For IP MIB (RFC4293).
Signed-off-by: NYOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>

Otherwise, we will see a lot of casts...
Signed-off-by: NYOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>

Signed-off-by: NYOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>

Signed-off-by: NYOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>

The data itself is already charged to the SKB, doing
the skb_set_owner_w() just generates a lot of noise and
extra atomics we don't really need.

Lmbench improvements on lat_tcp are minimal:

before:
TCP latency using localhost: 23.2701 microseconds
TCP latency using localhost: 23.1994 microseconds
TCP latency using localhost: 23.2257 microseconds

after:
TCP latency using localhost: 22.8380 microseconds
TCP latency using localhost: 22.9465 microseconds
TCP latency using localhost: 22.8462 microseconds
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

We currently allocate a fixed size (TCP_SYNQ_HSIZE=512) slots hash table for
each LISTEN socket, regardless of various parameters (listen backlog for
example)

On x86_64, this means order-1 allocations (might fail), even for 'small'
sockets, expecting few connections. On the contrary, a huge server wanting a
backlog of 50000 is slowed down a bit because of this fixed limit.

This patch makes the sizing of listen hash table a dynamic parameter,
depending of :
- net.core.somaxconn tunable (default is 128)
- net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog tunable (default : 256, 1024 or 128)
- backlog value given by user application  (2nd parameter of listen())

For large allocations (bigger than PAGE_SIZE), we use vmalloc() instead of
kmalloc().

We still limit memory allocation with the two existing tunables (somaxconn &
tcp_max_syn_backlog). So for standard setups, this patch actually reduce RAM
usage.
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Move the attribute policy for the non-specific attributes into
net/fib_rules.h and include it in the respective protocols.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Move mark selector currently implemented per protocol into
the protocol independant part.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Now that all protocols have been made aware of the mark
field it can be moved out of the union thus simplyfing
its usage.

The config options in the IPv4/IPv6/DECnet subsystems
to enable respectively disable mark based routing only
obfuscate the code with ifdefs, the cost for the
additional comparison in the flow key is insignificant,
and most distributions have all these options enabled
by default anyway. Therefore it makes sense to remove
the config options and enable mark based routing by
default.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

nfmark is being used in various subsystems and has become
the defacto mark field for all kinds of packets. Therefore
it makes sense to rename it to `mark' and remove the
dependency on CONFIG_NETFILTER.
Signed-off-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

MAX_HEADER does not include the ipv6 header length in it,
so we need to add it in explicitly.

With help from YOSHIFUJI Hideaki.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

TCP and RAW do not have this issue.  Closes Bug #7432.
Signed-off-by: NYOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NYasuyuki Kozakai <yasuyuki.kozakai@toshiba.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: NYOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>

Signed-off-by: NYasuyuki Kozakai <yasuyuki.kozakai@toshiba.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: NYOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>

RFC4191 explicitly states that the procedures are applicable to
hosts only.  We should not have changed behavior of routers.
Signed-off-by: NYOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>

Signed-off-by: NYOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>

Only routers in "FAILED" state should be considered unreachable.
Otherwise, we do not try to use speicific routes unless all least specific
routers are considered unreachable.
Signed-off-by: NYOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>

nexthdr is NEXTHDR_FRAGMENT, the nexthdr value from the fragment header
is hp->nexthdr.
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Based on patch by James D. Nurmi:

I've got some code very dependant on nfnetlink_queue, and turned up a
large number of warns coming from skb_trim.  While it's quite possibly
my code, having not seen it on older kernels made me a bit suspect.

