Initial API implemented for notifying applications that an ASYNC_JOB
has completed. Currently only s_server is using this. The Dummy Async
engine "cheats" in that it notifies that it has completed *before* it
pauses the job. A normal async engine would not do that.

Only the posix version of this has been implemented so far, so it will
probably fail to compile on Windows at the moment.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The following entry points have been made async aware:
SSL_accept
SSL_read
SSL_write

Also added is a new mode - SSL_MODE_ASYNC. Calling the above functions with
the async mode enabled will initiate a new async job. If an async pause is
encountered whilst executing the job (such as for example if using SHA1/RSA
with the Dummy Async engine), then the above functions return with
SSL_WANT_ASYNC. Calling the functions again (with exactly the same args
as per non-blocking IO), will resume the job where it left off.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

There are lots of calls to EVP functions from within libssl There were
various places where we should probably check the return value but don't.
This adds these checks.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

The new function SSL_use_certificate_chain_file was always crashing in
the internal function use_certificate_chain_file because it would pass a
NULL value for SSL_CTX *, but use_certificate_chain_file would
unconditionally try to dereference it.
Reviewed-by: NStephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

All instances of SSLeay (any combination of case) were replaced with
the case-equivalent OpenSSL.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

A number of error codes were wrong due to a rebase of the state machine
code.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Remove all the defines for the old state machines states. Mapping old to new
is probably going to cause more problems than it solves so it is probably
better to just remove them.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

SSL_state has been replaced by SSL_get_state and SSL_set_state is no longer
supported.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

The macros SSL_in_connect_init() and SSL_in_accept_init() inadvertently
depended on SSL structure internals. This fixes it to use public API calls
instead.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Rename the enum HANDSHAKE_STATE to OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE to ensure there are
no namespace clashes, and convert it into a typedef.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Previously each message specific process function would create its own
PACKET structure. Rather than duplicate all of this code lots of times we
should create it in the state machine itself.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

ssl.h and ssl3.h have a number of defines for the various states in the old
state machine code. Since this is public API it is not desirable to just
remove them. Instead redefine them to the closest equivalent state in the
new state machine code. If an application calls SSL_state then the return
value can still be compared against these old values if necessary. However
not all values have an equivalent state in the new code, so these are just
redefined to a dummy value.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Clean up and remove lots of code that is now no longer needed due to the
move to the new state machine.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Implement all of the necessary changes to make DTLS on the server work
with the new state machine code.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Implement all of the necessary changes for moving TLS server side
processing into the new state machine code.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Split the TLS server ssl3_get_* and ssl3_send_* functions into two ready
for the migration to the new state machine code.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Move all DTLS client side processing into the new state machine code. A
subsequent commit will clean up the old dead code.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Create a dtls_get_message function similar to the old dtls1_get_message but
in the format required for the new state machine code. The old function will
eventually be deleted in later commits.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

The new state machine code will split up the reading and writing of
hanshake messages into discrete phases. In order to facilitate that the
existing "get" type functions will be split into two halves: one to get
the message and one to process it. The "send" type functions will also have
all work relating to constructing the message split out into a separate
function just for that. For some functions there will also be separate
pre and post "work" phases to prepare or update state.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

This is the first drop of the new state machine code.

The rewrite has the following objectives:
- Remove duplication of state code between client and server
- Remove duplication of state code between TLS and DTLS
- Simplify transitions and bring the logic together in a single location
  so that it is easier to validate
- Remove duplication of code between each of the message handling functions
- Receive a message first and then work out whether that is a valid
  transition - not the other way around (the other way causes lots of issues
  where we are expecting one type of message next but actually get something
  else)
- Separate message flow state from handshake state (in order to better
  understand each)
  - message flow state = when to flush buffers; handling restarts in the
    event of NBIO events; handling the common flow of steps for reading a
    message and the common flow of steps for writing a message etc
  - handshake state = what handshake message are we working on now
- Control complexity: only the state machine can change state: keep all
  the state changes local to a file

This builds on previous state machine related work:
- Surface CCS processing in the state machine
- Version negotiation rewrite
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

The function ssl3_get_message gets a whole message from the underlying bio
and returns it to the state machine code. The new state machine code will
split this into two discrete steps: get the message header and get the
message body. This commit splits the existing function into these two
sub steps to facilitate the state machine implementation.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Note that this commit constifies a user callback parameter and therefore
will break compilation for applications using this callback. But unless
they are abusing write access to the buffer, the fix is trivial.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Move all packet parsing to the beginning of the method. This limits the
SSLv2 compatibility soup to the parsing, and makes the rest of the
processing uniform.

This is also needed for simpler EMS support: EMS servers need to do an
early scan for EMS to make resumption decisions. This'll be easier when
the entire ClientHello is parsed in the beginning.

