crypto: rsa-pkcs1pad - use constant time memory comparison for MACs

Otherwise, we enable all sorts of forgeries via timing attack.
Signed-off-by: NJason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Suggested-by: NStephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>

crypto/rsa-pkcs1pad.c

@@ -490,7 +490,7 @@ static int pkcs1pad_verify_complete(struct akcipher_request *req, int err)
 		goto done;
 	pos++;
 
-	if (memcmp(out_buf + pos, digest_info->data, digest_info->size))
+	if (crypto_memneq(out_buf + pos, digest_info->data, digest_info->size))
 		goto done;
 
 	pos += digest_info->size;