make timing attack protection unconditional

crypto/ecdsa/ecs_ossl.c

@@ -151,7 +151,6 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
 			}
 		while (BN_is_zero(k));
 
-#ifdef ECDSA_POINT_MUL_NO_CONSTTIME
 		/* We do not want timing information to leak the length of k,
 		 * so we compute G*k using an equivalent scalar of fixed
 		 * bit-length. */
@@ -159,7 +158,6 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp,
 		if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err;
 		if (BN_num_bits(k) <= BN_num_bits(order))
 			if (!BN_add(k, k, order)) goto err;
-#endif /* def(ECDSA_POINT_MUL_NO_CONSTTIME) */
 
 		/* compute r the x-coordinate of generator * k */
 		if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, tmp_point, k, NULL, NULL, ctx))