Signed-off-by: NJörn Engel <joern@wohnheim.fh-wedel.de>
Signed-off-by: NAdrian Bunk <bunk@stusta.de>

This patch implements an API whereby an application can determine the
label of its peer's Unix datagram sockets via the auxiliary data mechanism of
recvmsg.

Patch purpose:

This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the
security context of the peer of a Unix datagram socket.  The application
can then use this security context to determine the security context for
processing on behalf of the peer who sent the packet.

Patch design and implementation:

The design and implementation is very similar to the UDP case for INET
sockets.  Basically we build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for
retrieving user credentials.  Linux offers the API for obtaining user
credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages
that are bundled together with a normal message).  To retrieve the security
context, the application first indicates to the kernel such desire by
setting the SO_PASSSEC option via getsockopt.  Then the application
retrieves the security context using the auxiliary data mechanism.

An example server application for Unix datagram socket should look like this:

toggle = 1;
toggle_len = sizeof(toggle);

setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len);
recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0);
if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
    cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr);
    if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) &&
        cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_SOCKET &&
        cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
        memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));
    }
}

sock_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option SOCK_PASSSEC to allow
a server socket to receive security context of the peer.

Testing:

We have tested the patch by setting up Unix datagram client and server
applications.  We verified that the server can retrieve the security context
using the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: NCatherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NAcked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Adds an async_wait_queue and some additional fields to tcp_sock, and a
dma_cookie_t to sk_buff.
Signed-off-by: NChris Leech <christopher.leech@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Put a comment in there explaining why we double the setsockopt()
caller's SO_RCVBUF.  People keep wondering.
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Sizes in bytes (allyesconfig, i386) and files where those inlines
are used:

238 sock_queue_rcv_skb 2.6.16/net/x25/x25_in.o
238 sock_queue_rcv_skb 2.6.16/net/rose/rose_in.o
238 sock_queue_rcv_skb 2.6.16/net/packet/af_packet.o
238 sock_queue_rcv_skb 2.6.16/net/netrom/nr_in.o
238 sock_queue_rcv_skb 2.6.16/net/llc/llc_sap.o
238 sock_queue_rcv_skb 2.6.16/net/llc/llc_conn.o
238 sock_queue_rcv_skb 2.6.16/net/irda/af_irda.o
238 sock_queue_rcv_skb 2.6.16/net/ipx/af_ipx.o
238 sock_queue_rcv_skb 2.6.16/net/ipv6/udp.o
238 sock_queue_rcv_skb 2.6.16/net/ipv6/raw.o
238 sock_queue_rcv_skb 2.6.16/net/ipv4/udp.o
238 sock_queue_rcv_skb 2.6.16/net/ipv4/raw.o
238 sock_queue_rcv_skb 2.6.16/net/ipv4/ipmr.o
238 sock_queue_rcv_skb 2.6.16/net/econet/econet.o
238 sock_queue_rcv_skb 2.6.16/net/econet/af_econet.o
238 sock_queue_rcv_skb 2.6.16/net/bluetooth/sco.o
238 sock_queue_rcv_skb 2.6.16/net/bluetooth/l2cap.o
238 sock_queue_rcv_skb 2.6.16/net/bluetooth/hci_sock.o
238 sock_queue_rcv_skb 2.6.16/net/ax25/ax25_in.o
238 sock_queue_rcv_skb 2.6.16/net/ax25/af_ax25.o
238 sock_queue_rcv_skb 2.6.16/net/appletalk/ddp.o
238 sock_queue_rcv_skb 2.6.16/drivers/net/pppoe.o

276 sk_receive_skb 2.6.16/net/decnet/dn_nsp_in.o
276 sk_receive_skb 2.6.16/net/dccp/ipv6.o
276 sk_receive_skb 2.6.16/net/dccp/ipv4.o
276 sk_receive_skb 2.6.16/net/dccp/dccp_ipv6.o
276 sk_receive_skb 2.6.16/drivers/net/pppoe.o

209 sk_dst_check 2.6.16/net/ipv6/ip6_output.o
209 sk_dst_check 2.6.16/net/ipv4/udp.o
209 sk_dst_check 2.6.16/net/decnet/dn_nsp_out.o

Large inlines with multiple callers:
Size  Uses Wasted Name and definition
===== ==== ====== ================================================
  238   21   4360 sock_queue_rcv_skb    include/net/sock.h
  109   10    801 sock_recv_timestamp   include/net/sock.h
  276    4    768 sk_receive_skb        include/net/sock.h
   94    8    518 __sk_dst_check        include/net/sock.h
  209    3    378 sk_dst_check  include/net/sock.h
  131    4    333 sk_setup_caps include/net/sock.h
  152    2    132 sk_stream_alloc_pskb  include/net/sock.h
  125    2    105 sk_stream_writequeue_purge    include/net/sock.h
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Found by Solar Designer.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

No code changes, just tidying up, in some cases moving EXPORT_SYMBOLs
to just after the function exported, etc.
Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch extends {get|set}sockopt compatibility layer in order to
move protocol specific parts to their place and avoid huge universal
net/compat.c file in the future.
Signed-off-by: NDmitry Mishin <dim@openvz.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This patch implements an application of the LSM-IPSec networking
controls whereby an application can determine the label of the
security association its TCP or UDP sockets are currently connected to
via getsockopt and the auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.

