Make the include guards consistent by renaming them systematically according
to the naming conventions below

The public header files (in the 'include/openssl' directory) are not changed
in 1.1.1, because it is a stable release.

For the private header files files, the guard names try to match the path
specified in the include directives, with all letters converted to upper case
and '/' and '.' replaced by '_'. An extra 'OSSL_' is added as prefix.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9681)

Apart from public and internal header files, there is a third type called
local header files, which are located next to source files in the source
directory. Currently, they have different suffixes like

  '*_lcl.h', '*_local.h', or '*_int.h'

This commit changes the different suffixes to '*_local.h' uniformly.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9681)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9847)

When the new OpenSSL CSPRNG was introduced in version 1.1.1,
it was announced in the release notes that it would be fork-safe,
which the old CSPRNG hadn't been.

The fork-safety was implemented using a fork count, which was
incremented by a pthread_atfork handler. Initially, this handler
was enabled by default. Unfortunately, the default behaviour
had to be changed for other reasons in commit b5319bdb, so
the new OpenSSL CSPRNG failed to keep its promise.

This commit restores the fork-safety using a different approach.
It replaces the fork count by a fork id, which coincides with
the process id on UNIX-like operating systems and is zero on other
operating systems. It is used to detect when an automatic reseed
after a fork is necessary.

To prevent a future regression, it also adds a test to verify that
the child reseeds after fork.

CVE-2019-1549
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9802)

CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NShane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9295)

The barriers prevent the compiler from narrowing down the
possible value range of the mask and ~mask in the select
statements, which avoids the recognition of the select
and turning it into a conditional load or branch.
Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9217)

(cherry picked from commit 04edd688b3727835f9b2c7cca7e4c963bf3ed2ba)

Although in a false-conditional code section gcc-4.8.4 flagged this with
a C90 warning :-(

include/internal/refcount.h:108:7: error: C++ style comments are not allowed in ISO C90 [-Werror]
       // under Windows CE we still have old-style Interlocked* functions
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9388)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NNicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9281)

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9034)

'no-dso' is meaningless, as it doesn't get any macro defined.
Therefore, we remove all checks of OPENSSL_NO_DSO.  However, there may
be some odd platforms with no DSO scheme.  For those, we generate the
internal macro DSO_NONE aand use it.
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8622)

This implementation is referenced to https://www.boost.org/doc/libs/1_69_0/boost/detail/interlocked.hppReviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8596)

(cherry picked from commit 88ffc8dea4e313b6acfd3a9ef3868bee96717cf9)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8347)

Trim trailing whitespace. It doesn't match OpenSSL coding standards,
AFAICT, and it can cause problems with git tooling.

Trailing whitespace remains in test data and external source.

Backport-of: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8092Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8134)

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7569)

(cherry picked from commit 5c8b7b4caa0faedb69277063a7c6b3a8e56c6308)

If this fails try out if mfspr268 works.

Use OPENSSL_ppccap=0x20 for enabling mftb,
OPENSSL_ppccap=0x40 for enabling mfspr268,
and OPENSSL_ppccap=0 for enabling neither.

Fixes #8012
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8043)

(cherry picked from commit c8f370485c43729db44b680e41e875ddd7f3108c)

1.  In addition to overriding the default application name,
    one can now also override the configuration file name
    and flags passed to CONF_modules_load_file().

2.  By default we still keep going when configuration file
    processing fails.  But, applications that want to be
    strict about initialization errors can now make explicit
    flag choices via non-null OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS that omit
    the CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_RETURN_CODES flag (which had so far
    been both undocumented and unused).

3.  In OPENSSL_init_ssl() do not request OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG
    if the options already include OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CONFIG.

4.  Don't set up atexit() handlers when called with opts equal to
    OPENSSL_INIT_BASE_ONLY (this flag should only be used alone).
Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7969)

We have a number of instances where there are multiple "init" functions for
a single CRYPTO_ONCE variable, e.g. to load config automatically or to not
load config automatically. Unfortunately the RUN_ONCE mechanism was not
correctly giving the right return value where an alternative init function
was being used.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7983)

Expected usage pattern is to unconditionally set error and then
wipe it if there was no actual error.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit f658a3b64d8750642f4975090740865f770c2a1b)

The existing tsan_counter() API increments a reference counter.
Provide a new API, tsan_decr(), to decrement such a reference counter.
This can be used, for example, when a reference is added to the session_ctx's
sess_accept stats but should more properly be tracked in the regular ctx's
statistics.
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7464)

(cherry picked from commit 95658c32436017aeeef3d8598957071baf6769a9)

Change all calls to getenv() inside libcrypto to use a new wrapper function
that use secure_getenv() if available and an issetugid then getenv if not.

