- 22 5月, 2006 1 次提交
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由 Alexey Dobriyan 提交于
Signed-off-by: NAlexey Dobriyan <adobriyan@gmail.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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- 16 5月, 2006 1 次提交
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由 Serge E. Hallyn 提交于
Check for NULL kmalloc return value before writing to it. Signed-off-by: NSerge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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- 04 5月, 2006 1 次提交
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由 Stephen Smalley 提交于
Clear selinux_enabled flag upon runtime disable of SELinux by userspace, and make sure it is defined even if selinux= boot parameter support is not enabled in configuration. Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Tested-by: NJon Smirl <jonsmirl@gmail.com> Acked-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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- 01 5月, 2006 4 次提交
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由 Steve Grubb 提交于
The below patch should be applied after the inode and ipc sid patches. This patch is a reworking of Tim's patch that has been updated to match the inode and ipc patches since its similar. [updated: > Stephen Smalley also wanted to change a variable from isec to tsec in the > user sid patch. ] Signed-off-by: NSteve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Steve Grubb 提交于
Hi, The patch below converts IPC auditing to collect sid's and convert to context string only if it needs to output an audit record. This patch depends on the inode audit change patch already being applied. Signed-off-by: NSteve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Steve Grubb 提交于
Previously, we were gathering the context instead of the sid. Now in this patch, we gather just the sid and convert to context only if an audit event is being output. This patch brings the performance hit from 146% down to 23% Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Darrel Goeddel 提交于
The following patch provides selinux interfaces that will allow the audit system to perform filtering based on the process context (user, role, type, sensitivity, and clearance). These interfaces will allow the selinux module to perform efficient matches based on lower level selinux constructs, rather than relying on context retrievals and string comparisons within the audit module. It also allows for dominance checks on the mls portion of the contexts that are impossible with only string comparisons. Signed-off-by: NDarrel Goeddel <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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- 20 4月, 2006 1 次提交
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由 Ron Yorston 提交于
Fix an off-by-one error in the MLS compatibility code that was causing contexts with a MLS suffix to be rejected, preventing sharing partitions between FC4 and FC5. Bug reported in https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=188068Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@redhat.com> Cc: <stable@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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- 11 4月, 2006 2 次提交
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由 David Howells 提交于
Remove an unnecessary memory barrier (implicit in rcu_dereference()) from install_session_keyring(). install_session_keyring() is also rearranged a little to make it slightly more efficient. As install_*_keyring() may schedule (in synchronize_rcu() or keyring_alloc()), they may not be entered with interrupts disabled - and so there's no point saving the interrupt disablement state over the critical section. exec_keys() will also be invoked with interrupts enabled, and so that doesn't need to save the interrupt state either. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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由 David Howells 提交于
This fixes the problem of an oops occuring when a user attempts to add a key to a non-keyring key [CVE-2006-1522]. The problem is that __keyring_search_one() doesn't check that the keyring it's been given is actually a keyring. I've fixed this problem by: (1) declaring that caller of __keyring_search_one() must guarantee that the keyring is a keyring; and (2) making key_create_or_update() check that the keyring is a keyring, and return -ENOTDIR if it isn't. This can be tested by: keyctl add user b b `keyctl add user a a @s` Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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- 10 4月, 2006 1 次提交
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由 Dave Jones 提交于
security/selinux/xfrm.c: In function 'selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram': security/selinux/xfrm.c:284: error: 'struct sec_path' has no member named 'x' security/selinux/xfrm.c: In function 'selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb': security/selinux/xfrm.c:317: error: 'struct sec_path' has no member named 'x' Signed-off-by: NDave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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- 26 3月, 2006 4 次提交
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由 Chris Wright 提交于
PTRACE_TRACEME doesn't have proper capabilities validation when parent is less privileged than child. Issue pointed out by Ram Gupta <ram.gupta5@gmail.com>. Note: I haven't identified a strong security issue, and it's a small ABI change that could break apps that rely on existing behaviour (which allows parent that is less privileged than child to ptrace when child does PTRACE_TRACEME). Signed-off-by: NChris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Ram Gupta <ram.gupta5@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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由 Chris Wright 提交于
Move capable() to kernel/capability.c and eliminate duplicate implementations. Add __capable() function which can be used to check for capabiilty of any process. Signed-off-by: NChris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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由 David Howells 提交于
Cause an attempt to add a duplicate non-updateable key (such as a keyring) to a keyring to discard the extant copy in favour of the new one rather than failing with EEXIST: # do the test in an empty session keyctl session # create a new keyring called "a" and attach to session keyctl newring a @s # create another new keyring called "a" and attach to session, # displacing the keyring added by the second command: keyctl newring a @s Without this patch, the third command will fail. For updateable keys (such as those of "user" type), the update method will still be called rather than a new key being created. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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由 David Howells 提交于
Make key quota detection generate an error if either quota is exceeded rather than only if both quotas are exceeded. Signed-off-by: NDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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- 24 3月, 2006 1 次提交
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由 Davi Arnaut 提交于
Copies user-space string with strndup_user() and moves the type string duplication code to a function (thus fixing a wrong check on the length of the type.) Signed-off-by: NDavi Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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- 23 3月, 2006 1 次提交
