instruction.  This means they can
  write a GS value which points to any value in kernel space, which can
  be useful with the following gadget in an interrupt/exception/NMI
  handler:

	if (coming from user space)
		swapgs
	mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg1
	// dependent load or store based on the value of %reg
	// for example: mov %(reg1), %reg2

  If an interrupt is coming from user space, and the entry code
  speculatively skips the swapgs (due to user branch mistraining), it
  may speculatively execute the GS-based load and a subsequent dependent
  load or store, exposing the kernel data to an L1 side channel leak.

  Note that, on Intel, a similar attack exists in the above gadget when
  coming from kernel space, if the swapgs gets speculatively executed to
  switch back to the user GS.  On AMD, this variant isn't possible
  because swapgs is serializing with respect to future GS-based
  accesses.

  NOTE: The FSGSBASE patch set hasn't been merged yet, so the above case
	doesn't exist quite yet.

- When FSGSBASE is disabled, the issue is mitigated somewhat because
  unprivileged users must use prctl(ARCH_SET_GS) to set GS, which
  restricts GS values to user space addresses only.  That means the
  gadget would need an additional step, since the target kernel address
  needs to be read from user space first.  Something like:

	if (coming from user space)
		swapgs
	mov %gs:<percpu_offset>, %reg1
	mov (%reg1), %reg2
	// dependent load or store based on the value of %reg2
	// for example: mov %(reg2), %reg3

  It's difficult to audit for this gadget in all the handlers, so while
  there are no known instances of it, it's entirely possible that it
  exists somewhere (or could be introduced in the future).  Without
  tooling to analyze all such code paths, consider it vulnerable.

  Effects of SMAP on the !FSGSBASE case:

  - If SMAP is enabled, and the CPU reports RDCL_NO (i.e., not
    susceptible to Meltdown), the kernel is prevented from speculatively
    reading user space memory, even L1 cached values.  This effectively
    disables the !FSGSBASE attack vector.

  - If SMAP is enabled, but the CPU *is* susceptible to Meltdown, SMAP
    still prevents the kernel from speculatively reading user space
    memory.  But it does *not* prevent the kernel from reading the
    user value from L1, if it has already been cached.  This is probably
    only a small hurdle for an attacker to overcome.

Thanks to Dave Hansen for contributing the speculative_smap() function.

Thanks to Andrew Cooper for providing the inside scoop on whether swapgs
is serializing on AMD.

[ tglx: Fixed the USER fence decision and polished the comment as suggested
  	by Dave Hansen ]
Signed-off-by: NJosh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: NDave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      23e7a7b3
  19. 26 7月, 2019 3 次提交
    • J
      dt-bindings: allow up to four clocks for orion-mdio · 404f59e2
      由 Josua Mayer 提交于 
      commit 80785f5a22e9073e2ded5958feb7f220e066d17b upstream.

Armada 8040 needs four clocks to be enabled for MDIO accesses to work.
Update the binding to allow the extra clock to be specified.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 6d6a331f ("dt-bindings: allow up to three clocks for orion-mdio")
Reviewed-by: NAndrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>
Signed-off-by: NJosua Mayer <josua@solid-run.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      404f59e2
    • P
      x86/atomic: Fix smp_mb__{before,after}_atomic() · 9e0bcb59
      由 Peter Zijlstra 提交于 
      [ Upstream commit 69d927bba39517d0980462efc051875b7f4db185 ]

Recent probing at the Linux Kernel Memory Model uncovered a
'surprise'. Strongly ordered architectures where the atomic RmW
primitive implies full memory ordering and
smp_mb__{before,after}_atomic() are a simple barrier() (such as x86)
fail for:

	*x = 1;
	atomic_inc(u);
	smp_mb__after_atomic();
	r0 = *y;

Because, while the atomic_inc() implies memory order, it
(surprisingly) does not provide a compiler barrier. This then allows
the compiler to re-order like so:

	atomic_inc(u);
	*x = 1;
	smp_mb__after_atomic();
	r0 = *y;

Which the CPU is then allowed to re-order (under TSO rules) like:

	atomic_inc(u);
	r0 = *y;
	*x = 1;

And this very much was not intended. Therefore strengthen the atomic
RmW ops to include a compiler barrier.

