1. 15 10月, 2014 8 次提交
    • A
      fm10k: Add skb->xmit_more support · 2c2b2f0c
      Alexander Duyck 提交于
      This change adds support for skb->xmit_more based on the changes that were
      made to igb to support the feature.  The main changes are moving up the
      check for maybe_stop_tx so that we can check netif_xmit_stopped to determine
      if we must write the tail because we can add no further buffers.
      Acked-by: NMatthew Vick <matthew.vick@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NAlexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@redhat.com>
      Acked-by: NJeff Kirsher <jeffrey.t.kirsher@intel.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      2c2b2f0c
    • N
      net: fec: Fix sparse warnings with different lock contexts for basic block · 5bc26726
      Nimrod Andy 提交于
      reproduce:
      make  ARCH=arm C=1 2>fec.txt drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.o
      cat fec.txt
      
      sparse warnings:
      drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_main.c:2916:12: warning: context imbalance
      in 'fec_set_features' - different lock contexts for basic block
      
      Christopher Li suggest to change as below:
      	if (need_lock) {
      		lock();
      		do_something_real();
      		unlock();
      	} else {
      		do_something_real();
      	}
      Reported-by: NFabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>
      Suggested-by: NChristopher Li <sparse@chrisli.org>
      Signed-off-by: NFugang Duan <B38611@freescale.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      5bc26726
    • V
    • D
      Merge branch 'sctp' · b27fa993
      David S. Miller 提交于
      Daniel Borkmann says:
      
      ====================
      Here are some SCTP fixes.
      
      [ Note, immediate workaround would be to disable ASCONF (it
        is sysctl disabled by default). It is actually only used
        together with chunk authentication. ]
      ====================
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      b27fa993
    • D
      net: sctp: fix remote memory pressure from excessive queueing · 26b87c78
      Daniel Borkmann 提交于
      This scenario is not limited to ASCONF, just taken as one
      example triggering the issue. When receiving ASCONF probes
      in the form of ...
      
        -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
        <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
        -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
        <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
        ---- ASCONF_a; [ASCONF_b; ...; ASCONF_n;] JUNK ------>
        [...]
        ---- ASCONF_m; [ASCONF_o; ...; ASCONF_z;] JUNK ------>
      
      ... where ASCONF_a, ASCONF_b, ..., ASCONF_z are good-formed
      ASCONFs and have increasing serial numbers, we process such
      ASCONF chunk(s) marked with !end_of_packet and !singleton,
      since we have not yet reached the SCTP packet end. SCTP does
      only do verification on a chunk by chunk basis, as an SCTP
      packet is nothing more than just a container of a stream of
      chunks which it eats up one by one.
      
      We could run into the case that we receive a packet with a
      malformed tail, above marked as trailing JUNK. All previous
      chunks are here goodformed, so the stack will eat up all
      previous chunks up to this point. In case JUNK does not fit
      into a chunk header and there are no more other chunks in
      the input queue, or in case JUNK contains a garbage chunk
      header, but the encoded chunk length would exceed the skb
      tail, or we came here from an entirely different scenario
      and the chunk has pdiscard=1 mark (without having had a flush
      point), it will happen, that we will excessively queue up
      the association's output queue (a correct final chunk may
      then turn it into a response flood when flushing the
      queue ;)): I ran a simple script with incremental ASCONF
      serial numbers and could see the server side consuming
      excessive amount of RAM [before/after: up to 2GB and more].
      
      The issue at heart is that the chunk train basically ends
      with !end_of_packet and !singleton markers and since commit
      2e3216cd ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding
      with 1 packet") therefore preventing an output queue flush
      point in sctp_do_sm() -> sctp_cmd_interpreter() on the input
      chunk (chunk = event_arg) even though local_cork is set,
      but its precedence has changed since then. In the normal
      case, the last chunk with end_of_packet=1 would trigger the
      queue flush to accommodate possible outgoing bundling.
      
      In the input queue, sctp_inq_pop() seems to do the right thing
      in terms of discarding invalid chunks. So, above JUNK will
      not enter the state machine and instead be released and exit
      the sctp_assoc_bh_rcv() chunk processing loop. It's simply
      the flush point being missing at loop exit. Adding a try-flush
      approach on the output queue might not work as the underlying
      infrastructure might be long gone at this point due to the
      side-effect interpreter run.
      