Anyhow, based on some googling I turned up this thread:
http://lkml.org/lkml/2006/8/13/56

And believe the issue to be related, so attached is a small patch to
the kernel -- not sure if this is completely correct, but for anyone
else hitting the WARN_ON(1) in skbuff.h, it might be helpful..
Signed-off-by: NJames D. Nurmi <jdnurmi@gmail.com>

Ported to ip6_queue and nfnetlink_queue and added return value
checks.
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

It would be nice to keep things working even with this built as a
module, it took me some time to realize my IPv6 tunnel was broken
because of the missing sit module. This module alias fixes things
until distributions have added an appropriate alias to modprobe.conf.
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

If inet6_init() fails later than ndisc_init() call, or IPv6 module is
unloaded, ndisc_netdev_notifier call remains in the list and will follows in
oops later.
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

In theory these are opaque 32bit values.  However, we end up
allocating them sequentially in host-endian and stick unchanged
on the wire.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

There's a bug in the seqfile show operation for flowlabel objects, where 
each hash chain is traversed cumulatively for each element.  The following 
function is called for each element of each chain:

static void ip6fl_fl_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, struct ip6_flowlabel *fl)
{
        while(fl) {
                seq_printf...
		
		fl = fl->next;
	}
}

Thus, objects can appear mutliple times when reading 
/proc/net/ip6_flowlabel, as the above is called for each element in the 
chain.

The solution is to remove the while() loop from the above, and traverse 
each chain exactly once, per the patch below.  This also removes the 
ip6fl_fl_seq_show() function, which does nothing else.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Currently, when an application requests a lease for a flowlabel via the 
IPV6_FLOWLABEL_MGR socket option, no error is returned if an invalid type 
of destination address is supplied as part of the request, leading to a 
silent failure.  This patch ensures that EINVAL is returned to the 
application in this case.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

There is a number of issues in parsing user-provided table in
translate_table(). Malicious user with CAP_NET_ADMIN may crash system by
passing special-crafted table to the *_tables.

The first issue is that mark_source_chains() function is called before entry
content checks. In case of standard target, mark_source_chains() function
uses t->verdict field in order to determine new position. But the check, that
this field leads no further, than the table end, is in check_entry(), which
is called later, than mark_source_chains().

The second issue, that there is no check that target_offset points inside
entry. If so, *_ITERATE_MATCH macro will follow further, than the entry
ends. As a result, we'll have oops or memory disclosure.

And the third issue, that there is no check that the target is completely
inside entry. Results are the same, as in previous issue.
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org>
Acked-by: NKirill Korotaev <dev@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

There's a bug in the seqfile handling for /proc/net/ip6_flowlabel, where,
after finding a flowlabel, the code will loop forever not finding any
further flowlabels, first traversing the rest of the hash bucket then just
looping.

This patch fixes the problem by breaking after the hash bucket has been
traversed.

Note that this bug can cause lockups and oopses, and is trivially invoked
by an unpriveleged user.
Signed-off-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NHeiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

As reported by Mark Dowd <Mark_Dowd@McAfee.com>, ip6_tables is susceptible
to a fragmentation attack causing false negatives on extension header matches.

When extension headers occur in the non-first fragment after the fragment
header (possibly with an incorrect nexthdr value in the fragment header)
a rule looking for this extension header will never match.

Drop fragments that are at offset 0 and don't contain the final protocol
header regardless of the ruleset, since this should not happen normally.
Since all extension headers are before the protocol header this makes sure
an extension header is either not present or in the first fragment, where
we can properly parse it.

With help from Yasuyuki KOZAKAI <yasuyuki.kozakai@toshiba.co.jp>.
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

As reported by Mark Dowd <Mark_Dowd@McAfee.com>, ip6_tables is susceptible
to a fragmentation attack causing false negatives on protocol matches.

When the protocol header doesn't follow the fragment header immediately,
the fragment header contains the protocol number of the next extension
header. When the extension header and the protocol header are sent in
a second fragment a rule like "ip6tables .. -p udp -j DROP" will never
match.

Drop fragments that are at offset 0 and don't contain the final protocol
header regardless of the ruleset, since this should not happen normally.

With help from Yasuyuki KOZAKAI <yasuyuki.kozakai@toshiba.co.jp>.
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NThomas Graf <tgraf@suug.ch>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>