One EXPORT_SYMBOL should be enough for everyone.
Signed-off-by: NAdrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: NGreg Ungerer <gerg@uclinux.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This builds on top of the earlier vmalloc_32_user() work introduced by
b5073173, as we now have places in the nommu
allmodconfig that hit up against these missing APIs.

As vmalloc_32_user() is already implemented, this is moved over to
vmalloc_user() and simply made a wrapper.  As all current nommu platforms are
32-bit addressable, there's no special casing we have to do for ZONE_DMA and
things of that nature as per GFP_VMALLOC32.

remap_vmalloc_range() needs to check VM_USERMAP in order to figure out whether
we permit the remap or not, which means that we also have to rework the
vmalloc_user() code to grovel for the VMA and set the flag.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Mundt <lethal@linux-sh.org>
Acked-by: NDavid McCullough <david_mccullough@securecomputing.com>
Acked-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NGreg Ungerer <gerg@snapgear.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Removing config variable DUMPTOFLASH, since it is not used
Signed-off-by: NJiri Olsa <olsajiri@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NGreg Ungerer <gerg@snapgear.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

remove dead config symbols from m68knommu code
Signed-off-by: NJiri Olsa <olsajiri@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NGreg Ungerer <gerg@snapgear.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Use ARRAY_SIZE macroto get maximum ports in ColdFire serial driver.
Signed-off-by: NGreg Ungerer <gerg@uclinux.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The function is question gets the pid from sysctl table, so this one is a
virtual pid, i.e.  the pid of a task as it is seen from inside a namespace.

So the find_task_by_vpid() must be used here.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Remove dead config symbol from FRV code.
Signed-off-by: NJiri Olsa <olsajiri@gmail.com>
Acked-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

To be consistent with other architectures, these two DMA macros should
be defined in scatterlist.h as opposed to dma-mapping.h
Signed-off-by: NRobert P. J. Day <rpjday@crashcourse.ca>
Acked-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Permit the memory to be located somewhere other than address 0xC0000000 in
NOMMU mode.  The configuration options are already present, it just
requires wiring up in the linker script.

Note that only a limited set of locations of runtime addresses are available
because of the way the CPU protection registers work.
Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.

Smack implements mandatory access control (MAC) using labels
attached to tasks and data containers, including files, SVIPC,
and other tasks. Smack is a kernel based scheme that requires
an absolute minimum of application support and a very small
amount of configuration data.

Smack uses extended attributes and
provides a set of general mount options, borrowing technics used
elsewhere. Smack uses netlabel for CIPSO labeling. Smack provides
a pseudo-filesystem smackfs that is used for manipulation of
system Smack attributes.

The patch, patches for ls and sshd, a README, a startup script,
and x86 binaries for ls and sshd are also available on

    http://www.schaufler-ca.com

Development has been done using Fedora Core 7 in a virtual machine
environment and on an old Sony laptop.

Smack provides mandatory access controls based on the label attached
to a task and the label attached to the object it is attempting to
access. Smack labels are deliberately short (1-23 characters) text
strings. Single character labels using special characters are reserved
for system use. The only operation applied to Smack labels is equality
comparison. No wildcards or expressions, regular or otherwise, are
used. Smack labels are composed of printable characters and may not
include "/".

A file always gets the Smack label of the task that created it.

Smack defines and uses these labels:

    "*" - pronounced "star"
    "_" - pronounced "floor"
    "^" - pronounced "hat"
    "?" - pronounced "huh"

The access rules enforced by Smack are, in order:

1. Any access requested by a task labeled "*" is denied.
2. A read or execute access requested by a task labeled "^"
   is permitted.
3. A read or execute access requested on an object labeled "_"
   is permitted.
4. Any access requested on an object labeled "*" is permitted.
5. Any access requested by a task on an object with the same
   label is permitted.
6. Any access requested that is explicitly defined in the loaded
   rule set is permitted.
7. Any other access is denied.

Rules may be explicitly defined by writing subject,object,access
triples to /smack/load.

Smack rule sets can be easily defined that describe Bell&LaPadula
sensitivity, Biba integrity, and a variety of interesting
configurations. Smack rule sets can be modified on the fly to
accommodate changes in the operating environment or even the time
of day.