      One possibility, albeit a bit of a kludge, would be to defer
      invalid chunk freeing into the state machine in order to
      possibly trigger packet discards and thus indirectly a queue
      flush on error. It would surely be better to discard chunks
      as in the current, perhaps better controlled environment, but
      going back and forth, it's simply architecturally not possible.
      I tried various trailing JUNK attack cases and it seems to
      look good now.
      
      Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
      
      Fixes: 2e3216cd ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      26b87c78
    • D
      net: sctp: fix panic on duplicate ASCONF chunks · b69040d8
      Daniel Borkmann 提交于
      When receiving a e.g. semi-good formed connection scan in the
      form of ...
      
        -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
        <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
        -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
        <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
        ---------------- ASCONF_a; ASCONF_b ----------------->
      
      ... where ASCONF_a equals ASCONF_b chunk (at least both serials
      need to be equal), we panic an SCTP server!
      
      The problem is that good-formed ASCONF chunks that we reply with
      ASCONF_ACK chunks are cached per serial. Thus, when we receive a
      same ASCONF chunk twice (e.g. through a lost ASCONF_ACK), we do
      not need to process them again on the server side (that was the
      idea, also proposed in the RFC). Instead, we know it was cached
      and we just resend the cached chunk instead. So far, so good.
      
      Where things get nasty is in SCTP's side effect interpreter, that
      is, sctp_cmd_interpreter():
      
      While incoming ASCONF_a (chunk = event_arg) is being marked
      !end_of_packet and !singleton, and we have an association context,
      we do not flush the outqueue the first time after processing the
      ASCONF_ACK singleton chunk via SCTP_CMD_REPLY. Instead, we keep it
      queued up, although we set local_cork to 1. Commit 2e3216cd
      changed the precedence, so that as long as we get bundled, incoming
      chunks we try possible bundling on outgoing queue as well. Before
      this commit, we would just flush the output queue.
      
      Now, while ASCONF_a's ASCONF_ACK sits in the corked outq, we
      continue to process the same ASCONF_b chunk from the packet. As
      we have cached the previous ASCONF_ACK, we find it, grab it and
      do another SCTP_CMD_REPLY command on it. So, effectively, we rip
      the chunk->list pointers and requeue the same ASCONF_ACK chunk
      another time. Since we process ASCONF_b, it's correctly marked
      with end_of_packet and we enforce an uncork, and thus flush, thus
      crashing the kernel.
      
      Fix it by testing if the ASCONF_ACK is currently pending and if
      that is the case, do not requeue it. When flushing the output
      queue we may relink the chunk for preparing an outgoing packet,
      but eventually unlink it when it's copied into the skb right
      before transmission.
      
      Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
      
      Fixes: 2e3216cd ("sctp: Follow security requirement of responding with 1 packet")
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      b69040d8
    • D
      net: sctp: fix skb_over_panic when receiving malformed ASCONF chunks · 9de7922b
      Daniel Borkmann 提交于
      Commit 6f4c618d ("SCTP : Add paramters validity check for
      ASCONF chunk") added basic verification of ASCONF chunks, however,
      it is still possible to remotely crash a server by sending a
      special crafted ASCONF chunk, even up to pre 2.6.12 kernels:
      