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由 Davi Arnaut 提交于
This patch address several issues in the current BSD Secure Levels code: o plaintext_to_sha1: Missing check for a NULL return from __get_free_page o passwd_write_file: A page is leaked if the password is wrong. o fix securityfs registration order o seclvl_init is a mess and can't properly tolerate failures, failure path is upside down (deldif and delf should be switched) Cleanups: o plaintext_to_sha1: Use buffers passed in o passwd_write_file: Use kmalloc() instead of get_zeroed_page() o passwd_write_file: hashedPassword comparison is just memcmp o s/ENOSYS/EINVAL/ o misc (akpm: after some discussion it appears that the BSD secure levels feature should be scheduled for removal. But for now, let's fix these problems up). Signed-off-by: NDavi Arnaut <davi.arnaut@gmail.com> Cc: Michael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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- 22 3月, 2006 11 次提交
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由 James Morris 提交于
Add a slab cache for the SELinux inode security struct, one of which is allocated for every inode instantiated by the system. The memory savings are considerable. On 64-bit, instead of the size-128 cache, we have a slab object of 96 bytes, saving 32 bytes per object. After booting, I see about 4000 of these and then about 17,000 after a kernel compile. With this patch, we save around 530KB of kernel memory in the latter case. On 32-bit, the savings are about half of this. Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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由 James Morris 提交于
Remove an unneded pointer variable in selinux_inode_init_security(). Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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由 James Morris 提交于
A further fix is needed for selinuxfs link count management, to ensure that the count is correct for the parent directory when a subdirectory is created. This is only required for the root directory currently, but the code has been updated for the general case. Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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由 James Morris 提交于
Fix copy & paste error in sel_make_avc_files(), removing a supurious call to d_genocide() in the error path. All of this will be cleaned up by kill_litter_super(). Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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由 James Morris 提交于
Remove the call to sel_make_bools() from sel_fill_super(), as policy needs to be loaded before the boolean files can be created. Policy will never be loaded during sel_fill_super() as selinuxfs is kernel mounted during init and the only means to load policy is via selinuxfs. Also, the call to d_genocide() on the error path of sel_make_bools() is incorrect and replaced with sel_remove_bools(). Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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由 James Morris 提交于
Unify the error path of sel_fill_super() so that all errors pass through the same point and generate an error message. Also, removes a spurious dput() in the error path which breaks the refcounting for the filesystem (litter_kill_super() will correctly clean things up itself on error). Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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由 James Morris 提交于
Use existing sel_make_dir() helper to create booleans directory rather than duplicating the logic. Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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由 James Morris 提交于
Fix the hard link count for selinuxfs directories, which are currently one short. Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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由 Stephen Smalley 提交于
Simplify sel_read_bool to use the simple_read_from_buffer helper, like the other selinuxfs functions. Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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由 Ingo Molnar 提交于
Semaphore to mutex conversion. The conversion was generated via scripts, and the result was validated automatically via a script as well. Signed-off-by: NIngo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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由 Stephen Smalley 提交于
This patch disables the automatic labeling of new inodes on disk when no policy is loaded. Discussion is here: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=180296 In short, we're changing the behavior so that when no policy is loaded, SELinux does not label files at all. Currently it does add an 'unlabeled' label in this case, which we've found causes problems later. SELinux always maintains a safe internal label if there is none, so with this patch, we just stick with that and wait until a policy is loaded before adding a persistent label on disk. The effect is simply that if you boot with SELinux enabled but no policy loaded and create a file in that state, SELinux won't try to set a security extended attribute on the new inode on the disk. This is the only sane behavior for SELinux in that state, as it cannot determine the right label to assign in the absence of a policy. That state usually doesn't occur, but the rawhide installer seemed to be misbehaving temporarily so it happened to show up on a test install. Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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- 21 3月, 2006 9 次提交
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由 Catherine Zhang 提交于
Signed-off-by: NCatherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
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由 Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo 提交于
A recent changeset removes dummy_socket_getpeersec, replacing it with two new functions, but still references the removed function in the security_fixup_ops table, fix it by doing the replacement operation in the fixup table too. Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Catherine Zhang 提交于
This patch implements an application of the LSM-IPSec networking controls whereby an application can determine the label of the security association its TCP or UDP sockets are currently connected to via getsockopt and the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Patch purpose: This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the security context of an IPSec security association a particular TCP or UDP socket is using. The application can then use this security context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of the peer at the other end of this connection. In the case of UDP, the security context is for each individual packet. An example application is the inetd daemon, which could be modified to start daemons running at security contexts dependent on the remote client. Patch design approach: - Design for TCP The patch enables the SELinux LSM to set the peer security context for a socket based on the security context of the IPSec security association. The application may retrieve this context using getsockopt. When called, the kernel determines if the socket is a connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket and, if so, uses the dst_entry cache on the socket to retrieve the security associations. If a security association has a security context, the context string is returned, as for UNIX domain sockets. - Design for UDP Unlike TCP, UDP is connectionless. This requires