The in-kernel XICS emulation is faster than doing it all in QEMU
and it has got a lot of testing, so enable it by default.
Signed-off-by: NAnton Blanchard <anton@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>

Currently the H_CONFER hcall is implemented in kernel virtual mode,
meaning that whenever a guest thread does an H_CONFER, all the threads
in that virtual core have to exit the guest.  This is bad for
performance because it interrupts the other threads even if they
are doing useful work.

The H_CONFER hcall is called by a guest VCPU when it is spinning on a
spinlock and it detects that the spinlock is held by a guest VCPU that
is currently not running on a physical CPU.  The idea is to give this
VCPU's time slice to the holder VCPU so that it can make progress
towards releasing the lock.

To avoid having the other threads exit the guest unnecessarily,
we add a real-mode implementation of H_CONFER that checks whether
the other threads are doing anything.  If all the other threads
are idle (i.e. in H_CEDE) or trying to confer (i.e. in H_CONFER),
it returns H_TOO_HARD which causes a guest exit and allows the
H_CONFER to be handled in virtual mode.

Otherwise it spins for a short time (up to 10 microseconds) to give
other threads the chance to observe that this thread is trying to
confer.  The spin loop also terminates when any thread exits the guest
or when all other threads are idle or trying to confer.  If the
timeout is reached, the H_CONFER returns H_SUCCESS.  In this case the
guest VCPU will recheck the spinlock word and most likely call
H_CONFER again.

This also improves the implementation of the H_CONFER virtual mode
handler.  If the VCPU is part of a virtual core (vcore) which is
runnable, there will be a 'runner' VCPU which has taken responsibility
for running the vcore.  In this case we yield to the runner VCPU
rather than the target VCPU.

We also introduce a check on the target VCPU's yield count: if it
differs from the yield count passed to H_CONFER, the target VCPU
has run since H_CONFER was called and may have already released
the lock.  This check is required by PAPR.
Signed-off-by: NSam Bobroff <sam.bobroff@au1.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>

There are two ways in which a guest instruction can be obtained from
the guest in the guest exit code in book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S.  If the
exit was caused by a Hypervisor Emulation interrupt (i.e. an illegal
instruction), the offending instruction is in the HEIR register
(Hypervisor Emulation Instruction Register).  If the exit was caused
by a load or store to an emulated MMIO device, we load the instruction
from the guest by turning data relocation on and loading the instruction
with an lwz instruction.

Unfortunately, in the case where the guest has opposite endianness to
the host, these two methods give results of different endianness, but
both get put into vcpu->arch.last_inst.  The HEIR value has been loaded
using guest endianness, whereas the lwz will load the instruction using
host endianness.  The rest of the code that uses vcpu->arch.last_inst
assumes it was loaded using host endianness.

To fix this, we define a new vcpu field to store the HEIR value.  Then,
in kvmppc_handle_exit_hv(), we transfer the value from this new field to
vcpu->arch.last_inst, doing a byte-swap if the guest and host endianness
differ.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>

This removes the code that was added to enable HV KVM to work
on PPC970 processors.  The PPC970 is an old CPU that doesn't
support virtualizing guest memory.  Removing PPC970 support also
lets us remove the code for allocating and managing contiguous
real-mode areas, the code for the !kvm->arch.using_mmu_notifiers
case, the code for pinning pages of guest memory when first
accessed and keeping track of which pages have been pinned, and
the code for handling H_ENTER hypercalls in virtual mode.

Book3S HV KVM is now supported only on POWER7 and POWER8 processors.
The KVM_CAP_PPC_RMA capability now always returns 0.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>

This patch adds trace points in the guest entry and exit code and also
for exceptions handled by the host in kernel mode - hypercalls and page
faults. The new events are added to /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events
under a new subsystem called kvm_hv.
Acked-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NSuresh Warrier <warrier@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>

Currently the calculations of stolen time for PPC Book3S HV guests
uses fields in both the vcpu struct and the kvmppc_vcore struct.  The
fields in the kvmppc_vcore struct are protected by the
vcpu->arch.tbacct_lock of the vcpu that has taken responsibility for
running the virtual core.  This works correctly but confuses lockdep,
because it sees that the code takes the tbacct_lock for a vcpu in
kvmppc_remove_runnable() and then takes another vcpu's tbacct_lock in
vcore_stolen_time(), and it thinks there is a possibility of deadlock,
causing it to print reports like this:

