- 10 4月, 2020 1 次提交
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由 Ryan Dahl 提交于
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- 09 4月, 2020 9 次提交
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由 Chris Knight 提交于
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由 Nayeem Rahman 提交于
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由 Chris Knight 提交于
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由 Ryan Dahl 提交于
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由 Ali Hasani 提交于
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由 Ali Hasani 提交于
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由 Ryan Dahl 提交于
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由 Ryan Dahl 提交于
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由 Ryan Dahl 提交于
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- 08 4月, 2020 8 次提交
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由 Bartek Iwańczuk 提交于
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由 Ryan Dahl 提交于
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由 Ryan Dahl 提交于
dprint seems to be stable enough to not panic on our own source code now.
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由 Ryan Dahl 提交于
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由 Ryan Dahl 提交于
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由 Ryan Dahl 提交于
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由 Bartek Iwańczuk 提交于
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由 Ryan Dahl 提交于
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- 07 4月, 2020 9 次提交
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由 Akshat Agarwal 提交于
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由 Ryan Dahl 提交于
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由 木杉 提交于
I just tried it and found that using application/typescript, the browser will download the file directly, I think that .ts should be mapped to application/javascript or text/typescript
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由 Nayeem Rahman 提交于
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由 Bartek Iwańczuk 提交于
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由 Ali Hasani 提交于
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由 Ali Hasani 提交于
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由 Giorgi Rostomashvili 提交于
Fixes #4000 and fixes #4476. Now always tries to fetch reference types for JS files. Does not throw if it fails, since Typescript compiler will complain if the file is not there(it will try to fetch it again first) and people who just use JS should not be bothered by this error. Not sure about my test, it passes and catches the bug but maybe there is a better way to express it.
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由 Bartek Iwańczuk 提交于
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- 06 4月, 2020 5 次提交
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由 Yusuke Sakurai 提交于
This test doesn't remove created directory after test. It will fail on next run.
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由 Andrew Stucki 提交于
This relates directly to [an issue](https://github.com/denoland/deno_std/issues/620) that I initially raised in `deno_std` awhile back, and was reminded about it today when the `oak` project popped up on my github recommended repos. As of now Deno's http servers are vulnerable to the same underlying issue of go CVE-2019-16276 due to the fact that it's based off of ported go code from their old standard library. [Here's the commit that fixed the CVE.](https://github.com/golang/go/commit/6e6f4aaf70c8b1cc81e65a26332aa9409de03ad8) Long story short, some off the shelf proxies and caching servers allow for passing unaltered malformed headers to backends that they're fronting. When they pass invalid headers that they don't understand this can cause issues with HTTP request smuggling. I believe that to this date, this is the default behavior of AWS ALBs--meaning any server that strips whitespace from the tail end of header field names and then interprets the header, when placed behind an ALB, is susceptible to request smuggling. The current behavior is actually specifically called out in [RFC 7230](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-3.2.4) as something that MUST result in a rejected message, but the change corresponding to this PR, is more lenient and what both go and nginx currently do, and is better than the current behavior.
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由 Andreas 提交于
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由 Ondřej Žára 提交于
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由 crowlKats 提交于
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- 05 4月, 2020 3 次提交
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由 Andres Villegas 提交于
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由 Khải 提交于
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由 Nayeem Rahman 提交于
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- 04 4月, 2020 5 次提交
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由 Lorran Rosa 提交于
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由 Kitson Kelly 提交于
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由 Parker Gabel 提交于
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由 Yusuke Sakurai 提交于
Co-authored-by: Ncrowlkats <crowlkats@gmail.com>
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由 Ryan Dahl 提交于
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