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  1. 09 5月, 2007 1 次提交
    • K
      proc: maps protection · 5096add8
      由 Kees Cook 提交于 
      The /proc/pid/ "maps", "smaps", and "numa_maps" files contain sensitive
information about the memory location and usage of processes.  Issues:

- maps should not be world-readable, especially if programs expect any
  kind of ASLR protection from local attackers.
- maps cannot just be 0400 because "-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2 -O2" makes glibc
  check the maps when %n is in a *printf call, and a setuid(getuid())
  process wouldn't be able to read its own maps file.  (For reference
  see http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/1/22/150)
- a system-wide toggle is needed to allow prior behavior in the case of
  non-root applications that depend on access to the maps contents.

This change implements a check using "ptrace_may_attach" before allowing
access to read the maps contents.  To control this protection, the new knob
/proc/sys/kernel/maps_protect has been added, with corresponding updates to
the procfs documentation.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: build fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: New sysctl numbers are old hat]
Signed-off-by: NKees Cook <kees@outflux.net>
Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      5096add8
  3. 24 4月, 2007 1 次提交
  5. 05 3月, 2007 1 次提交
  7. 02 3月, 2007 1 次提交
  9. 15 2月, 2007 11 次提交
  11. 12 2月, 2007 5 次提交
    • O
      [PATCH] _proc_do_string(): fix short reads · 8d060877
      由 Oleg Nesterov 提交于 
      If you try to read things like /proc/sys/kernel/osrelease with single-byte
reads, you get just one byte and then EOF.  This is because _proc_do_string()
assumes that the caller is read()ing into a buffer which is large enough to
fit the whole string in a single hit.

Fix.

Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      8d060877
    • A
      [PATCH] sysctl warning fix · cb799b89
      由 Andrew Morton 提交于 
      kernel/sysctl.c:2816: warning: 'sysctl_ipc_data' defined but not used
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      cb799b89
    • T
      [PATCH] Add TAINT_USER and ability to set taint flags from userspace · 34f5a398
      由 Theodore Ts'o 提交于 
      Allow taint flags to be set from userspace by writing to
/proc/sys/kernel/tainted, and add a new taint flag, TAINT_USER, to be used
when userspace has potentially done something dangerous that might
compromise the kernel.  This will allow support personnel to ask further
questions about what may have caused the user taint flag to have been set.

For example, they might examine the logs of the realtime JVM to see if the
Java program has used the really silly, stupid, dangerous, and
completely-non-portable direct access to physical memory feature which MUST
be implemented according to the Real-Time Specification for Java (RTSJ).
Sigh.  What were those silly people at Sun thinking?

[akpm@osdl.org: build fix]
[bunk@stusta.de: cleanup]
Signed-off-by: N"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: NAdrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      34f5a398
    • A
      [PATCH] sysctl_{,ms_}jiffies: fix oldlen semantics · 3ee75ac3
      由 Alexey Dobriyan 提交于 
      currently it's
1) if *oldlenp == 0,
	don't writeback anything

2) if *oldlenp >= table->maxlen,
	don't writeback more than table->maxlen bytes and rewrite *oldlenp
	don't look at underlying type granularity

3) if 0 < *oldlenp < table->maxlen,
		*cough*
	string sysctls don't writeback more than *oldlenp bytes.
	OK, that's because sizeof(char) == 1

	int sysctls writeback anything in (0, table->maxlen] range
	Though accept integers divisible by sizeof(int) for writing.

sysctl_jiffies and sysctl_ms_jiffies don't writeback anything but
sizeof(int), which violates 1) and 2).

So, make sysctl_jiffies and sysctl_ms_jiffies accept
a) *oldlenp == 0, not doing writeback
b) *oldlenp >= sizeof(int), writing one integer.

-EINVAL still returned for *oldlenp == 1, 2, 3.
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      3ee75ac3
    • E
      [PATCH] make reading /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bould not require CAP_SYS_MODULE · 6ff1b442
      由 Eric Paris 提交于 
      Reading /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound requires CAP_SYS_MODULE.  (see
proc_dointvec_bset in kernel/sysctl.c)

sysctl appears to drive all over proc reading everything it can get it's
hands on and is complaining when it is being denied access to read
cap-bound.  Clearly writing to cap-bound should be a sensitive operation
but requiring CAP_SYS_MODULE to read cap-bound seems a bit to strong.  I
believe the information could with reasonable certainty be obtained by
looking at a bunch of the output of /proc/pid/status which has very low
security protection, so at best we are just getting a little obfuscation of
information.