      skb_over_panic: text:ffffffffa01ea1c3 len:31056 put:30768
       head:ffff88011bd81800 data:ffff88011bd81800 tail:0x7950
       end:0x440 dev:<NULL>
       ------------[ cut here ]------------
      kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:129!
      [...]
      Call Trace:
       <IRQ>
       [<ffffffff8144fb1c>] skb_put+0x5c/0x70
       [<ffffffffa01ea1c3>] sctp_addto_chunk+0x63/0xd0 [sctp]
       [<ffffffffa01eadaf>] sctp_process_asconf+0x1af/0x540 [sctp]
       [<ffffffff8152d025>] ? _read_unlock_bh+0x15/0x20
       [<ffffffffa01e0038>] sctp_sf_do_asconf+0x168/0x240 [sctp]
       [<ffffffffa01e3751>] sctp_do_sm+0x71/0x1210 [sctp]
       [<ffffffff8147645d>] ? fib_rules_lookup+0xad/0xf0
       [<ffffffffa01e6b22>] ? sctp_cmp_addr_exact+0x32/0x40 [sctp]
       [<ffffffffa01e8393>] sctp_assoc_bh_rcv+0xd3/0x180 [sctp]
       [<ffffffffa01ee986>] sctp_inq_push+0x56/0x80 [sctp]
       [<ffffffffa01fcc42>] sctp_rcv+0x982/0xa10 [sctp]
       [<ffffffffa01d5123>] ? ipt_local_in_hook+0x23/0x28 [iptable_filter]
       [<ffffffff8148bdc9>] ? nf_iterate+0x69/0xb0
       [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
       [<ffffffff8148bf86>] ? nf_hook_slow+0x76/0x120
       [<ffffffff81496d10>] ? ip_local_deliver_finish+0x0/0x2d0
       [<ffffffff81496ded>] ip_local_deliver_finish+0xdd/0x2d0
       [<ffffffff81497078>] ip_local_deliver+0x98/0xa0
       [<ffffffff8149653d>] ip_rcv_finish+0x12d/0x440
       [<ffffffff81496ac5>] ip_rcv+0x275/0x350
       [<ffffffff8145c88b>] __netif_receive_skb+0x4ab/0x750
       [<ffffffff81460588>] netif_receive_skb+0x58/0x60
      
      This can be triggered e.g., through a simple scripted nmap
      connection scan injecting the chunk after the handshake, for
      example, ...
      
        -------------- INIT[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------->
        <----------- INIT-ACK[ASCONF; ASCONF_ACK] ------------
        -------------------- COOKIE-ECHO -------------------->
        <-------------------- COOKIE-ACK ---------------------
        ------------------ ASCONF; UNKNOWN ------------------>
      
      ... where ASCONF chunk of length 280 contains 2 parameters ...
      
        1) Add IP address parameter (param length: 16)
        2) Add/del IP address parameter (param length: 255)
      
      ... followed by an UNKNOWN chunk of e.g. 4 bytes. Here, the
      Address Parameter in the ASCONF chunk is even missing, too.
      This is just an example and similarly-crafted ASCONF chunks
      could be used just as well.
      
      The ASCONF chunk passes through sctp_verify_asconf() as all
      parameters passed sanity checks, and after walking, we ended
      up successfully at the chunk end boundary, and thus may invoke
      sctp_process_asconf(). Parameter walking is done with
      WORD_ROUND() to take padding into account.
      
      In sctp_process_asconf()'s TLV processing, we may fail in
      sctp_process_asconf_param() e.g., due to removal of the IP
      address that is also the source address of the packet containing
      the ASCONF chunk, and thus we need to add all TLVs after the
      failure to our ASCONF response to remote via helper function
      sctp_add_asconf_response(), which basically invokes a
      sctp_addto_chunk() adding the error parameters to the given
      skb.
      
      When walking to the next parameter this time, we proceed
      with ...
      
        length = ntohs(asconf_param->param_hdr.length);
        asconf_param = (void *)asconf_param + length;
      
      ... instead of the WORD_ROUND()'ed length, thus resulting here
      in an off-by-one that leads to reading the follow-up garbage
      parameter length of 12336, and thus throwing an skb_over_panic
      for the reply when trying to sctp_addto_chunk() next time,
      which implicitly calls the skb_put() with that length.
      
      Fix it by using sctp_walk_params() [ which is also used in
      INIT parameter processing ] macro in the verification *and*
      in ASCONF processing: it will make sure we don't spill over,
      that we walk parameters WORD_ROUND()'ed. Moreover, we're being
      more defensive and guard against unknown parameter types and
      missized addresses.
      
      Joint work with Vlad Yasevich.
      