=============================================
[ INFO: possible recursive locking detected ]
3.18.0-rc7-kvm-00016-g8db4bc6 #89 Not tainted
---------------------------------------------
qemu-system-ppc/6188 is trying to acquire lock:
 (&(&vcpu->arch.tbacct_lock)->rlock){......}, at: [<d00000000ecb1fe8>] .vcore_stolen_time+0x48/0xd0 [kvm_hv]

but task is already holding lock:
 (&(&vcpu->arch.tbacct_lock)->rlock){......}, at: [<d00000000ecb25a0>] .kvmppc_remove_runnable.part.3+0x30/0xd0 [kvm_hv]

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&(&vcpu->arch.tbacct_lock)->rlock);
  lock(&(&vcpu->arch.tbacct_lock)->rlock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

3 locks held by qemu-system-ppc/6188:
 #0:  (&vcpu->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<d00000000eb93f98>] .vcpu_load+0x28/0xe0 [kvm]
 #1:  (&(&vcore->lock)->rlock){+.+...}, at: [<d00000000ecb41b0>] .kvmppc_vcpu_run_hv+0x530/0x1530 [kvm_hv]
 #2:  (&(&vcpu->arch.tbacct_lock)->rlock){......}, at: [<d00000000ecb25a0>] .kvmppc_remove_runnable.part.3+0x30/0xd0 [kvm_hv]

stack backtrace:
CPU: 40 PID: 6188 Comm: qemu-system-ppc Not tainted 3.18.0-rc7-kvm-00016-g8db4bc6 #89
Call Trace:
[c000000b2754f3f0] [c000000000b31b6c] .dump_stack+0x88/0xb4 (unreliable)
[c000000b2754f470] [c0000000000faeb8] .__lock_acquire+0x1878/0x2190
[c000000b2754f600] [c0000000000fbf0c] .lock_acquire+0xcc/0x1a0
[c000000b2754f6d0] [c000000000b2954c] ._raw_spin_lock_irq+0x4c/0x70
[c000000b2754f760] [d00000000ecb1fe8] .vcore_stolen_time+0x48/0xd0 [kvm_hv]
[c000000b2754f7f0] [d00000000ecb25b4] .kvmppc_remove_runnable.part.3+0x44/0xd0 [kvm_hv]
[c000000b2754f880] [d00000000ecb43ec] .kvmppc_vcpu_run_hv+0x76c/0x1530 [kvm_hv]
[c000000b2754f9f0] [d00000000eb9f46c] .kvmppc_vcpu_run+0x2c/0x40 [kvm]
[c000000b2754fa60] [d00000000eb9c9a4] .kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x54/0x160 [kvm]
[c000000b2754faf0] [d00000000eb94538] .kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x498/0x760 [kvm]
[c000000b2754fcb0] [c000000000267eb4] .do_vfs_ioctl+0x444/0x770
[c000000b2754fd90] [c0000000002682a4] .SyS_ioctl+0xc4/0xe0
[c000000b2754fe30] [c0000000000092e4] syscall_exit+0x0/0x98

In order to make the locking easier to analyse, we change the code to
use a spinlock in the kvmppc_vcore struct to protect the stolen_tb and
preempt_tb fields.  This lock needs to be an irq-safe lock since it is
used in the kvmppc_core_vcpu_load_hv() and kvmppc_core_vcpu_put_hv()
functions, which are called with the scheduler rq lock held, which is
an irq-safe lock.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>

Remove the function inst_set_field() that is not used anywhere.

This was partially found by using a static code analysis program called cppcheck.
Signed-off-by: NRickard Strandqvist <rickard_strandqvist@spectrumdigital.se>
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>

Remove the function get_fpr_index() that is not used anywhere.

This was partially found by using a static code analysis program called cppcheck.
Signed-off-by: NRickard Strandqvist <rickard_strandqvist@spectrumdigital.se>
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>

Removes some functions that are not used anywhere:
kvmppc_core_load_guest_debugstate() kvmppc_core_load_host_debugstate()

This was partially found by using a static code analysis program called cppcheck.
Signed-off-by: NRickard Strandqvist <rickard_strandqvist@spectrumdigital.se>
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>

Remove the function sr_nx() that is not used anywhere.

