This patch adds support for the extended RIPEMD hash
algorithms RIPEMD-256 and RIPEMD-320.
Signed-off-by: NAdrian-Ken Rueegsegger <rueegsegger@swiss-it.ch>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

This patch puts all common RIPEMD values in the
appropriate header file. Initial values and constants
are the same for all variants of RIPEMD.
Signed-off-by: NAdrian-Ken Rueegsegger <rueegsegger@swiss-it.ch>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

    
Check whether the destination buffer is written to beyond the last
byte contained in the scatterlist.
    
Also change IDX1 of the cross-page access offsets to a multiple of 4.
This triggers a corruption in the HIFN driver and doesn't seem to
negatively impact other testcases.
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Change logs should be kept in source control systems, not the source.
This patch removes the change log from tcrpyt to stop people from
extending it any more.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

This patch adds Kconfig entries for RIPEMD-128 and RIPEMD-160.
Signed-off-by: NAdrian-Ken Rueegsegger <rueegsegger@swiss-it.ch>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

This patch adds test vectors for RIPEMD-128 and
RIPEMD-160 hash algorithms and digests (HMAC).

The test vectors are taken from ISO:IEC 10118-3 (2004)
and RFC2286.
Signed-off-by: NAdrian-Ken Rueegsegger <rueegsegger@swiss-it.ch>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

This patch adds support for RIPEMD-128 and RIPEMD-160
hash algorithms.
Signed-off-by: NAdrian-Ken Rueegsegger <rueegsegger@swiss-it.ch>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The EINPROGRESS notifications should be done just like the final
call-backs, i.e., with BH off.  This patch fixes the call in cryptd
since previously it was called with BH on.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

When chainiv postpones requests it never calls their completion functions.
This causes symptoms such as memory leaks when IPsec is in use.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Coverity CID: 2306 & 2307 RESOURCE_LEAK

In the second for loop in test_cipher(), data is allocated space with
kzalloc() and is only ever freed in an error case.
Looking at this loop, data is written to this memory but nothing seems
to read from it. 
So here is a patch removing the allocation, I think this is the right
fix.

Only compile tested.
Signed-off-by: NDarren Jenkins <darrenrjenkins@gmailcom>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Steps to reproduce:

	modprobe tcrypt		# with CONFIG_DEBUG_SG=y

testing cts(cbc(aes)) encryption
test 1 (128 bit key):
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at include/linux/scatterlist.h:65!
invalid opcode: 0000 [1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
CPU 0 
Modules linked in: tea xts twofish twofish_common tcrypt(+) [maaaany]
Pid: 16151, comm: modprobe Not tainted 2.6.26-rc4-fat #7
RIP: 0010:[<ffffffffa0bf032e>]  [<ffffffffa0bf032e>] :cts:cts_cbc_encrypt+0x151/0x355
RSP: 0018:ffff81016f497a88  EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: ffffe20009535d58 RBX: ffff81016f497af0 RCX: 0000000087654321
RDX: ffff8100010d4f28 RSI: ffff81016f497ee8 RDI: ffff81016f497ac0
RBP: ffff81016f497c38 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000011
R10: ffffffff00000008 R11: ffff8100010d4f28 R12: ffff81016f497ac0
R13: ffff81016f497b30 R14: 0000000000000010 R15: 0000000000000010
FS:  00007fac6fa276f0(0000) GS:ffffffff8060e000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
CR2: 00007f12ca7cc000 CR3: 000000016f441000 CR4: 00000000000026e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff4ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Process modprobe (pid: 16151, threadinfo ffff81016f496000, task ffff8101755b4ae0)
Stack:  0000000000000001 ffff81016f496000 ffffffff80719f78 0000000000000001
 0000000000000001 ffffffff8020c87c ffff81016f99c918 20646c756f772049
 65687420656b696c 0000000000000020 0000000000000000 0000000033341102
Call Trace:
 [<ffffffff8020c87c>] ? restore_args+0x0/0x30
 [<ffffffffa04aa311>] ? :aes_generic:crypto_aes_expand_key+0x311/0x369
 [<ffffffff802ab453>] ? check_object+0x15a/0x213
 [<ffffffff802aad22>] ? init_object+0x6e/0x76
 [<ffffffff802ac3ae>] ? __slab_free+0xfc/0x371
 [<ffffffffa0bf05ed>] :cts:crypto_cts_encrypt+0xbb/0xca
 [<ffffffffa07108de>] ? :crypto_blkcipher:setkey+0xc7/0xec
 [<ffffffffa07110b8>] :crypto_blkcipher:async_encrypt+0x38/0x3a
 [<ffffffffa2ce9341>] :tcrypt:test_cipher+0x261/0x7c6
 [<ffffffffa2cfd9df>] :tcrypt:tcrypt_mod_init+0x9df/0x1b30
 [<ffffffff80261e35>] sys_init_module+0x9e/0x1b2
 [<ffffffff8020c15a>] system_call_after_swapgs+0x8a/0x8f
Code: 45 c0 e8 aa 24 63 df 48 c1 e8 0c 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 e2 ff ff 48 8b 55 88 48 6b c0 68 48 01 c8 b9 21 43 65 87 48 39 4d 80 74 04 <0f> 0b eb fe f6 c2 01 74 04 0f 0b eb fe 83 e2 03 4c 89 ef 44 89 
RIP  [<ffffffffa0bf032e>] :cts:cts_cbc_encrypt+0x151/0x355
 RSP <ffff81016f497a88>
---[ end trace e8bahiarjand37fd ]---
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