CPU processor override flags are unchanged.

Extra checks for OPENSSL_issetugid() have been removed in favour of the
safe getenv.
Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7047)

(cherry picked from commit 5c39a55d04ea6e6f734b627a050b9e702788d50d)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7176)

Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6996)

Relax memory_order on counter decrement itself, because mutable
members of the reference-counted structure should be visible on all
processors independently on counter. [Even re-format and minimize
dependency on other headers.]
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6900)

Goal here is to facilitate writing "thread-opportunistic" code that
withstands Thread Sanitizer's scrutiny. "Thread-opportunistic" is when
exact result is not required, e.g. some statistics, or execution flow
doesn't have to be unambiguous.
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6786)

Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6752)

Run `make update ERROR_REBUILD=-rebuild` to remove some stale error
codes for SM2 (which is now using its own submodule for error codes,
i.e., `SM2_*`).
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6690)

These headers are internal and never exposed to a cpp compiler, hence no
need for the preamble.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6554)

The GOST engine needs to be loaded before we initialise libssl. Otherwise
the GOST ciphersuites are not enabled. However the SSL conf module must
be loaded before we initialise libcrypto. Otherwise we will fail to read
the SSL config from a config file properly.

Another problem is that an application may make use of both libcrypto and
libssl. If it performs libcrypto stuff first and OPENSSL_init_crypto()
is called and loads a config file it will fail if that config file has
any libssl stuff in it.

This commit separates out the loading of the SSL conf module from the
interpretation of its contents. The loading piece doesn't know anything
about SSL so this can be moved to libcrypto. The interpretation of what it
means remains in libssl. This means we can load the SSL conf data before
libssl is there and interpret it when it later becomes available.

Fixes #5809
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5818)

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5756)

Fixes #4403

This commit moves the internal header file "internal/rand.h" to
<openssl/rand_drbg.h>, making the RAND_DRBG API public.
The RAND_POOL API remains private, its function prototypes were
moved to "internal/rand_int.h" and converted to lowercase.

Documentation for the new API is work in progress on GitHub #5461.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5462)

The introduction of thread local public and private DRBG instances (#5547)
makes it very cumbersome to change the reseeding (time) intervals for
those instances. This commit provides a function to set the default
values for all subsequently created DRBG instances.

 int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_defaults(
                                   unsigned int master_reseed_interval,
                                   unsigned int slave_reseed_interval,
                                   time_t master_reseed_time_interval,
                                   time_t slave_reseed_time_interval
                                   );

The function is intended only to be used during application initialization,
before any threads are created and before any random bytes are generated.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5576)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NDr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
GH: #5401

Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5105)

In PR #5295 it was decided that the locking api should remain private
and used only inside libcrypto. However, the locking functions were added
back to `libcrypto.num` by `mkdef.pl`, because the function prototypes
were still listed in `internal/rand.h`. (This header contains functions
which are internal, but shared between libcrypto and libssl.)

This commit moves the prototypes to `rand_lcl.h` and changes the names
to lowercase, following the convention therein. It also corrects an
outdated documenting comment.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5375)

The NIST standard presents two alternative ways for seeding the
CTR DRBG, depending on whether a derivation function is used or not.
In Section 10.2.1 of NIST SP800-90Ar1 the following is assessed:

  The use of the derivation function is optional if either an
  approved RBG or an entropy source provides full entropy output
  when entropy input is requested by the DRBG mechanism.
  Otherwise, the derivation function shall be used.

Since the OpenSSL DRBG supports being reseeded from low entropy random
sources (using RAND_POOL), the use of a derivation function is mandatory.
For that reason we change the default and replace the opt-in flag
RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF with an opt-out flag RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF.
This change simplifies the RAND_DRBG_new() calls.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5294)

The functions drbg_setup() and drbg_cleanup() used to duplicate a lot of
code from RAND_DRBG_new() and RAND_DRBG_free(). This duplication has been
removed, which simplifies drbg_setup() and makes drbg_cleanup() obsolete.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5294)

This commit adds three new accessors to the internal DRBG lock

   int RAND_DRBG_lock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
   int RAND_DRBG_unlock(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
   int RAND_DRBG_enable_locking(RAND_DRBG *drbg)

The three shared DRBGs are intended to be used concurrently, so they
have locking enabled by default. It is the callers responsibility to
guard access to the shared DRBGs by calls to RAND_DRBG_lock() and
RAND_DRBG_unlock().

All other DRBG instances don't have locking enabled by default, because
they are intendended to be used by a single thread. If it is desired,
locking can be enabled by using RAND_DRBG_enable_locking().
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5294)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5318)