      Fixes: b896b82be4ae ("[SCTP] ADDIP: Support for processing incoming ASCONF_ACK chunks.")
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NVlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
      Acked-by: NNeil Horman <nhorman@tuxdriver.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      9de7922b
    • B
      phy/micrel: KSZ8031RNL RMII clock reconfiguration bug · b838b4ac
      Bruno Thomsen 提交于
      Bug: Unable to send and receive Ethernet packets with Micrel PHY.
      
      Affected devices:
      KSZ8031RNL (commercial temp)
      KSZ8031RNLI (industrial temp)
      
      Description:
      PHY device is correctly detected during probe.
      PHY power-up default is 25MHz crystal clock input
      and output 50MHz RMII clock to MAC.
      Reconfiguration of PHY to input 50MHz RMII clock from MAC
      causes PHY to become unresponsive if clock source is changed
      after Operation Mode Strap Override (OMSO) register setup.
      
      Cause:
      Long lead times on parts where clock setup match circuit design
      forces the usage of similar parts with wrong default setup.
      
      Solution:
      Swapped KSZ8031 register setup and added phy_write return code validation.
      
      Tested with Freescale i.MX28 Fast Ethernet Controler (fec).
      Signed-off-by: NBruno Thomsen <bth@kamstrup.dk>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      b838b4ac
  2. 11 10月, 2014 29 次提交
  3. 10 10月, 2014 3 次提交
    • P
      networking: fm10k: Fix build failure · b71b12dc
      Pranith Kumar 提交于
      The latest linus git tip (3.18-rc1) fails with the following build failure. Fix
      this by making PTP support explicit for fm10k driver.
      
      rivers/built-in.o: In function `fm10k_ptp_register':
      (.text+0x12e760): undefined reference to `ptp_clock_registER'
      drivers/built-in.o: In function `fm10k_ptp_unregister':
      (.text+0x12e7dc): undefined reference to `ptp_clock_unregister'
      Makefile:930: recipe for target 'vmlinux' failed
      Signed-off-by: NPranith Kumar <bobby.prani@gmail.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      b71b12dc
    • L
      net: fs_enet: error: 'SCCE_ENET_TXF' undeclared · 7b4ecf39
      LEROY Christophe 提交于
      [linux-devel:devel-hourly-2014100909 3763/3915] drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fs_enet/mac-scc.c:119:32: error: 'SCCE_ENET_TXF' undeclared
      
      Due to patch d43a396a net: fs_enet: Add NAPI TX, it appears that some target
      compilations are broken.
      This is due to the fact that unlike the FEC, the SCC and FCC don't have a TXF
      event (complete Frame transmitted) but only TXB (buffer transmitted).
      Signed-off-by: NChristophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@c-s.fr>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      7b4ecf39
    • J
      net_sched: restore qdisc quota fairness limits after bulk dequeue · b8358d70
      Jesper Dangaard Brouer 提交于
      Restore the quota fairness between qdisc's, that we broke with commit
      5772e9a3 ("qdisc: bulk dequeue support for qdiscs with TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE").
      
      Before that commit, the quota in __qdisc_run() were in packets as
      dequeue_skb() would only dequeue a single packet, that assumption
      broke with bulk dequeue.
      
      We choose not to account for the number of packets inside the TSO/GSO
      packets (accessable via "skb_gso_segs").  As the previous fairness
      also had this "defect". Thus, GSO/TSO packets counts as a single
      packet.
      
      Further more, we choose to slack on accuracy, by allowing a bulk
      dequeue try_bulk_dequeue_skb() to exceed the "packets" limit, only
      limited by the BQL bytelimit.  This is done because BQL prefers to get
      its full budget for appropriate feedback from TX completion.
      
      In future, we might consider reworking this further and, if it allows,
      switch to a time-based model, as suggested by Eric. Right now, we only
      restore old semantics.
      
      Joint work with Eric, Hannes, Daniel and Jesper.  Hannes wrote the
      first patch in cooperation with Daniel and Jesper.  Eric rewrote the
      patch.
      
      Fixes: 5772e9a3 ("qdisc: bulk dequeue support for qdiscs with TCQ_F_ONETXQUEUE")
      Signed-off-by: NEric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
      Signed-off-by: NJesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NHannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
      Signed-off-by: NDaniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
      Signed-off-by: NDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      b8358d70