This was partially found by using a static code analysis program called cppcheck.
Signed-off-by: NRickard Strandqvist <rickard_strandqvist@spectrumdigital.se>
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>

The kvmppc_vcore_blocked() code does not check for the wait condition
after putting the process on the wait queue. This means that it is
possible for an external interrupt to become pending, but the vcpu to
remain asleep until the next decrementer interrupt.  The fix is to
make one last check for pending exceptions and ceded state before
calling schedule().
Signed-off-by: NSuresh Warrier <warrier@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>

When being restored from qemu, the kvm_get_htab_header are in native
endian, but the ptes are big endian.

This patch fixes restore on a KVM LE host. Qemu also needs a fix for
this :

     http://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/qemu-ppc/2014-11/msg00008.htmlSigned-off-by: NCédric Le Goater <clg@fr.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>

This fixes some inaccuracies in the state machine for the virtualized
ICP when implementing the H_IPI hcall (Set_MFFR and related states):

1. The old code wipes out any pending interrupts when the new MFRR is
   more favored than the CPPR but less favored than a pending
   interrupt (by always modifying xisr and the pending_pri). This can
   cause us to lose a pending external interrupt.

   The correct code here is to only modify the pending_pri and xisr in
   the ICP if the MFRR is equal to or more favored than the current
   pending pri (since in this case, it is guaranteed that that there
   cannot be a pending external interrupt). The code changes are
   required in both kvmppc_rm_h_ipi and kvmppc_h_ipi.

2. Again, in both kvmppc_rm_h_ipi and kvmppc_h_ipi, there is a check
   for whether MFRR is being made less favored AND further if new MFFR
   is also less favored than the current CPPR, we check for any
   resends pending in the ICP. These checks look like they are
   designed to cover the case where if the MFRR is being made less
   favored, we opportunistically trigger a resend of any interrupts
   that had been previously rejected. Although, this is not a state
   described by PAPR, this is an action we actually need to do
   especially if the CPPR is already at 0xFF.  Because in this case,
   the resend bit will stay on until another ICP state change which
   may be a long time coming and the interrupt stays pending until
   then. The current code which checks for MFRR < CPPR is broken when
   CPPR is 0xFF since it will not get triggered in that case.

   Ideally, we would want to do a resend only if

   	prio(pending_interrupt) < mfrr && prio(pending_interrupt) < cppr

   where pending interrupt is the one that was rejected. But we don't
   have the priority of the pending interrupt state saved, so we
   simply trigger a resend whenever the MFRR is made less favored.

3. In kvmppc_rm_h_ipi, where we save state to pass resends to the
   virtual mode, we also need to save the ICP whose need_resend we
   reset since this does not need to be my ICP (vcpu->arch.icp) as is
   incorrectly assumed by the current code. A new field rm_resend_icp
   is added to the kvmppc_icp structure for this purpose.
Signed-off-by: NSuresh Warrier <warrier@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>

Testing with KSM active in the host showed occasional corruption of
guest memory.  Typically a page that should have contained zeroes
would contain values that look like the contents of a user process
stack (values such as 0x0000_3fff_xxxx_xxx).

Code inspection in kvmppc_h_protect revealed that there was a race
condition with the possibility of granting write access to a page
which is read-only in the host page tables.  The code attempts to keep
the host mapping read-only if the host userspace PTE is read-only, but
if that PTE had been temporarily made invalid for any reason, the
read-only check would not trigger and the host HPTE could end up
read-write.  Examination of the guest HPT in the failure situation
revealed that there were indeed shared pages which should have been
read-only that were mapped read-write.

To close this race, we don't let a page go from being read-only to
being read-write, as far as the real HPTE mapping the page is
concerned (the guest view can go to read-write, but the actual mapping
stays read-only).  When the guest tries to write to the page, we take
an HDSI and let kvmppc_book3s_hv_page_fault take care of providing a
writable HPTE for the page.

This eliminates the occasional corruption of shared pages
that was previously seen with KSM active.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>

When we get an HMI (hypervisor maintenance interrupt) while in a
guest, we see that guest enters into paused state.  The reason is, in
kvmppc_handle_exit_hv it falls through default path and returns to
host instead of resuming guest.  This causes guest to enter into
paused state.  HMI is a hypervisor only interrupt and it is safe to
resume the guest since the host has handled it already.  This patch
adds a switch case to resume the guest.

