- 27 2月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Jeffrey Wilcke 提交于
params: settle the Pi vs Tau dispute
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- 26 2月, 2016 3 次提交
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由 Jeffrey Wilcke 提交于
This commit increases the artificial gas floor to 4712388
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由 Jeffrey Wilcke 提交于
eth/downloader: fix header download limiting
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由 Felix Lange 提交于
Fixes #2201
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- 24 2月, 2016 8 次提交
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由 Péter Szilágyi 提交于
Godeps, eth, tests: update ethash, used shared for testing
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由 Péter Szilágyi 提交于
eth/downloader: bump the download queue size to prevent starvation
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由 Jeffrey Wilcke 提交于
Closes #2241: Use Keccak-256 from golang.org/x/crypto/sha3 and mention explicitly
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由 Péter Szilágyi 提交于
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由 Péter Szilágyi 提交于
p2p/discover: NTP sanity check clock drift in case of expirations
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由 Péter Szilágyi 提交于
ethdb: fully disable metrics if not requested (oops?)
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由 Péter Szilágyi 提交于
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由 Péter Szilágyi 提交于
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- 23 2月, 2016 6 次提交
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由 Péter Szilágyi 提交于
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由 Péter Szilágyi 提交于
Added Vagrantfile so that developers can spin up a VM to build geth
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由 Péter Szilágyi 提交于
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由 Péter Szilágyi 提交于
eth: fixed homestead tx check
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由 Péter Szilágyi 提交于
eth/downloader: fix partial rollback and ancestor lookup
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由 Péter Szilágyi 提交于
core/state, trie: add node iterator, test state/trie sync consistency
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- 22 2月, 2016 12 次提交
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As we aren't really using the standarized SHA-3
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This hash function is slightly different from the standarized NIST SHA-3 as both of them use different domain separation bits.
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Revision: 1f22c0103821b9390939b6776727195525381532
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- 20 2月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Jeffrey Wilcke 提交于
When a block is queried for retrieval we should add a check whether the block falls within the frontier rules. If we'd always use `From` retrieving transaction might fail. This PR temporarily changes everything to `FromFrontier` (safe!).
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- 19 2月, 2016 8 次提交
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由 Jeffrey Wilcke 提交于
core, core/vm: consensus changes necessary for the homestead release
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由 Felix Lange 提交于
console: seed random number generator
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由 Bas van Kervel 提交于
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由 Jeffrey Wilcke 提交于
p2p, p2p/discover: EIP-8 changes
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由 Felix Lange 提交于
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由 Felix Lange 提交于
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由 Felix Lange 提交于
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由 Péter Szilágyi 提交于
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- 18 2月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Jeffrey Wilcke 提交于
Assuming the following scenario where a miner has 15% of all hashing power and the ability to exert a moderate control over the network to the point where if the attacker sees a message A, it can't stop A from propagating, but what it **can** do is send a message B and ensure that most nodes see B before A. The attacker can then selfish mine and augment selfish mining strategy by giving his own blocks an advantage. This change makes the time at which a block is received less relevant and so the level of control an attacker has over the network no longer makes a difference. This change changes the current td algorithm `B_td > C_td` to the new algorithm `B_td > C_td || B_td == C_td && rnd < 0.5`.
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