Patch purpose:

This patch enables a security-aware application to retrieve the
security context of an IPSec security association a particular TCP or
UDP socket is using.  The application can then use this security
context to determine the security context for processing on behalf of
the peer at the other end of this connection.  In the case of UDP, the
security context is for each individual packet.  An example
application is the inetd daemon, which could be modified to start
daemons running at security contexts dependent on the remote client.

Patch design approach:

- Design for TCP
The patch enables the SELinux LSM to set the peer security context for
a socket based on the security context of the IPSec security
association.  The application may retrieve this context using
getsockopt.  When called, the kernel determines if the socket is a
connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket and, if so, uses the dst_entry
cache on the socket to retrieve the security associations.  If a
security association has a security context, the context string is
returned, as for UNIX domain sockets.

- Design for UDP
Unlike TCP, UDP is connectionless.  This requires a somewhat different
API to retrieve the peer security context.  With TCP, the peer
security context stays the same throughout the connection, thus it can
be retrieved at any time between when the connection is established
and when it is torn down.  With UDP, each read/write can have
different peer and thus the security context might change every time.
As a result the security context retrieval must be done TOGETHER with
the packet retrieval.

The solution is to build upon the existing Unix domain socket API for
retrieving user credentials.  Linux offers the API for obtaining user
credentials via ancillary messages (i.e., out of band/control messages
that are bundled together with a normal message).

Patch implementation details:

- Implementation for TCP
The security context can be retrieved by applications using getsockopt
with the existing SO_PEERSEC flag.  As an example (ignoring error
checking):

getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERSEC, optbuf, &optlen);
printf("Socket peer context is: %s\n", optbuf);

The SELinux function, selinux_socket_getpeersec, is extended to check
for labeled security associations for connected (TCP_ESTABLISHED ==
sk->sk_state) TCP sockets only.  If so, the socket has a dst_cache of
struct dst_entry values that may refer to security associations.  If
these have security associations with security contexts, the security
context is returned.

getsockopt returns a buffer that contains a security context string or
the buffer is unmodified.

- Implementation for UDP
To retrieve the security context, the application first indicates to
the kernel such desire by setting the IP_PASSSEC option via
getsockopt.  Then the application retrieves the security context using
the auxiliary data mechanism.

An example server application for UDP should look like this:

toggle = 1;
toggle_len = sizeof(toggle);

setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_PASSSEC, &toggle, &toggle_len);
recvmsg(sockfd, &msg_hdr, 0);
if (msg_hdr.msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) {
    cmsg_hdr = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg_hdr);
    if (cmsg_hdr->cmsg_len <= CMSG_LEN(sizeof(scontext)) &&
        cmsg_hdr->cmsg_level == SOL_IP &&
        cmsg_hdr->cmsg_type == SCM_SECURITY) {
        memcpy(&scontext, CMSG_DATA(cmsg_hdr), sizeof(scontext));
    }
}

ip_setsockopt is enhanced with a new socket option IP_PASSSEC to allow
a server socket to receive security context of the peer.  A new
ancillary message type SCM_SECURITY.

When the packet is received we get the security context from the
sec_path pointer which is contained in the sk_buff, and copy it to the
ancillary message space.  An additional LSM hook,
selinux_socket_getpeersec_udp, is defined to retrieve the security
context from the SELinux space.  The existing function,
selinux_socket_getpeersec does not suit our purpose, because the
security context is copied directly to user space, rather than to
kernel space.

Testing:

We have tested the patch by setting up TCP and UDP connections between
applications on two machines using the IPSec policies that result in
labeled security associations being built.  For TCP, we can then
extract the peer security context using getsockopt on either end.  For
UDP, the receiving end can retrieve the security context using the
auxiliary data mechanism of recvmsg.
Signed-off-by: NCatherine Zhang <cxzhang@watson.ibm.com>
Acked-by: NJames Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Acked-by: NHerbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

net: Use <linux/capability.h> where capable() is used.
Signed-off-by: NRandy Dunlap <rdunlap@xenotime.net>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

So that we can share several timewait sockets related functions and
make the timewait mini sockets infrastructure closer to the request
mini sockets one.