a somewhat different API to retrieve the peer security context. With TCP, the peer security context stays the same throughout the connection, thus it can be retrieved at any time between when the connection is established and when it is torn down. With UDP, each read/write can have different peer and thus the security context might change every time. As a result the security context retrieval must be done TOGETHER with the packet retrieval. The solution is to build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for retrieving user credentials. Linux offers the API for obtaining user credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages that are bundled together with a normal message). Patch implementation details: - Implementation for TCP The security context can be retrieved by applications using getsockopt with the existing SO_PEERSEC flag. As an example (ignoring error checking): getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, optbuf, &optlen); printf("Socket peer context is: %s\n", optbuf); The SELinux function, selinux_socket_getpeersec, is extended to check for labeled security associations for connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED == sk->sk_state) TCP sockets only. If so, the socket has a dst_cache of struct dst_entry values that may refer to security associations. If these have security associations with security contexts, the security context is returned. getsockopt returns a buffer that contains a security context string or the buffer is unmodified. - Implementation for UDP To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by setting the IP_PASSSEC option via getsockopt. Then the application retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism. An example server application for UDP should look like this: toggle = 1; toggle_len = sizeof(toggle); setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len); recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0); if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr); if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_IP && cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) { memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext)); } } ip_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option IP_PASSSEC to allow a server socket to receive security context of the peer. A new ancillary message type SCM_SECURITY. When the packet is received we get the security context from the sec_path pointer which is contained in the sk_buff, and copy it to the ancillary message space. An additional LSM hook, selinux_socket_getpeersec_udp, is defined to retrieve the security context from the SELinux space. The existing function, selinux_socket_getpeersec does not suit our purpose, because the security context is copied directly to user space, rather than to kernel space. Testing: We have tested the patch by setting up TCP and UDP connections between applications on two machines using the IPSec policies that result in labeled security associations being built. For TCP, we can then extract the peer security context using getsockopt on either end. For UDP, the receiving end can retrieve the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg. Signed-off-by: NCatherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com> Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Jamal Hadi Salim 提交于
Add new netlink messages to selinux framework Signed-off-by: NJamal Hadi Salim <hadi@cyberus.ca> Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
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由 Amy Griffis 提交于
Updated patch to dynamically allocate audit rule fields in kernel's internal representation. Added unlikely() calls for testing memory allocation result. Amy Griffis wrote: [Wed Jan 11 2006, 02:02:31PM EST] > Modify audit's kernel-userspace interface to allow the specification > of string fields in audit rules. > > Signed-off-by: Amy Griffis <amy.griffis@hp.com> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> (cherry picked from 5ffc4a863f92351b720fe3e9c5cd647accff9e03 commit)
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由 Steve Grubb 提交于
Attached is a patch that hardwires important SE Linux events to the audit system. Please Apply. Signed-off-by: NSteve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Acked-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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由 Dustin Kirkland 提交于
This patch fixes a couple of bugs revealed in new features recently added to -mm1: * fixes warnings due to inconsistent use of const struct inode *inode * fixes bug that prevent a kernel from booting with audit on, and SELinux off due to a missing function in security/dummy.c * fixes a bug that throws spurious audit_panic() messages due to a missing return just before an error_path label * some reasonable house cleaning in audit_ipc_context(), audit_inode_context(), and audit_log_task_context() Signed-off-by: NDustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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由 Dustin Kirkland 提交于
This patch extends existing audit records with subject/object context information. Audit records associated with filesystem inodes, ipc, and tasks now contain SELinux label information in the field "subj" if the item is performing the action, or in "obj" if the item is the receiver of an action. These labels are collected via hooks in SELinux and appended to the appropriate record in the audit code. This additional information is required for Common Criteria Labeled Security Protection Profile (LSPP). [AV: fixed kmalloc flags use] [folded leak fixes] [folded cleanup from akpm (kfree(NULL)] [folded audit_inode_context() leak fix] [folded akpm's fix for audit_ipc_perm() definition in case of !CONFIG_AUDIT] Signed-off-by: NDustin Kirkland <dustin.kirkland@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
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由 Steve Grubb 提交于
The attached patch updates various items for the new user space messages. Please apply. Signed-off-by: NSteve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: NDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
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- 12 3月, 2006 1 次提交
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由 Stephen Smalley 提交于
Fix SELinux to not reset the tracer SID when the child is already being traced, since selinux_ptrace is also called by proc for access checking outside of the context of a ptrace attach. Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by: NChris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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- 08 2月, 2006 1 次提交
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由 Stephen Smalley 提交于
Make SELinux depend on AUDIT as it requires the basic audit support to log permission denials at all. Note that AUDITSYSCALL remains optional for SELinux, although it can be useful in providing further information upon denials. Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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- 06 2月, 2006 1 次提交
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由 Stephen Smalley 提交于
Make SELinux depend on SECURITY_NETWORK (which depends on SECURITY), as it requires the socket hooks for proper operation even in the local case. Signed-off-by: NStephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org> Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
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