When HMAC gets a key longer than the block size of the hash, it needs
to feed it as input to the hash to reduce it to a fixed length.  As
it is HMAC converts the key to a scatter and gather list.  However,
this doesn't work on certain platforms if the key is not allocated
via kmalloc.  For example, the keys from tcrypt are stored in the
rodata section and this causes it to fail with HMAC on x86-64.

This patch fixes this by copying the key to memory obtained via
kmalloc before hashing it.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Normally, kzalloc returns NULL or a valid pointer value, not a value to be
tested using IS_ERR.
Signed-off-by: NJulia Lawall <julia@diku.dk>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

After attaching the IV to the head during encryption, eseqiv does not
increase the encryption length by that amount.  As such the last block
of the actual plain text will be left unencrypted.

Fortunately the only user of this code hifn currently crashes so this
shouldn't affect anyone :)
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

crypto_authenc_givencrypt_done uses req->data as struct aead_givcrypt_request,
while it really points to a struct aead_request, causing this crash:

BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 6b6b6b6b
IP: [<dc87517b>] :authenc:crypto_authenc_genicv+0x23/0x109
*pde = 00000000
Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
Modules linked in: hifn_795x authenc esp4 aead xfrm4_mode_tunnel sha1_generic hmac crypto_hash]

Pid: 3074, comm: ping Not tainted (2.6.25 #4)
EIP: 0060:[<dc87517b>] EFLAGS: 00010296 CPU: 0
EIP is at crypto_authenc_genicv+0x23/0x109 [authenc]
EAX: daa04690 EBX: daa046e0 ECX: dab0a100 EDX: daa046b0
ESI: 6b6b6b6b EDI: dc872054 EBP: c033ff60 ESP: c033ff0c
 DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 0000 GS: 0033 SS: 0068
Process ping (pid: 3074, ti=c033f000 task=db883a80 task.ti=dab6c000)
Stack: 00000000 daa046b0 c0215a3e daa04690 dab0a100 00000000 ffffffff db9fd7f0
       dba208c0 dbbb1720 00000001 daa04720 00000001 c033ff54 c0119ca9 dc852a75
       c033ff60 c033ff60 daa046e0 00000000 00000001 c033ff6c dc87527b 00000001
Call Trace:
 [<c0215a3e>] ? dev_alloc_skb+0x14/0x29
 [<c0119ca9>] ? printk+0x15/0x17
 [<dc87527b>] ? crypto_authenc_givencrypt_done+0x1a/0x27 [authenc]
 [<dc850cca>] ? hifn_process_ready+0x34a/0x352 [hifn_795x]
 [<dc8353c7>] ? rhine_napipoll+0x3f2/0x3fd [via_rhine]
 [<dc851a56>] ? hifn_check_for_completion+0x4d/0xa6 [hifn_795x]
 [<dc851ab9>] ? hifn_tasklet_callback+0xa/0xc [hifn_795x]
 [<c011d046>] ? tasklet_action+0x3f/0x66
 [<c011d230>] ? __do_softirq+0x38/0x7a
 [<c0105a5f>] ? do_softirq+0x3e/0x71
 [<c011d17c>] ? irq_exit+0x2c/0x65
 [<c010e0c0>] ? smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0x5f/0x6a
 [<c01042e4>] ? apic_timer_interrupt+0x28/0x30
 [<dc851640>] ? hifn_handle_req+0x44a/0x50d [hifn_795x]
 ...
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Ciphers, block modes, name it, are grouped together and sorted.
Signed-off-by: NSebastian Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