Next changesets will take advantage of this, moving more code out of
TCP and DCCP v4 and v6 to common infrastructure.
Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@mandriva.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

From: Jesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>

This is the net/ part of the big kfree cleanup patch.

Remove pointless checks for NULL prior to calling kfree() in net/.
Signed-off-by: NJesper Juhl <jesper.juhl@gmail.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@conectiva.com.br>
Acked-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Acked-by: NYOSHIFUJI Hideaki <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>

Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

 - added typedef unsigned int __nocast gfp_t;

 - replaced __nocast uses for gfp flags with gfp_t - it gives exactly
   the same warnings as far as sparse is concerned, doesn't change
   generated code (from gcc point of view we replaced unsigned int with
   typedef) and documents what's going on far better.
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

I have been experimenting with loadable protocol modules, and ran into
several issues with module reference counting.

The first issue was that __module_get failed at the BUG_ON check at
the top of the routine (checking that my module reference count was
not zero) when I created the first socket. When sk_alloc() is called,
my module reference count was still 0. When I looked at why sctp
didn't have this problem, I discovered that sctp creates a control
socket during module init (when the module ref count is not 0), which
keeps the reference count non-zero. This section has been updated to
address the point Stephen raised about checking the return value of
try_module_get().

The next problem arose when my socket init routine returned an error.
This resulted in my module reference count being decremented below 0.
My socket ops->release routine was also being called. The issue here
is that sock_release() calls the ops->release routine and decrements
the ref count if sock->ops is not NULL. Since the socket probably
didn't get correctly initialized, this should not be done, so we will
set sock->ops to NULL because we will not call try_module_get().

While searching for another bug, I also noticed that sys_accept() has
a possibility of doing a module_put() when it did not do an
__module_get so I re-ordered the call to security_socket_accept().
Signed-off-by: NFrank Filz <ffilzlnx@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

proto_unregister holds a lock while calling kmem_cache_destroy, which
can sleep.

Noticed by Daniele Orlandi <daniele@orlandi.com>.
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

One of my x86_64 (linux 2.6.13) server log is filled with :

schedule_timeout: wrong timeout value ffffffffffffff06 from ffffffff802e63ca
schedule_timeout: wrong timeout value ffffffffffffff06 from ffffffff802e63ca
schedule_timeout: wrong timeout value ffffffffffffff06 from ffffffff802e63ca
schedule_timeout: wrong timeout value ffffffffffffff06 from ffffffff802e63ca
schedule_timeout: wrong timeout value ffffffffffffff06 from ffffffff802e63ca

This is because some application does a

struct linger li;
li.l_onoff = 1;
li.l_linger = -1;
setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_LINGER, &li, sizeof(li));

And unfortunatly l_linger is defined as a 'signed int' in
include/linux/socket.h:

struct linger {
         int             l_onoff;        /* Linger active                */
         int             l_linger;       /* How long to linger for       */
};

I dont know if it's safe to change l_linger to 'unsigned int' in the
include file (It might be defined as int in ABI specs)
Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <dada1@cosmosbay.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

The ipv4 and ipv6 protocols need to access it unconditionally.
SYSCTL=n build failure reported by Russell King.
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Out of tcp_create_openreq_child, will be used in
dccp_create_openreq_child, and is a nice sock function anyway.
Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This paves the way to generalise the rest of the sock ID lookup
routines and saves some bytes in TCPv4 TIME_WAIT sockets on distro
kernels (where IPv6 is always built as a module):

[root@qemu ~]# grep tw_sock /proc/slabinfo
tw_sock_TCPv6  0  0  128  31  1
tw_sock_TCP    0  0   96  41  1
[root@qemu ~]#

Now if a protocol wants to use the TIME_WAIT generic infrastructure it
only has to set the sk_prot->twsk_obj_size field with the size of its
inet_timewait_sock derived sock and proto_register will create
sk_prot->twsk_slab, for now its only for INET sockets, but we can
introduce timewait_sock later if some non INET transport protocolo
wants to use this stuff.

Next changesets will take advantage of this new infrastructure to
generalise even more TCP code.

[acme@toy net-2.6.14]$ grep built-in /tmp/before.size /tmp/after.size
/tmp/before.size: 188646   11764    5068  205478   322a6 net/ipv4/built-in.o
/tmp/after.size:  188144   11764    5068  204976   320b0 net/ipv4/built-in.o
[acme@toy net-2.6.14]$

Tested with both IPv4 & IPv6 (::1 (localhost) & ::ffff:172.20.0.1
(qemu host)).
Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Allows overriding of sysctl_{wmem,rmrm}_max
Signed-off-by: NPatrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

On Sparc, SO_DONTLINGER support resulted in sock_reset_flag being 
called without lock_sock().
Signed-off-by: NKyle Moffett <mrmacman_g4@mac.com>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

From: Victor Fusco <victor@cetuc.puc-rio.br>

Fix the sparse warning "implicit cast to nocast type"
Signed-off-by: NVictor Fusco <victor@cetuc.puc-rio.br>
Signed-off-by: NDomen Puncer <domen@coderock.org>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Kept this first changeset minimal, without changing existing names to
ease peer review.

