1. 19 4月, 2011 3 次提交
    • L
      Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mason/btrfs-unstable · adff377b
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      * git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mason/btrfs-unstable: (24 commits)
        Btrfs: fix free space cache leak
        Btrfs: avoid taking the chunk_mutex in do_chunk_alloc
        Btrfs end_bio_extent_readpage should look for locked bits
        Btrfs: don't force chunk allocation in find_free_extent
        Btrfs: Check validity before setting an acl
        Btrfs: Fix incorrect inode nlink in btrfs_link()
        Btrfs: Check if btrfs_next_leaf() returns error in btrfs_real_readdir()
        Btrfs: Check if btrfs_next_leaf() returns error in btrfs_listxattr()
        Btrfs: make uncache_state unconditional
        btrfs: using cached extent_state in set/unlock combinations
        Btrfs: avoid taking the trans_mutex in btrfs_end_transaction
        Btrfs: fix subvolume mount by name problem when default mount subvolume is set
        fix user annotation in ioctl.c
        Btrfs: check for duplicate iov_base's when doing dio reads
        btrfs: properly handle overlapping areas in memmove_extent_buffer
        Btrfs: fix memory leaks in btrfs_new_inode()
        Btrfs: check for duplicate iov_base's when doing dio reads
        Btrfs: reuse the extent_map we found when calling btrfs_get_extent
        Btrfs: do not use async submit for small DIO io's
        Btrfs: don't split dio bios if we don't have to
        ...
      adff377b
    • L
      proc: do proper range check on readdir offset · d8bdc59f
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      Rather than pass in some random truncated offset to the pid-related
      functions, check that the offset is in range up-front.
      
      This is just cleanup, the previous commit fixed the real problem.
      
      Cc: stable@kernel.org
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      d8bdc59f
    • L
      next_pidmap: fix overflow condition · c78193e9
      Linus Torvalds 提交于
      next_pidmap() just quietly accepted whatever 'last' pid that was passed
      in, which is not all that safe when one of the users is /proc.
      
      Admittedly the proc code should do some sanity checking on the range
      (and that will be the next commit), but that doesn't mean that the
      helper functions should just do that pidmap pointer arithmetic without
      checking the range of its arguments.
      
      So clamp 'last' to PID_MAX_LIMIT.  The fact that we then do "last+1"
      doesn't really matter, the for-loop does check against the end of the
      pidmap array properly (it's only the actual pointer arithmetic overflow
      case we need to worry about, and going one bit beyond isn't going to
      overflow).
      
      [ Use PID_MAX_LIMIT rather than pid_max as per Eric Biederman ]
      Reported-by: NTavis Ormandy <taviso@cmpxchg8b.com>
      Analyzed-by: NRobert Święcki <robert@swiecki.net>
      Cc: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
      Cc: Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@openvz.org>
      Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      c78193e9
  2. 18 4月, 2011 8 次提交
  3. 17 4月, 2011 5 次提交
  4. 16 4月, 2011 17 次提交
  5. 15 4月, 2011 7 次提交