Some practical use cases:

Hierarchical levels. The less common of the two usual uses
for MLS systems is to define hierarchical levels, often
unclassified, confidential, secret, and so on. To set up smack
to support this, these rules could be defined:

   C        Unclass rx
   S        C       rx
   S        Unclass rx
   TS       S       rx
   TS       C       rx
   TS       Unclass rx

A TS process can read S, C, and Unclass data, but cannot write it.
An S process can read C and Unclass. Note that specifying that
TS can read S and S can read C does not imply TS can read C, it
has to be explicitly stated.

Non-hierarchical categories. This is the more common of the
usual uses for an MLS system. Since the default rule is that a
subject cannot access an object with a different label no
access rules are required to implement compartmentalization.

A case that the Bell & LaPadula policy does not allow is demonstrated
with this Smack access rule:

A case that Bell&LaPadula does not allow that Smack does:

    ESPN    ABC   r
    ABC     ESPN  r

On my portable video device I have two applications, one that
shows ABC programming and the other ESPN programming. ESPN wants
to show me sport stories that show up as news, and ABC will
only provide minimal information about a sports story if ESPN
is covering it. Each side can look at the other's info, neither
can change the other. Neither can see what FOX is up to, which
is just as well all things considered.

Another case that I especially like:

    SatData Guard   w
    Guard   Publish w

A program running with the Guard label opens a UDP socket and
accepts messages sent by a program running with a SatData label.
The Guard program inspects the message to ensure it is wholesome
and if it is sends it to a program running with the Publish label.
This program then puts the information passed in an appropriate
place. Note that the Guard program cannot write to a Publish
file system object because file system semanitic require read as
well as write.

The four cases (categories, levels, mutual read, guardbox) here
are all quite real, and problems I've been asked to solve over
the years. The first two are easy to do with traditonal MLS systems
while the last two you can't without invoking privilege, at least
for a while.
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Joshua Brindle <method@manicmethod.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Add a new set of configuration functions to the NetLabel/LSM API so that
LSMs can perform their own configuration of the NetLabel subsystem without
relying on assistance from userspace.
Signed-off-by: NPaul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: NCasey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Reviewed-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Root processes are considered more important when out of memory and killing
proceses.  The check for CAP_SYS_ADMIN was augmented with a check for
uid==0 or euid==0.

There are several possible ways to look at this:

	1. uid comparisons are unnecessary, trust CAP_SYS_ADMIN
	   alone.  However CAP_SYS_RESOURCE is the one that really
	   means "give me extra resources" so allow for that as
	   well.
	2. Any privileged code should be protected, but uid is not
	   an indication of privilege.  So we should check whether
	   any capabilities are raised.
	3. uid==0 makes processes on the host as well as in containers
	   more important, so we should keep the existing checks.
	4. uid==0 makes processes only on the host more important,
	   even without any capabilities.  So we should be keeping
	   the (uid==0||euid==0) check but only when
	   userns==&init_user_ns.

I'm following number 1 here.
Signed-off-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The capability bounding set is a set beyond which capabilities cannot grow.
 Currently cap_bset is per-system.  It can be manipulated through sysctl,
but only init can add capabilities.  Root can remove capabilities.  By
default it includes all caps except CAP_SETPCAP.

This patch makes the bounding set per-process when file capabilities are
enabled.  It is inherited at fork from parent.  Noone can add elements,
CAP_SETPCAP is required to remove them.

One example use of this is to start a safer container.  For instance, until
device namespaces or per-container device whitelists are introduced, it is
best to take CAP_MKNOD away from a container.

The bounding set will not affect pP and pE immediately.  It will only
affect pP' and pE' after subsequent exec()s.  It also does not affect pI,
and exec() does not constrain pI'.  So to really start a shell with no way
of regain CAP_MKNOD, you would do

	prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, CAP_MKNOD);
	cap_t cap = cap_get_proc();
	cap_value_t caparray[1];
	caparray[0] = CAP_MKNOD;
	cap_set_flag(cap, CAP_INHERITABLE, 1, caparray, CAP_DROP);
	cap_set_proc(cap);
	cap_free(cap);

The following test program will get and set the bounding
set (but not pI).  For instance

	./bset get
		(lists capabilities in bset)
	./bset drop cap_net_raw
		(starts shell with new bset)
		(use capset, setuid binary, or binary with
		file capabilities to try to increase caps)

