1. 31 3月, 2009 34 次提交
  2. 30 3月, 2009 2 次提交
  3. 29 3月, 2009 3 次提交
    • H
      fix setuid sometimes wouldn't · 7c2c7d99
      Hugh Dickins 提交于
      check_unsafe_exec() also notes whether the fs_struct is being
      shared by more threads than will get killed by the exec, and if so
      sets LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE to make bprm_set_creds() careful about euid.
      But /proc/<pid>/cwd and /proc/<pid>/root lookups make transient
      use of get_fs_struct(), which also raises that sharing count.
      
      This might occasionally cause a setuid program not to change euid,
      in the same way as happened with files->count (check_unsafe_exec
      also looks at sighand->count, but /proc doesn't raise that one).
      
      We'd prefer exec not to unshare fs_struct: so fix this in procfs,
      replacing get_fs_struct() by get_fs_path(), which does path_get
      while still holding task_lock, instead of raising fs->count.
      Signed-off-by: NHugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
      Cc: stable@kernel.org
      ___
      
       fs/proc/base.c |   50 +++++++++++++++--------------------------------
       1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      7c2c7d99
    • H
      fix setuid sometimes doesn't · e426b64c
      Hugh Dickins 提交于
      Joe Malicki reports that setuid sometimes doesn't: very rarely,
      a setuid root program does not get root euid; and, by the way,
      they have a health check running lsof every few minutes.
      
      Right, check_unsafe_exec() notes whether the files_struct is being
      shared by more threads than will get killed by the exec, and if so
      sets LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE to make bprm_set_creds() careful about euid.
      But /proc/<pid>/fd and /proc/<pid>/fdinfo lookups make transient
      use of get_files_struct(), which also raises that sharing count.
      
      There's a rather simple fix for this: exec's check on files->count
      has been redundant ever since 2.6.1 made it unshare_files() (except
      while compat_do_execve() omitted to do so) - just remove that check.
      
      [Note to -stable: this patch will not apply before 2.6.29: earlier
      releases should just remove the files->count line from unsafe_exec().]
      Reported-by: NJoe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com>
      Narrowed-down-by: NMichael Itz <mitz@metacarta.com>
      Tested-by: NJoe Malicki <jmalicki@metacarta.com>
      Signed-off-by: NHugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
      Cc: stable@kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      e426b64c
    • H
      compat_do_execve should unshare_files · 53e9309e
      Hugh Dickins 提交于
      2.6.26's commit fd8328be
      "sanitize handling of shared descriptor tables in failing execve()"
      moved the unshare_files() from flush_old_exec() and several binfmts
      to the head of do_execve(); but forgot to make the same change to
      compat_do_execve(), leaving a CLONE_FILES files_struct shared across
      exec from a 32-bit process on a 64-bit kernel.
      
      It's arguable whether the files_struct really ought to be unshared
      across exec; but 2.6.1 made that so to stop the loading binary's fd
      leaking into other threads, and a 32-bit process on a 64-bit kernel
      ought to behave in the same way as 32 on 32 and 64 on 64.
      Signed-off-by: NHugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
      Cc: stable@kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      53e9309e
  4. 28 3月, 2009 1 次提交
    • N
      fs: avoid I_NEW inodes · aabb8fdb
      Nick Piggin 提交于
      To be on the safe side, it should be less fragile to exclude I_NEW inodes
      from inode list scans by default (unless there is an important reason to
      have them).
      
      Normally they will get excluded (eg.  by zero refcount or writecount etc),
      however it is a bit fragile for list walkers to know exactly what parts of
      the inode state is set up and valid to test when in I_NEW.  So along these
      lines, move I_NEW checks upward as well (sometimes taking I_FREEING etc
      checks with them too -- this shouldn't be a problem should it?)
      Signed-off-by: NNick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
      Acked-by: NJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
      Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
      Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
      aabb8fdb