On Thu, Mar 27, 2008 at 03:40:36PM +0100, Bodo Eggert wrote:
> Kamalesh Babulal <kamalesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> 
> > This patch cleanups the crypto code, replaces the init() and fini()
> > with the <algorithm name>_init/_fini
> 
> This part ist OK.
> 
> > or init/fini_<algorithm name> (if the 
> > <algorithm name>_init/_fini exist)
> 
> Having init_foo and foo_init won't be a good thing, will it? I'd start
> confusing them.
> 
> What about foo_modinit instead?

Thanks for the suggestion, the init() is replaced with

	<algorithm name>_mod_init ()

and fini () is replaced with <algorithm name>_mod_fini.
Signed-off-by: NKamalesh Babulal <kamalesh@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The key expansion routine could be get little more generic, become
a kernel doc entry and then get exported.
Signed-off-by: NSebastian Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Tested-by: NStefan Hellermann <stefan@the2masters.de>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Signed-off-by: NSebastian Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Implement CTS wrapper for CBC mode required for support of AES
encryption support for Kerberos (rfc3962).
Signed-off-by: NKevin Coffman <kwc@citi.umich.edu>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

replace all:
big_endian_variable = cpu_to_beX(beX_to_cpu(big_endian_variable) +
					expression_in_cpu_byteorder);
with:
	beX_add_cpu(&big_endian_variable, expression_in_cpu_byteorder);
Signed-off-by: NMarcin Slusarz <marcin.slusarz@gmail.com>
Cc: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Roel Kluin <12o3l@tiscali.nl>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The third test vector of ECB-XTEA-ENC fails for me all other
are fine. I could not find a RFC or something else where they
are defined. The test vector has not been modified since git
started recording histrory. The implementation is very close
(not to say equal) to what is available as Public Domain (they
recommend 64 rounds and the in kernel uses 32). Therefore I
belive that there is typo somewhere and tcrypt reported always
*fail* instead of *okey*.
This patch replaces input + result of the third test vector with
result + input from the third decryption vector. The key is the
same, the other three test vectors are also the reverse.
Signed-off-by: NSebastian Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Currently the tcrypt module is about 2 MiB on x86-32. The
main reason for the huge size is the data segment which contains
all the test vectors for each algorithm. The test vectors are
staticly allocated in an array and the size of the array has been
drastically increased by the merge of the Salsa20 test vectors.

With a hint from Benedigt Spranger I found a way how I could
convert those fixed-length arrays to strings which are flexible
in size. VIM and regex were also very helpfull :)
So, I am talking about a shrinking of ~97% on x86-32:

   text    data     bss     dec     hex filename
  18309 2039708      20 2058037  1f6735 tcrypt-b4.ko
  45628   23516      80   69224   10e68 tcrypt.ko
Signed-off-by: NSebastian Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The test routines (test_{cipher,hash,aead}) are makeing a copy
of the test template and are processing the encryption process
in place. This patch changes the creation of the copy so it will
work even if the source address of the input data isn't an array
inside of the template but a pointer.
Signed-off-by: NSebastian Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Signed-off-by: NJan Engelhardt <jengelh@computergmbh.de>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The speed templates as it look always the same. The key size
is repeated for each block size and we test always the same
block size. The addition of one inner loop makes it possible
to get rid of the struct and it is possible to use a tiny
u8 array :)
Signed-off-by: NSebastian Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Some crypto ciphers which are impleneted support similar key sizes
(16,24 & 32 byte). They can be grouped together and use a common
templatte instead of their own which contains the same data.
Signed-off-by: NSebastian Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Rename sha512 to sha512_generic and add a MODULE_ALIAS for sha512
so all sha512 implementations can be loaded automatically.

Keep the broken tabs so git recognizes this as a rename.
Signed-off-by: NJan Glauber <jang@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@sw.ru>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

'ack' is currently a simple integer that flags whether or not a client is done
touching fields in the given descriptor.  It is effectively just a single bit
of information.  Converting this to a flags parameter allows the other bits to
be put to use to control completion actions, like dma-unmap, and capture
results, like xor-zero-sum == 0.

Changes are one of:
1/ convert all open-coded ->ack manipulations to use async_tx_ack
   and async_tx_test_ack.
2/ set the ack bit at prep time where possible
3/ make drivers store the flags at prep time
4/ add flags to the device_prep_dma_interrupt prototype
Acked-by: NMaciej Sosnowski <maciej.sosnowski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>

Shrink struct dma_async_tx_descriptor and introduce
async_tx_channel_switch to properly inject a channel switch interrupt in
the descriptor stream.  This simplifies the locking model as drivers no
longer need to handle dma_async_tx_descriptor.lock.
Acked-by: NShannon Nelson <shannon.nelson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>

The kernel crashes when ipsec passes a udp packet of about 14XX bytes
of data to aes-xcbc-mac.

It seems the first xxxx bytes of the data are in first sg entry,
and remaining xx bytes are in next sg entry. But we don't 
check next sg entry to see if we need to go look the page up.

I noticed in hmac.c, we do a scatterwalk_sg_next(), to do this check
and possible lookup, thus xcbc.c needs to use this routine too.

A 15-hour run of an ipsec stress test sending streams of tcp and
udp packets of various sizes,  using this patch and 
aes-xcbc-mac completed successfully, so hopefully this fixes the
problem.
Signed-off-by: NJoy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

If the channel cannot perform the operation in one call to
->device_prep_dma_zero_sum, then fallback to the xor+page_is_zero path.
This only affects users with arrays larger than 16 devices on iop13xx or
32 devices on iop3xx.

Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>

Signed-off-by: NDan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>

The previous patch to move chainiv and eseqiv into blkcipher created
a section mismatch for the chainiv exit function which was also called
from __init.  This patch removes the __exit marking on it.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

When using aes-xcbc-mac for authentication in IPsec, 
the kernel crashes. It seems this algorithm doesn't 
account for the space IPsec may make in scatterlist for authtag.
Thus when crypto_xcbc_digest_update2() gets called,
nbytes may be less than sg[i].length. 
Since nbytes is an unsigned number, it wraps
at the end of the loop allowing us to go back 
into loop and causing crash in memcpy.

I used update function in digest.c to model this fix.
Please let me know if it looks ok.
Signed-off-by: NJoy Latten <latten@austin.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The XTS blockmode uses a copy of the IV which is saved on the stack
and may or may not be properly aligned. If it is not, it will break
hardware cipher like the geode or padlock.
This patch encrypts the IV in place so we don't have to worry about
alignment.
Signed-off-by: NSebastian Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Tested-by: NStefan Hellermann <stefan@the2masters.de>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

Every file should include the headers containing the externs for its 
global code (in this case for struct crypto_{init,exit}_digest_ops()).
Signed-off-by: NAdrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

The authenc algorithm requires BLKCIPHER to be present.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

For compatibility with dm-crypt initramfs setups it is useful to merge
chainiv/seqiv into the crypto_blkcipher module.  Since they're required
by most algorithms anyway this is an acceptable trade-off.
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>