************************************************************
cap_bound.c
************************************************************
 #include <sys/prctl.h>
 #include <linux/capability.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>

 #ifndef PR_CAPBSET_READ
 #define PR_CAPBSET_READ 23
 #endif

 #ifndef PR_CAPBSET_DROP
 #define PR_CAPBSET_DROP 24
 #endif

int usage(char *me)
{
	printf("Usage: %s get\n", me);
	printf("       %s drop <capability>\n", me);
	return 1;
}

 #define numcaps 32
char *captable[numcaps] = {
	"cap_chown",
	"cap_dac_override",
	"cap_dac_read_search",
	"cap_fowner",
	"cap_fsetid",
	"cap_kill",
	"cap_setgid",
	"cap_setuid",
	"cap_setpcap",
	"cap_linux_immutable",
	"cap_net_bind_service",
	"cap_net_broadcast",
	"cap_net_admin",
	"cap_net_raw",
	"cap_ipc_lock",
	"cap_ipc_owner",
	"cap_sys_module",
	"cap_sys_rawio",
	"cap_sys_chroot",
	"cap_sys_ptrace",
	"cap_sys_pacct",
	"cap_sys_admin",
	"cap_sys_boot",
	"cap_sys_nice",
	"cap_sys_resource",
	"cap_sys_time",
	"cap_sys_tty_config",
	"cap_mknod",
	"cap_lease",
	"cap_audit_write",
	"cap_audit_control",
	"cap_setfcap"
};

int getbcap(void)
{
	int comma=0;
	unsigned long i;
	int ret;

	printf("i know of %d capabilities\n", numcaps);
	printf("capability bounding set:");
	for (i=0; i<numcaps; i++) {
		ret = prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ, i);
		if (ret < 0)
			perror("prctl");
		else if (ret==1)
			printf("%s%s", (comma++) ? ", " : " ", captable[i]);
	}
	printf("\n");
	return 0;
}

int capdrop(char *str)
{
	unsigned long i;

	int found=0;
	for (i=0; i<numcaps; i++) {
		if (strcmp(captable[i], str) == 0) {
			found=1;
			break;
		}
	}
	if (!found)
		return 1;
	if (prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, i)) {
		perror("prctl");
		return 1;
	}
	return 0;
}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
	if (argc<2)
		return usage(argv[0]);
	if (strcmp(argv[1], "get")==0)
		return getbcap();
	if (strcmp(argv[1], "drop")!=0 || argc<3)
		return usage(argv[0]);
	if (capdrop(argv[2])) {
		printf("unknown capability\n");
		return 1;
	}
	return execl("/bin/bash", "/bin/bash", NULL);
}
************************************************************

[serue@us.ibm.com: fix typo]
Signed-off-by: NSerge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>a
Signed-off-by: N"Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>
Tested-by: NJiri Slaby <jirislaby@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

KaiGai Kohei observed that this line in the linux header is not needed.
Signed-off-by: NAndrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: KaiGai Kohei <kaigai@kaigai.gr.jp>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The patch supports legacy (32-bit) capability userspace, and where possible
translates 32-bit capabilities to/from userspace and the VFS to 64-bit
kernel space capabilities.  If a capability set cannot be compressed into
32-bits for consumption by user space, the system call fails, with -ERANGE.

FWIW libcap-2.00 supports this change (and earlier capability formats)

 http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/security/linux-privs/kernel-2.6/

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-syle fixes]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: use get_task_comm()]
[ezk@cs.sunysb.edu: build fix]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: do not initialise statics to 0 or NULL]
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: unused var]
[serue@us.ibm.com: export __cap_ symbols]
Signed-off-by: NAndrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Signed-off-by: NErez Zadok <ezk@cs.sunysb.edu>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Revert b68680e4 to make way for the next
patch: "Add 64-bit capability support to the kernel".

We want to keep the vfs_cap_data.data[] structure, using two 'data's for
64-bit caps (and later three for 96-bit caps), whereas
b68680e4 had gotten rid of the 'data' struct
made its members inline.

The 64-bit caps patch keeps the stack abuse fix at get_file_caps(), which was
the more important part of that patch.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Originally vfs_getxattr would pull the security xattr variable using
the inode getxattr handle and then proceed to clobber it with a subsequent call
to the LSM.