Currently SELinux policy has to 'dontaudit' capability checks for
CAP_SYS_MODULE for things like sysctl which just want to read cap-bound.
In doing so we also as a byproduct have to hide warnings of potential
exploits such as if at some time that sysctl actually tried to load a
module.  I wondered if anyone would have a problem opening cap-bound up to
read from anyone?
Acked-by: NChris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      6ff1b442
  13. 14 12月, 2006 1 次提交
  15. 11 12月, 2006 3 次提交
  17. 09 12月, 2006 5 次提交
  19. 08 12月, 2006 3 次提交
    • H
      [PATCH] struct seq_operations and struct file_operations constification · 15ad7cdc
      由 Helge Deller 提交于 
       - move some file_operations structs into the .rodata section

 - move static strings from policy_types[] array into the .rodata section

 - fix generic seq_operations usages, so that those structs may be defined
   as "const" as well

[akpm@osdl.org: couple of fixes]
Signed-off-by: NHelge Deller <deller@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
      15ad7cdc
    • B
      [PATCH] sysctl: string length calculated is wrong if it contains negative numbers · bd9b0bac
      由 BP, Praveen 提交于 
      In the functions do_proc_dointvec() and do_proc_doulongvec_minmax(),
there seems to be a bug in string length calculation if string contains
negative integer.

The console log given below explains the bug. Setting negative values
may not be a right thing to do for "console log level" but then the test
(given below) can be used to demonstrate the bug in the code.

# echo "-1 -1 -1 -123456" > /proc/sys/kernel/printk
# cat /proc/sys/kernel/printk
-1      -1      -1      -1234
#
# echo "-1 -1 -1 123456" > /proc/sys/kernel/printk
# cat /proc/sys/kernel/printk
-1      -1      -1      1234
#

(akpm: the bug is that 123456 gets truncated)

It works as expected if string contains all +ve integers

# echo "1 2 3 4" > /proc/sys/kernel/printk
# cat /proc/sys/kernel/printk
1       2       3       4
#

The patch given below fixes the issue.
Signed-off-by: NPraveen BP <praveenbp@ti.com>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
      bd9b0bac
    • A
      [PATCH] new scheme to preempt swap token · 7602bdf2
      由 Ashwin Chaugule 提交于 
      The new swap token patches replace the current token traversal algo.  The old
algo had a crude timeout parameter that was used to handover the token from
one task to another.  This algo, transfers the token to the tasks that are in
need of the token.  The urgency for the token is based on the number of times
a task is required to swap-in pages.  Accordingly, the priority of a task is
incremented if it has been badly affected due to swap-outs.  To ensure that
the token doesnt bounce around rapidly, the token holders are given a priority
boost.  The priority of tasks is also decremented, if their rate of swap-in's
keeps reducing.  This way, the condition to check whether to pre-empt the swap
token, is a matter of comparing two task's priority fields.

[akpm@osdl.org: cleanups]
Signed-off-by: NAshwin Chaugule <ashwin.chaugule@celunite.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
      7602bdf2
  21. 07 12月, 2006 1 次提交
  23. 06 11月, 2006 2 次提交
    • E
      [PATCH] sysctl: allow a zero ctl_name in the middle of a sysctl table · d99f160a
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      Since it is becoming clear that there are just enough users of the binary
sysctl interface that completely removing the binary interface from the kernel
will not be an option for foreseeable future, we need to find a way to address
the sysctl maintenance issues.

The basic problem is that sysctl requires one central authority to allocate
sysctl numbers, or else conflicts and ABI breakage occur.  The proc interface
to sysctl does not have that problem, as names are not densely allocated.

By not terminating a sysctl table until I have neither a ctl_name nor a
procname, it becomes simple to add sysctl entries that don't show up in the
binary sysctl interface.  Which allows people to avoid allocating a binary
sysctl value when not needed.

I have audited the kernel code and in my reading I have not found a single
sysctl table that wasn't terminated by a completely zero filled entry.  So
this change in behavior should not affect anything.

I think this mechanism eases the pain enough that combined with a little
disciple we can solve the reoccurring sysctl ABI breakage.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Acked-by: NAlan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
      d99f160a
    • E
      [PATCH] Improve the removed sysctl warnings · 0e009be8
      由 Eric W. Biederman 提交于 
      Don't warn about libpthread's access to kernel.version.  When it receives
-ENOSYS it will read /proc/sys/kernel/version.

If anything else shows up print the sysctl number string.
Signed-off-by: NEric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Cal Peake <cp@absolutedigital.net>
Cc: Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
      0e009be8
  25. 21 10月, 2006 1 次提交
  27. 02 10月, 2006 4 次提交