Without this patch we see guest entering into paused state with following
console messages:

[ 3003.329351] Severe Hypervisor Maintenance interrupt [Recovered]
[ 3003.329356]  Error detail: Timer facility experienced an error
[ 3003.329359] 	HMER: 0840000000000000
[ 3003.329360] 	TFMR: 4a12000980a84000
[ 3003.329366] vcpu c0000007c35094c0 (40):
[ 3003.329368] pc  = c0000000000c2ba0  msr = 8000000000009032  trap = e60
[ 3003.329370] r 0 = c00000000021ddc0  r16 = 0000000000000046
[ 3003.329372] r 1 = c00000007a02bbd0  r17 = 00003ffff27d5d98
[ 3003.329375] r 2 = c0000000010980b8  r18 = 00001fffffc9a0b0
[ 3003.329377] r 3 = c00000000142d6b8  r19 = c00000000142d6b8
[ 3003.329379] r 4 = 0000000000000002  r20 = 0000000000000000
[ 3003.329381] r 5 = c00000000524a110  r21 = 0000000000000000
[ 3003.329383] r 6 = 0000000000000001  r22 = 0000000000000000
[ 3003.329386] r 7 = 0000000000000000  r23 = c00000000524a110
[ 3003.329388] r 8 = 0000000000000000  r24 = 0000000000000001
[ 3003.329391] r 9 = 0000000000000001  r25 = c00000007c31da38
[ 3003.329393] r10 = c0000000014280b8  r26 = 0000000000000002
[ 3003.329395] r11 = 746f6f6c2f68656c  r27 = c00000000524a110
[ 3003.329397] r12 = 0000000028004484  r28 = c00000007c31da38
[ 3003.329399] r13 = c00000000fe01400  r29 = 0000000000000002
[ 3003.329401] r14 = 0000000000000046  r30 = c000000003011e00
[ 3003.329403] r15 = ffffffffffffffba  r31 = 0000000000000002
[ 3003.329404] ctr = c00000000041a670  lr  = c000000000272520
[ 3003.329405] srr0 = c00000000007e8d8 srr1 = 9000000000001002
[ 3003.329406] sprg0 = 0000000000000000 sprg1 = c00000000fe01400
[ 3003.329407] sprg2 = c00000000fe01400 sprg3 = 0000000000000005
[ 3003.329408] cr = 48004482  xer = 2000000000000000  dsisr = 42000000
[ 3003.329409] dar = 0000010015020048
[ 3003.329410] fault dar = 0000010015020048 dsisr = 42000000
[ 3003.329411] SLB (8 entries):
[ 3003.329412]   ESID = c000000008000000 VSID = 40016e7779000510
[ 3003.329413]   ESID = d000000008000001 VSID = 400142add1000510
[ 3003.329414]   ESID = f000000008000004 VSID = 4000eb1a81000510
[ 3003.329415]   ESID = 00001f000800000b VSID = 40004fda0a000d90
[ 3003.329416]   ESID = 00003f000800000c VSID = 400039f536000d90
[ 3003.329417]   ESID = 000000001800000d VSID = 0001251b35150d90
[ 3003.329417]   ESID = 000001000800000e VSID = 4001e46090000d90
[ 3003.329418]   ESID = d000080008000019 VSID = 40013d349c000400
[ 3003.329419] lpcr = c048800001847001 sdr1 = 0000001b19000006 last_inst = ffffffff
[ 3003.329421] trap=0xe60 | pc=0xc0000000000c2ba0 | msr=0x8000000000009032
[ 3003.329524] Severe Hypervisor Maintenance interrupt [Recovered]
[ 3003.329526]  Error detail: Timer facility experienced an error
[ 3003.329527] 	HMER: 0840000000000000
[ 3003.329527] 	TFMR: 4a12000980a94000
[ 3006.359786] Severe Hypervisor Maintenance interrupt [Recovered]
[ 3006.359792]  Error detail: Timer facility experienced an error
[ 3006.359795] 	HMER: 0840000000000000
[ 3006.359797] 	TFMR: 4a12000980a84000

 Id    Name                           State
----------------------------------------------------
 2     guest2                         running
 3     guest3                         paused
 4     guest4                         running
Signed-off-by: NMahesh Salgaonkar <mahesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>

The B (segment size) field in the RB operand for the tlbie
instruction is two bits, which we get from the top two bits of
the first doubleword of the HPT entry to be invalidated.  These
bits go in bits 8 and 9 of the RB operand (bits 54 and 55 in IBM
bit numbering).