This patch reorders the two operations such that when the xattr requested is
in the security namespace it first attempts to grab the value from the LSM
directly.

If it fails to obtain the value because there is no module present or the
module does not support the operation it will fall back to using the inode
getxattr operation.

In the event that both are inaccessible it returns EOPNOTSUPP.
Signed-off-by: NDavid P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This patch modifies the interface to inode_getsecurity to have the function
return a buffer containing the security blob and its length via parameters
instead of relying on the calling function to give it an appropriately sized
buffer.

Security blobs obtained with this function should be freed using the
release_secctx LSM hook.  This alleviates the problem of the caller having to
guess a length and preallocate a buffer for this function allowing it to be
used elsewhere for Labeled NFS.

The patch also removed the unused err parameter.  The conversion is similar to
the one performed by Al Viro for the security_getprocattr hook.
Signed-off-by: NDavid P. Quigley <dpquigl@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NSerge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NMatt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

By putting smaller objects on their own list, we greatly reduce overall
external fragmentation and increase repeatability.  This reduces total SLOB
overhead from > 50% to ~6% on a simple boot test.
Signed-off-by: NMatt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

We weren't merging freed blocks at the beginning of the free list.  Fixing
this showed a 2.5% efficiency improvement in a userspace test harness.
Signed-off-by: NMatt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

After making dirty a 100M file, the normal behavior is to start the
writeback for all data after 30s delays.  But sometimes the following
happens instead:

	- after 30s:    ~4M
	- after 5s:     ~4M
	- after 5s:     all remaining 92M

Some analyze shows that the internal io dispatch queues goes like this:

		s_io            s_more_io
		-------------------------
	1)	100M,1K         0
	2)	1K              96M
	3)	0               96M
1) initial state with a 100M file and a 1K file

2) 4M written, nr_to_write <= 0, so write more

3) 1K written, nr_to_write > 0, no more writes(BUG)

nr_to_write > 0 in (3) fools the upper layer to think that data have all
been written out.  The big dirty file is actually still sitting in
s_more_io.  We cannot simply splice s_more_io back to s_io as soon as s_io
becomes empty, and let the loop in generic_sync_sb_inodes() continue: this
may starve newly expired inodes in s_dirty.  It is also not an option to
draw inodes from both s_more_io and s_dirty, an let the loop go on: this
might lead to live locks, and might also starve other superblocks in sync
time(well kupdate may still starve some superblocks, that's another bug).

We have to return when a full scan of s_io completes.  So nr_to_write > 0
does not necessarily mean that "all data are written".  This patch
introduces a flag writeback_control.more_io to indicate that more io should
be done.  With it the big dirty file no longer has to wait for the next
kupdate invokation 5s later.

In sync_sb_inodes() we only set more_io on super_blocks we actually
visited.  This avoids the interaction between two pdflush deamons.

Also in __sync_single_inode() we don't blindly keep requeuing the io if the
filesystem cannot progress.  Failing to do so may lead to 100% iowait.
Tested-by: NMike Snitzer <snitzer@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NFengguang Wu <wfg@mail.ustc.edu.cn>
Cc: Michael Rubin <mrubin@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Fix following warning:
WARNING: mm/built-in.o(.text+0x22069): Section mismatch in reference from the function sparse_early_usemap_alloc() to the function .init.text:__alloc_bootmem_node()

static sparse_early_usemap_alloc() were used only by sparse_init()
and with sparse_init() annotated _init it is safe to
annotate sparse_early_usemap_alloc with __init too.
Signed-off-by: NSam Ravnborg <sam@ravnborg.org>
Cc: Andy Whitcroft <apw@shadowen.org>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

After running SetPageUptodate, preceeding stores to the page contents to
actually bring it uptodate may not be ordered with the store to set the
page uptodate.

Therefore, another CPU which checks PageUptodate is true, then reads the
page contents can get stale data.

Fix this by having an smp_wmb before SetPageUptodate, and smp_rmb after
PageUptodate.

Many places that test PageUptodate, do so with the page locked, and this
would be enough to ensure memory ordering in those places if
SetPageUptodate were only called while the page is locked.  Unfortunately
that is not always the case for some filesystems, but it could be an idea
for the future.