Basicaly tcp_openreq_alloc now receives the or_calltable, that in turn
has two new members:

->slab, that replaces tcp_openreq_cachep
->obj_size, to inform the size of the openreq descendant for
  a specific protocol

The protocol specific fields in struct open_request were moved to a
class hierarchy, with the things that are common to all connection
oriented PF_INET protocols in struct inet_request_sock, the TCP ones
in tcp_request_sock, that is an inet_request_sock, that is an
open_request.

I.e. this uses the same approach used for the struct sock class
hierarchy, with sk_prot indicating if the protocol wants to use the
open_request infrastructure by filling in sk_prot->rsk_prot with an
or_calltable.

Results? Performance is improved and TCP v4 now uses only 64 bytes per
open request minisock, down from 96 without this patch :-)

Next changeset will rename some of the structs, fields and functions
mentioned above, struct or_calltable is way unclear, better name it
struct request_sock_ops, s/struct open_request/struct request_sock/g,
etc.
Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

Ross moved.  Remove the bad email address so people will find the correct
one in ./CREDITS.
Signed-off-by: NJesper Juhl <juhl-lkml@dif.dk>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

This causes sk->sk_prot to change, which makes the socket
release free the sock into the wrong SLAB cache.  Fix this
by introducing sk_prot_creator so that we always remember
where the sock came from.
Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

I have recompiled Linux kernel 2.6.11.5 documentation for me and our
university students again.  The documentation could be extended for more
sources which are equipped by structured comments for recent 2.6 kernels.  I
have tried to proceed with that task.  I have done that more times from 2.6.0
time and it gets boring to do same changes again and again.  Linux kernel
compiles after changes for i386 and ARM targets.  I have added references to
some more files into kernel-api book, I have added some section names as well.
 So please, check that changes do not break something and that categories are
not too much skewed.

I have changed kernel-doc to accept "fastcall" and "asmlinkage" words reserved
by kernel convention.  Most of the other changes are modifications in the
comments to make kernel-doc happy, accept some parameters description and do
not bail out on errors.  Changed <pid> to @pid in the description, moved some
#ifdef before comments to correct function to comments bindings, etc.

You can see result of the modified documentation build at
  http://cmp.felk.cvut.cz/~pisa/linux/lkdb-2.6.11.tar.gz

Some more sources are ready to be included into kernel-doc generated
documentation.  Sources has been added into kernel-api for now.  Some more
section names added and probably some more chaos introduced as result of quick
cleanup work.
Signed-off-by: NPavel Pisa <pisa@cmp.felk.cvut.cz>
Signed-off-by: NMartin Waitz <tali@admingilde.org>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

	A lot of places in there are including major.h for no reason
whatsoever.  Removed.  And yes, it still builds.

	The history of that stuff is often amusing.  E.g. for net/core/sock.c
the story looks so, as far as I've been able to reconstruct it: we used to
need major.h in net/socket.c circa 1.1.early.  In 1.1.13 that need had
disappeared, along with register_chrdev(SOCKET_MAJOR, "socket", &net_fops)
in sock_init().  Include had not.  When 1.2 -> 1.3 reorg of net/* had moved
a lot of stuff from net/socket.c to net/core/sock.c, this crap had followed...
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@parcelfarce.linux.theplanet.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

A lot of places in there are including major.h for no reason whatsoever.
Removed.  And yes, it still builds. 

The history of that stuff is often amusing.  E.g.  for net/core/sock.c
the story looks so, as far as I've been able to reconstruct it: we used
to need major.h in net/socket.c circa 1.1.early.  In 1.1.13 that need
had disappeared, along with register_chrdev(SOCKET_MAJOR, "socket",
&net_fops) in sock_init().  Include had not.  When 1.2 -> 1.3 reorg of
net/* had moved a lot of stuff from net/socket.c to net/core/sock.c,
this crap had followed... 
Signed-off-by: NAl Viro <viro@parcelfarce.linux.theplanet.co.uk>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@ghostprotocols.net>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>

This fixes the warning reported by Marcel Holtmann (Thanks!).
Signed-off-by: NArnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@conectiva.com.br>
Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: NAndrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: NLinus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history,
even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git
archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about
3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early
git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good
infrastructure for it.

Let it rip!