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Third Party Openssl

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  1. 01 3月, 2018 1 次提交
  3. 23 2月, 2018 1 次提交
  5. 02 2月, 2018 1 次提交
    • T
      Add TLSv1.3 post-handshake authentication (PHA) · 9d75dce3
      由 Todd Short 提交于 
      Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA

Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates
initially configured, but use a certificate callback.

Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode:

* Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after
the initial handshake.

* Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless
of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake,
re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication.

Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that
add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options

Add support to s_client:
* Enabled automatically when cert is configured
* Can be forced enabled via -force_pha

Add support to s_server:
* Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server
* Remove some dead code

Update documentation

Update unit tests:
* Illegal use of PHA extension
* TLSv1.3 certificate tests

DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is
implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different.
Add a TODO and a #error

Update handshake context to deal with PHA.

The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the
ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this
handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included
after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate
Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication.

After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state
for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs,
copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest.
This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages
and any prior post-handshake authentication.

This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any
previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript.
This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the
first ClientFinished.
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)
      9d75dce3
  7. 30 1月, 2018 1 次提交
    • M
      Move decisions about whether to accept reneg into the state machine · 3faa07b5
      由 Matt Caswell 提交于 
      If a server receives an unexpected ClientHello then we may or may not
accept it. Make sure all such decisions are made in the state machine
and not in the record layer. This also removes a disparity between the
TLS and the DTLS code. The TLS code was making this decision in the
record layer, while the DTLS code was making it later.

Finally it also solves a problem where a warning alert was being sent
during tls_setup_handshake() and the function was returning a failure
return code. This is problematic because it can be called from a
transition function - which we only allow fatal errors to occur in.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5190)
      3faa07b5
  9. 25 1月, 2018 2 次提交
  11. 29 12月, 2017 1 次提交
  13. 26 12月, 2017 1 次提交
  15. 18 12月, 2017 1 次提交
  17. 14 12月, 2017 7 次提交
  19. 04 12月, 2017 4 次提交
  21. 26 9月, 2017 2 次提交
  23. 09 9月, 2017 2 次提交
  25. 01 9月, 2017 1 次提交
  27. 31 8月, 2017 2 次提交
  29. 15 8月, 2017 1 次提交
    • B
      Move ALPN handling from finalizer to delayed call · 5626f634
      由 Benjamin Kaduk 提交于 
      Commit 02f0274e moved ALPN processing
into an extension finalization function, as the only documented ordering
requirement from previous commits was that ALPN processing occur after
SNI processing, and SNI processing is performed before the extension
finalization step.  However, it is useful for applications'
alpn_select callbacks to run after ciphersuite selection as well -- at
least one application protocol specification (HTTP/2) imposes restrictions
on which ciphersuites are usable with that protocol.  Since it is generally
more preferrable to have a successful TLS connection with a default application
protocol than to fail the TLS connection and not be able to have the preferred
application protocol, it is good to give the alpn_select callback information
about the ciphersuite to be used, so that appropriate restrctions can be
enforced in application code.

Accordingly, split the ALPN handling out into a separate tls_handl_alpn()
function akin to tls_handle_status_request(), called from
tls_post_process_client_hello().  This is an alternative to resuscitating
ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(), something of an awkwward name itself.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4070)
      5626f634
  31. 03 8月, 2017 1 次提交
  33. 18 7月, 2017 1 次提交
  35. 07 7月, 2017 2 次提交
  37. 21 6月, 2017 3 次提交
  39. 20 6月, 2017 1 次提交
  41. 16 6月, 2017 4 次提交