Also bring the handling of anonymous page uptodateness in line with that of
file backed page management, by marking anon pages as uptodate when they
_are_ uptodate, rather than when our implementation requires that they be
marked as such.  Doing allows us to get rid of the smp_wmb's in the page
copying functions, which were especially added for anonymous pages for an
analogous memory ordering problem.  Both file and anonymous pages are
handled with the same barriers.

FAQ:
Q. Why not do this in flush_dcache_page?
A. Firstly, flush_dcache_page handles only one side (the smb side) of the
ordering protocol; we'd still need smp_rmb somewhere. Secondly, hiding away
memory barriers in a completely unrelated function is nasty; at least in the
PageUptodate macros, they are located together with (half) the operations
involved in the ordering. Thirdly, the smp_wmb is only required when first
bringing the page uptodate, wheras flush_dcache_page should be called each time
it is written to through the kernel mapping. It is logically the wrong place to
put it.

Q. Why does this increase my text size / reduce my performance / etc.
A. Because it is adding the necessary instructions to eliminate the data-race.

Q. Can it be improved?
A. Yes, eg. if you were to create a rule that all SetPageUptodate operations
run under the page lock, we could avoid the smp_rmb places where PageUptodate
is queried under the page lock. Requires audit of all filesystems and at least
some would need reworking. That's great you're interested, I'm eagerly awaiting
your patches.
Signed-off-by: NNick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Orphaned page might have fs-private metadata, the page is truncated.  As
the page hasn't mapping, page migration refuse to migrate the page.  It
appears the page is only freed in page reclaim and if zone watermark is
low, the page is never freed, as a result migration always fail.  I thought
we could free the metadata so such page can be freed in migration and make
migration more reliable.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: go direct to try_to_free_buffers()]
Signed-off-by: NShaohua Li <shaohua.li@intel.com>
Acked-by: NNick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Acked-by: NChristoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Though the lower_zone_protection was changed to lowmem_reserve_ratio, the
document has been not changed.  The lowmem_reserve_ratio seems quite hard
to estimate, but there is no guidance.  This patch is to change document
for it.
Signed-off-by: NYasunori Goto <y-goto@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <andrea@cpushare.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

I've written some test programs in ltp project.  During writing I met an
problem which I cannot solve in user land.  So I wrote a patch for linux
kernel.  Please, include this patch if acceptable.

The test program tests the 4th parameter of fadvise64_64:

    long sys_fadvise64_64(int fd, loff_t offset, loff_t len, int advice);

My test case calls fadvise64_64 with invalid advice value and checks errno is
set to EINVAL.  About the advice parameter man page says:

    ...
    Permissible values for advice include:

	   POSIX_FADV_NORMAL
                  ...
	   POSIX_FADV_SEQUENTIAL
                  ...
	   POSIX_FADV_RANDOM
		  ...
	   POSIX_FADV_NOREUSE
                  ...
	   POSIX_FADV_WILLNEED
                  ...
	   POSIX_FADV_DONTNEED
		  ...
    ERRORS
           ...
	   EINVAL An invalid value was specified for advice.

However, I got a bug report that the system call invocations
in my test case returned 0 unexpectedly.

I've inspected the kernel code:

    asmlinkage long sys_fadvise64_64(int fd, loff_t offset, loff_t len, int advice)
    {
	    struct file *file = fget(fd);
	    struct address_space *mapping;
	    struct backing_dev_info *bdi;
	    loff_t endbyte;			/* inclusive */
	    pgoff_t start_index;
	    pgoff_t end_index;
	    unsigned long nrpages;
	    int ret = 0;

	    if (!file)
		    return -EBADF;

	    if (S_ISFIFO(file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) {
		    ret = -ESPIPE;
		    goto out;
	    }

	    mapping = file->f_mapping;
	    if (!mapping || len < 0) {
		    ret = -EINVAL;
		    goto out;
	    }

	    if (mapping->a_ops->get_xip_page)
		    /* no bad return value, but ignore advice */
		    goto out;
    ...
    out:
	    fput(file);
	    return ret;
    }

I found the advice parameter is just ignored in the case
mapping->a_ops->get_xip_page is given. This behavior is different from
what is written on the man page. Is this o.k.?

get_xip_page is given if CONFIG_EXT2_FS_XIP is true.
Anyway I cannot find the easy way to detect get_xip_page
field is given or CONFIG_EXT2_FS_XIP is true from the
user space.