The compute_tlbie_rb() function gets these bits as v >> (62 - 8),
which is not correct as it will bring in the top 10 bits, not
just the top two.  These extra bits could corrupt the AP, AVAL
and L fields in the RB value.  To fix this we shift right 62 bits
and then shift left 8 bits, so we only get the two bits of the
B field.

The first doubleword of the HPT entry is under the control of the
guest kernel.  In fact, Linux guests will always put zeroes in bits
54 -- 61 (IBM bits 2 -- 9), but we should not rely on guests doing
this.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: NAneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>

In kvm_test_clear_dirty(), if we find an invalid HPTE we move on to the
next HPTE without unlocking the invalid one.  In fact we should never
find an invalid and unlocked HPTE in the rmap chain, but for robustness
we should unlock it.  This adds the missing unlock.
Reported-by: NBenjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: NAneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>

When injecting an IRQ, we only document which IRQ priority (which translates
to IRQ type) gets injected. However, when reading traces you don't necessarily
have all the numbers in your head to know which IRQ really is meant.

This patch converts the IRQ number field to a symbolic name that is in sync
with the respective define. That way it's a lot easier for readers to figure
out what interrupt gets injected.
Signed-off-by: NAlexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>

We reused host EBX and ECX, but KVM might not support all features;
emulated XSAVE size should be smaller.

EBX depends on unknown XCR0, so we default to ECX.

SDM CPUID (EAX = 0DH, ECX = 0):
 EBX Bits 31-00: Maximum size (bytes, from the beginning of the
     XSAVE/XRSTOR save area) required by enabled features in XCR0. May
     be different than ECX if some features at the end of the XSAVE save
     area are not enabled.

 ECX Bit 31-00: Maximum size (bytes, from the beginning of the
     XSAVE/XRSTOR save area) of the XSAVE/XRSTOR save area required by
     all supported features in the processor, i.e all the valid bit
     fields in XCR0.
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add nested virtualization support for xsaves.
Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Add logic to get/set the XSS model-specific register.
Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Initialize the XSS exit bitmap.  It is zero so there should be no XSAVES
or XRSTORS exits.
Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

- EAX=0Dh, ECX=1: output registers EBX/ECX/EDX are reserved.

- EAX=0Dh, ECX>1: output register ECX bit 0 is clear for all the CPUID
leaves we support, because variable "supported" comes from XCR0 and not
XSS.  Bits above 0 are reserved, so ECX is overall zero.  Output register
EDX is reserved.

Source: Intel Architecture Instruction Set Extensions Programming
Reference, ref. number 319433-022
Reviewed-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

This is the size of the XSAVES area.  This starts providing guest support
for XSAVES (with no support yet for supervisor states, i.e. XSS == 0
always in guests for now).

Wanpeng Li suggested testing XSAVEC as well as XSAVES, since in practice
no real processor exists that only has one of them, and there is no
other way for userspace programs to compute the area of the XSAVEC
save area.  CPUID(EAX=0xd,ECX=1).EBX provides an upper bound.
Suggested-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Tested-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Expose the XSAVES feature to the guest if the kvm_x86_ops say it is
available.
Signed-off-by: NWanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

For code that deals with cpuid, this makes things a bit more readable.
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Userspace is expecting non-compacted format for KVM_GET_XSAVE, but
struct xsave_struct might be using the compacted format.  Convert
in order to preserve userspace ABI.

Likewise, userspace is passing non-compacted format for KVM_SET_XSAVE
but the kernel will pass it to XRSTORS, and we need to convert back.

Fixes: f31a9f7c
Cc: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Tested-by: NNadav Amit <namit@cs.technion.ac.il>
Reviewed-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

get_xsave_addr is the API to access XSAVE states, and KVM would
like to use it.  Export it.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: NThomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Merge tag 'kvm-s390-next-20141204' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kvms390/linux into HEAD

KVM: s390: Fixups for kvm/next (3.19)

Here we have two fixups of the latest interrupt rework and
one architectural fixup.

Instead of returning a possibly random or'ed together value, let's
always return -EFAULT if rc is set.
Signed-off-by: NJens Freimann <jfrei@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NCornelia Huck <cornelia.huck@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

Currently we use a mixture of atomic/non-atomic bitops
and the local_int spin lock to protect the pending_irqs bitmap
and interrupt payload data.