NOTE: atomic_{or,and,xor} and the bitops already had the compiler
barrier.
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
      9e0bcb59
    • Q
      sched/fair: Fix "runnable_avg_yN_inv" not used warnings · 7fc96cd2
      由 Qian Cai 提交于 
      [ Upstream commit 509466b7d480bc5d22e90b9fbe6122ae0e2fbe39 ]

runnable_avg_yN_inv[] is only used in kernel/sched/pelt.c but was
included in several other places because they need other macros all
came from kernel/sched/sched-pelt.h which was generated by
Documentation/scheduler/sched-pelt. As the result, it causes compilation
a lot of warnings,

  kernel/sched/sched-pelt.h:4:18: warning: 'runnable_avg_yN_inv' defined but not used [-Wunused-const-variable=]
  kernel/sched/sched-pelt.h:4:18: warning: 'runnable_avg_yN_inv' defined but not used [-Wunused-const-variable=]
  kernel/sched/sched-pelt.h:4:18: warning: 'runnable_avg_yN_inv' defined but not used [-Wunused-const-variable=]
  ...

Silence it by appending the __maybe_unused attribute for it, so all
generated variables and macros can still be kept in the same file.
Signed-off-by: NQian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1559596304-31581-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pwSigned-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NSasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
      7fc96cd2
  21. 14 7月, 2019 4 次提交
  23. 03 7月, 2019 1 次提交
  25. 18 6月, 2019 1 次提交
    • E
      tcp: add tcp_min_snd_mss sysctl · 7f9f8a37
      由 Eric Dumazet 提交于 
      commit 5f3e2bf008c2221478101ee72f5cb4654b9fc363 upstream.

Some TCP peers announce a very small MSS option in their SYN and/or
SYN/ACK messages.

This forces the stack to send packets with a very high network/cpu
overhead.

Linux has enforced a minimal value of 48. Since this value includes
the size of TCP options, and that the options can consume up to 40
bytes, this means that each segment can include only 8 bytes of payload.

In some cases, it can be useful to increase the minimal value
to a saner value.

We still let the default to 48 (TCP_MIN_SND_MSS), for compatibility
reasons.

Note that TCP_MAXSEG socket option enforces a minimal value
of (TCP_MIN_MSS). David Miller increased this minimal value
in commit c39508d6 ("tcp: Make TCP_MAXSEG minimum more correct.")
from 64 to 88.

We might in the future merge TCP_MIN_SND_MSS and TCP_MIN_MSS.

CVE-2019-11479 -- tcp mss hardcoded to 48
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Suggested-by: NJonathan Looney <jtl@netflix.com>
Acked-by: NNeal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>
Cc: Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>
Cc: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Cc: Bruce Curtis <brucec@netflix.com>
Cc: Jonathan Lemon <jonathan.lemon@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      7f9f8a37
  27. 09 6月, 2019 3 次提交
  29. 31 5月, 2019 2 次提交
    • W
      arm64: errata: Add workaround for Cortex-A76 erratum #1463225 · 2eefb4a3
      由 Will Deacon 提交于 
      commit 969f5ea627570e91c9d54403287ee3ed657f58fe upstream.

Revisions of the Cortex-A76 CPU prior to r4p0 are affected by an erratum
that can prevent interrupts from being taken when single-stepping.

This patch implements a software workaround to prevent userspace from
effectively being able to disable interrupts.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NWill Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      2eefb4a3
    • D
      bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations · 43caa29c
      由 Daniel Borkmann 提交于 
      commit ede95a63b5e84ddeea6b0c473b36ab8bfd8c6ce3 upstream.

Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module
space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later
attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for
example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then
before commit 290af866 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case
where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort
with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out.

Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case
of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached
or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter
was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can
be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit
is reached.

Fixes: 290af866 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config")
Fixes: 0a14842f ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64")
Co-Developed-by: NRick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
      43caa29c