I propose the following patch which checks the advice parameter
even if get_xip_page is given.
Signed-off-by: NMasatake YAMATO <yamato@redhat.com>
Acked-by: NCarsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The show_mem() output does not include the total number of pagecache
pages.  This would be helpful when analyzing the debug information in
the /var/log/messages file after OOM kills occur.

This patch includes the total pagecache pages in that output.
Signed-off-by: NLarry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

In 46d2277c ("Clean up and make
try_to_free_buffers() not race with dirty pages"), try_to_free_buffers
was changed to bail out if the page was dirty.

That in turn caused truncate_complete_page to leak massive amounts of
memory, because the dirty bit was only cleared after the call to
try_to_free_buffers.

So the call to cancel_dirty_page was moved up to have the dirty bit
cleared early in 3e67c098 ("truncate:
clear page dirtiness before running try_to_free_buffers()").

The problem with that fix is, that the page can be redirtied after
cancel_dirty_page was called, eg. like this:

truncate_complete_page()
  cancel_dirty_page() // PG_dirty cleared, decr. dirty pages
  do_invalidatepage()
    ext3_invalidatepage()
      journal_invalidatepage()
        journal_unmap_buffer()
          __dispose_buffer()
            __journal_unfile_buffer()
              __journal_temp_unlink_buffer()
                mark_buffer_dirty(); // PG_dirty set, incr. dirty pages

And then we end up with dirty pages being wrongly accounted.

As a result, in ecdfc978 ("Resurrect
'try_to_free_buffers()' VM hackery") the changes to try_to_free_buffers
were reverted, so the original reason for the massive memory leak is
gone, and we can also revert the move of the call to cancel_dirty_page
from truncate_complete_page and get the accounting right again.

I'm not sure if it matters, but opposed to the final check in
__remove_from_page_cache, this one also cares about the task io
accounting, so maybe we want to use this instead, although it's not
quite the clean fix either.
Signed-off-by: NBjörn Steinbrink <B.Steinbrink@gmx.de>
Tested-by: NKrzysztof Piotr Oledzki <ole@ans.pl>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz>
Cc: Nick Piggin <nickpiggin@yahoo.com.au>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Thomas Osterried <osterried@jesse.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

The current PageTail semantic is that a PageTail page is first a
PageCompound page.  So remove the redundant PageCompound test in
set_page_refcounted().
Signed-off-by: NQi Yong <qiyong@fc-cn.com>
Cc: Christoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

fastcall is always defined to be empty, remove it

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes]
Signed-off-by: NHarvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Signed-off-by: NAndi Kleen <ak@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Since I_SYNC was split out from I_LOCK, the concern in commit
4b89eed9 ("Write back inode data pages
even when the inode itself is locked") is not longer valid.

We should revert to the original behavior: in __writeback_single_inode(),
when we find an I_SYNC-ed inode and we're not doing a data-integrity sync,
skip writing entirely.  Otherwise, we are double calling do_writepages()
Signed-off-by: NQi Yong <qiyong@fc-cn.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Cc: Joern Engel <joern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de>
Cc: WU Fengguang <wfg@mail.ustc.edu.cn>
Cc: Michael Rubin <mrubin@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

try_to_unmap always fails on a page found in a VM_LOCKED vma (unless
migrating), and recycles it back to the active list.  But if it's an
anonymous page, we've already allocated swap to it: just wasting swap.
Spot locked pages in page_referenced_one and treat them as referenced.
Signed-off-by: NHugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>
Tested-by: NKAMEZAWA Hiroyuki <kamezawa.hiroyu@jp.fujitsu.com>
Cc: Ethan Solomita <solo@google.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Remove the prefetch logic in order to avoid touching impossible per cpu
areas.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Cc: Mike Travis <travis@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

This patch fixes a sles9 system hang in start_this_handle from a customer
with some heavy workload where all tasks are waiting on kjournald to commit
the transaction, but kjournald waits on t_updates to go down to zero (it
never does).