As a side effect,
1) PACKETize ssl_get_prev_session and tls1_process_ticket; and
2) Delete dead code for SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

This patch updates the "DEFAULT" cipherstring to be
"ALL:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT:!eNULL". COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT is now defined
internally by a flag on each ciphersuite indicating whether it should be
excluded from DEFAULT or not. This gives us control at an individual
ciphersuite level as to exactly what is in DEFAULT and what is not.

Finally all DES, RC4 and RC2 ciphersuites are added to COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT
and hence removed from DEFAULT.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Much related/similar work also done by
Ivan Nestlerode <ivan.nestlerode@sonos.com>

   +Replace FILE BIO's with dummy ops that fail.
   +Include <stdio.h> for sscanf() even with no-stdio (since the declaration
    is there). We rely on sscanf() to parse the OPENSSL_ia32cap environment
    variable, since it can be larger than a 'long'. And we don't rely on the
    availability of strtoull().
   +Remove OPENSSL_stderr(); not used.
   +Make OPENSSL_showfatal() do nothing (currently without stdio there's
    nothing we can do).
   +Remove file-based functionality from ssl/. The function
    prototypes were already gone, but not the functions themselves.
   +Remove unviable conf functionality via SYS_UEFI
   +Add fallback definition of BUFSIZ.
   +Remove functions taking FILE * from header files.
   +Add missing DECLARE_PEM_write_fp_const
   +Disable X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir(). X509_LOOKUP_file() was already compiled out,
    so remove its prototype.
   +Use OPENSSL_showfatal() in CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid().
   +Eliminate SRP_VBASE_init() and supporting functions. Users will need to
    build the verifier manually instead.
   +Eliminate compiler warning for unused do_pk8pkey_fp().
   +Disable TEST_ENG_OPENSSL_PKEY.
   +Disable GOST engine as is uses [f]printf all over the place.
   +Eliminate compiler warning for unused send_fp_chars().
Signed-off-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Previously you could only set both the default path and file locations
together. This adds the ability to set one without the other.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

The existing implementation of DTLSv1_listen() is fundamentally flawed. This
function is used in DTLS solutions to listen for new incoming connections
from DTLS clients. A client will send an initial ClientHello. The server
will respond with a HelloVerifyRequest containing a unique cookie. The
client the responds with a second ClientHello - which this time contains the
cookie.

Once the cookie has been verified then DTLSv1_listen() returns to user code,
which is typically expected to continue the handshake with a call to (for
example) SSL_accept().

Whilst listening for incoming ClientHellos, the underlying BIO is usually in
an unconnected state. Therefore ClientHellos can come in from *any* peer.
The arrival of the first ClientHello without the cookie, and the second one
with it, could be interspersed with other intervening messages from
different clients.

The whole purpose of this mechanism is as a defence against DoS attacks. The
idea is to avoid allocating state on the server until the client has
verified that it is capable of receiving messages at the address it claims
to come from. However the existing DTLSv1_listen() implementation completely
fails to do this. It attempts to super-impose itself on the standard state
machine and reuses all of this code. However the standard state machine
expects to operate in a stateful manner with a single client, and this can
cause various problems.

A second more minor issue is that the return codes from this function are
quite confused, with no distinction made between fatal and non-fatal errors.
Most user code treats all errors as non-fatal, and simply retries the call
to DTLSv1_listen().

This commit completely rewrites the implementation of DTLSv1_listen() and
provides a stand alone implementation that does not rely on the existing
state machine. It also provides more consistent return codes.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

-Wincompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers (the latter did not require
any code changes).
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

If a client receives a ServerKeyExchange for an anon DH ciphersuite with the
value of p set to 0 then a seg fault can occur. This commits adds a test to
reject p, g and pub key parameters that have a 0 value (in accordance with
RFC 5246)

The security vulnerability only affects master and 1.0.2, but the fix is
additionally applied to 1.0.1 for additional confidence.

CVE-2015-1794
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

make errors wants things in a different order to the way things are
currently defined in the header files. The easiest fix is to just let it
reorder it.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

The move of CCS into the state machine was causing make errors to fail. This
fixes it.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

The handling of incoming CCS records is a little strange. Since CCS is not
a handshake message it is handled differently to normal handshake messages.
Unfortunately whilst technically it is not a handhshake message the reality
is that it must be processed in accordance with the state of the handshake.
Currently CCS records are processed entirely within the record layer. In
order to ensure that it is handled in accordance with the handshake state
a flag is used to indicate that it is an acceptable time to receive a CCS.

Previously this flag did not exist (see CVE-2014-0224), but the flag should
only really be considered a workaround for the problem that CCS is not
visible to the state machine.

Outgoing CCS messages are already handled within the state machine.

This patch makes CCS visible to the TLS state machine. A separate commit
will handle DTLS.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>