We need to use atomic bitops for the pending_irqs bitmap everywhere
and in addition acquire the local_int lock where interrupt data needs
to be protected.
Signed-off-by: NJens Freimann <jfrei@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

The cpu address of a source cpu (responsible for an external irq) is only to
be stored if bit 6 of the ext irq code is set.

If bit 6 is not set, it is to be zeroed out.

The special external irq code used for virtio and pfault uses the cpu addr as a
parameter field. As bit 6 is set, this implementation is correct.
Reviewed-by: NThomas Huth <thuth@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>

We currently track the pid of the task that runs the VCPU in vcpu_load.
If a yield to that VCPU is triggered while the PID of the wrong thread
is active, the wrong thread might receive a yield, but this will most
likely not help the executing thread at all.  Instead, if we only track
the pid on the KVM_RUN ioctl, there are two possibilities:

1) the thread that did a non-KVM_RUN ioctl is holding a mutex that
the VCPU thread is waiting for.  In this case, the VCPU thread is not
runnable, but we also do not do a wrong yield.

2) the thread that did a non-KVM_RUN ioctl is sleeping, or doing
something that does not block the VCPU thread.  In this case, the
VCPU thread can receive the directed yield correctly.
Signed-off-by: NChristian Borntraeger <borntraeger@de.ibm.com>
CC: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
CC: Raghavendra K T <raghavendra.kt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
CC: Michael Mueller <mimu@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

kvm_enter_guest() has to be called with preemption disabled and will
set PF_VCPU.  Current code takes PF_VCPU as a hint that the VCPU thread
is running and therefore needs no yield.

However, the check on PF_VCPU is wrong on s390, where preemption has
to stay enabled in order to correctly process page faults.  Thus,
s390 reenables preemption and starts to execute the guest.  The thread
might be scheduled out between kvm_enter_guest() and kvm_exit_guest(),
resulting in PF_VCPU being set but not being run.  When this happens,
the opportunity for directed yield is missed.

However, this check is done already in kvm_vcpu_on_spin before calling
kvm_vcpu_yield_loop:

        if (!ACCESS_ONCE(vcpu->preempted))
                continue;

so the check on PF_VCPU is superfluous in general, and this patch
removes it.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Hildenbrand <dahi@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

Current linear search doesn't scale well when
large amount of memslots is used and looked up slot
is not in the beginning memslots array.
Taking in account that memslots don't overlap, it's
possible to switch sorting order of memslots array from
'npages' to 'base_gfn' and use binary search for
memslot lookup by GFN.

As result of switching to binary search lookup times
are reduced with large amount of memslots.

Following is a table of search_memslot() cycles
during WS2008R2 guest boot.

                         boot,          boot + ~10 min
                         mostly same    of using it,
                         slot lookup    randomized lookup
                max      average        average
                cycles   cycles         cycles

13 slots      : 1450       28           30

13 slots      : 1400       30           40
binary search

117 slots     : 13000      30           460

117 slots     : 2000       35           180
binary search
Signed-off-by: NIgor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

it will allow to use binary search for GFN -> memslot
lookups, reducing lookup cost with large slots amount.
Signed-off-by: NIgor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

In typical guest boot workload only 2-3 memslots are used
extensively, and at that it's mostly the same memslot
lookup operation.

Adding LRU cache improves average lookup time from
46 to 28 cycles (~40%) for this workload.
Signed-off-by: NIgor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

UP/DOWN shift loops will shift array in needed
direction and stop at place where new slot should
be placed regardless of old slot size.
Signed-off-by: NIgor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

if number of pages haven't changed sorting algorithm
will do nothing, so there is no need to do extra check
to avoid entering sorting logic.
Signed-off-by: NIgor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>

While fixing an x2apic bug,
 17d68b76 KVM: x86: fix guest-initiated crash with x2apic (CVE-2013-6376)
we've made only one cluster available.  This means that the amount of
logically addressible x2APICs was reduced to 16 and VCPUs kept
overwriting themselves in that region, so even the first cluster wasn't
set up correctly.

This patch extends x2APIC support back to the logical_map's limit, and
keeps the CVE fixed as messages for non-present APICs are dropped.
Signed-off-by: NRadim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>