bpf: add bpf_jit_limit knob to restrict unpriv allocations
commit ede95a63b5e84ddeea6b0c473b36ab8bfd8c6ce3 upstream. Rick reported that the BPF JIT could potentially fill the entire module space with BPF programs from unprivileged users which would prevent later attempts to load normal kernel modules or privileged BPF programs, for example. If JIT was enabled but unsuccessful to generate the image, then before commit 290af866 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") we would always fall back to the BPF interpreter. Nowadays in the case where the CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON could be set, then the load will abort with a failure since the BPF interpreter was compiled out. Add a global limit and enforce it for unprivileged users such that in case of BPF interpreter compiled out we fail once the limit has been reached or we fall back to BPF interpreter earlier w/o using module mem if latter was compiled in. In a next step, fair share among unprivileged users can be resolved in particular for the case where we would fail hard once limit is reached. Fixes: 290af866 ("bpf: introduce BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON config") Fixes: 0a14842f ("net: filter: Just In Time compiler for x86-64") Co-Developed-by: NRick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com> Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> Acked-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org> Cc: Ben Hutchings <ben.hutchings@codethink.co.uk> Signed-off-by: NGreg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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