• M
    [Bluetooth] Reject L2CAP connections on an insecure ACL link · e7c29cb1
    Marcel Holtmann 提交于
    The Security Mode 4 of the Bluetooth 2.1 specification has strict
    authentication and encryption requirements. It is the initiators job
    to create a secure ACL link. However in case of malicious devices, the
    acceptor has to make sure that the ACL is encrypted before allowing
    any kind of L2CAP connection. The only exception here is the PSM 1 for
    the service discovery protocol, because that is allowed to run on an
    insecure ACL link.
    
    Previously it was enough to reject a L2CAP connection during the
    connection setup phase, but with Bluetooth 2.1 it is forbidden to
    do any L2CAP protocol exchange on an insecure link (except SDP).
    
    The new hci_conn_check_link_mode() function can be used to check the
    integrity of an ACL link. This functions also takes care of the cases
    where Security Mode 4 is disabled or one of the devices is based on
    an older specification.
    Signed-off-by: NMarcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
    e7c29cb1
af_bluetooth.c 9.9 KB