This was reported as a lowmem shortage deadlock but when checking the debug
data I noticed the VM wasn't under pressure at all (well it was really
under vm pressure, because lots of tasks hanged in the VM prune_dcache
methods trying to flush dirty inodes, but no task was hanging in GFP_NOFS
mode, the holder of the journal handle should have if this was a vm issue
in the first place).

No task was apparently holding the leftover handle in the committing
transaction, so I deduced t_updates was stuck to 1 because a journal_stop
was never run by some path (this turned out to be correct).  With a debug
patch adding proper reverse links and stack trace logging in ext3 deployed
in production, I found journal_stop is never run because
mark_inode_dirty_sync is called inside release_task called by do_exit.
(that was quite fun because I would have never thought about this
subtleness, I thought a regular path in ext3 had a bug and it forgot to
call journal_stop)

do_exit->release_task->mark_inode_dirty_sync->schedule() (will never
come back to run journal_stop)

The reason is that shrink_dcache_parent is racy by design (feature not
a bug) and it can do blocking I/O in some case, but the point is that
calling shrink_dcache_parent at the last stage of do_exit isn't safe
for self-reaping tasks.

I guess the memory pressure of the unbalanced highmem system allowed
to trigger this more easily.

Now mainline doesn't have this line in iput (like sles9 has):

    	     if (inode->i_state & I_DIRTY_DELAYED)
	     			mark_inode_dirty_sync(inode);

so it will probably not crash with ext3, but for example ext2 implements an
I/O-blocking ext2_put_inode that will lead to similar screwups with
ext2_free_blocks never coming back and it's definitely wrong to call
blocking-IO paths inside do_exit.  So this should fix a subtle bug in
mainline too (not verified in practice though).  The equivalent fix for
ext3 is also not verified yet to fix the problem in sles9 but I don't have
doubt it will (it usually takes days to crash, so it'll take weeks to be
sure).

An alternate fix would be to offload that work to a kernel thread, but I
don't think a reschedule for this is worth it, the vm should be able to
collect those entries for the synchronous release_task.
Signed-off-by: NAndrea Arcangeli <andrea@suse.de>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@ucw.cz>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: Alexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

Add vm.highmem_is_dirtyable toggle

A 32 bit machine with HIGHMEM64 enabled running DCC has an MMAPed file of
approximately 2Gb size which contains a hash format that is written
randomly by the dbclean process.  On 2.6.16 this process took a few
minutes.  With lowmem only accounting of dirty ratios, this takes about 12
hours of 100% disk IO, all random writes.

Include a toggle in /proc/sys/vm/highmem_is_dirtyable which can be set to 1 to
add the highmem back to the total available memory count.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: Fix the CONFIG_DETECT_SOFTLOCKUP=y build]
Signed-off-by: NBron Gondwana <brong@fastmail.fm>
Cc: Ethan Solomita <solo@google.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Cc: WU Fengguang <wfg@mail.ustc.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

We have repeatedly discussed if the cold pages still have a point. There is
one way to join the two lists: Use a single list and put the cold pages at the
end and the hot pages at the beginning. That way a single list can serve for
both types of allocations.

The discussion of the RFC for this and Mel's measurements indicate that
there may not be too much of a point left to having separate lists for
hot and cold pages (see http://marc.info/?t=119492914200001&r=1&w=2).
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mel@csn.ul.ie>
Cc: Martin Bligh <mbligh@mbligh.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

When running with a 16M IOREMAP_MAX_ORDER (on armv7) we found that the
vmlist search routine in __get_vm_area_node can mistakenly allow a driver
to ioremap a range larger than vmalloc space.

If at the time of the ioremap all existing vmlist areas sit below the
determined alignment then the search routine continues past all entries and
exits the for loop - straight into the found: label - without ever testing
for integer wrapping or that the requested size fits.

We were seeing a driver successfully ioremap 128M of flash even though
there was only 120M of vmalloc space.  From that point the system was left
with the remainder of the first 16M of space to vmalloc/ioremap within.
Signed-off-by: NRobert Bragg <robert@sixbynine.org>
Acked-by: NNick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

1. Add comments explaining how the function can be called.

2. Collect global diffs in a local array and only spill
   them once into the global counters when the zone scan
   is finished. This means that we only touch each global
   counter once instead of each time we fold cpu counters
   into zone counters.
Signed-off-by: NChristoph Lameter <clameter@sgi.com>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>