Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4552)

This would cut out some distracting noise in the test output
if we ended up hitting these error cases.

Reported by Coverity.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4602)

Thanks to David Benjamin for suggesting the fix needed by this fix.
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4607)

Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API
and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when
the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular,
RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed
on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API'
and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues,
introducing the following changes:

- Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which
  facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback.
- Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the
  get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by
  RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy().
- Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG
  in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current
  state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller
  provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding.
- Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll()
  (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based
  on rand_drbg_restart().
- Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy
  source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function.
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)

Previously if a client received an HRR then we would do version negotiation
immediately - because we know we are going to get TLSv1.3. However this
causes a problem when we emit the 2nd ClientHello because we start changing
a whole load of stuff to ommit things that aren't relevant for < TLSv1.3.
The spec requires that the 2nd ClientHello is the same except for changes
required from the HRR. Therefore the simplest thing to do is to defer the
version negotiation until we receive the ServerHello.

Fixes #4292
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4527)

Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4497)

Caught by AddressSanitizer
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4497)

Test for the bug where early_data is not accepted by the server when it
does not have an SNI callback set up, but the client sent a servername in
the initial ClientHello establishing the session.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4519)

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4485)

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4485)

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4503)

test/bad_dtls_test.c: In function 'validate_client_hello':
test/bad_dtls_test.c:128:33: error: 'u' may be used uninitialized in this function [-Werror=maybe-uninitialized]
     if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &u) || u != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)
                                 ^
Apparently -O1 does not perform sufficient optimization to ascertain
that PACKET_get_1 will always initialize u if it returns true.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4518)

When an SSL's context is swtiched from a ticket-enabled context to
a ticket-disabled context in the servername callback, no session-id
is generated, so the session can't be resumed.

If a servername callback changes the SSL_OP_NO_TICKET option, check
to see if it's changed to disable, and whether a session ticket is
expected (i.e. the client indicated ticket support and the SSL had
tickets enabled at the time), and whether we already have a previous
session (i.e. s->hit is set).

In this case, clear the ticket-expected flag, remove any ticket data
and generate a session-id in the session.

If the SSL hit (resumed) and switched to a ticket-disabled context,
assume that the resumption was via session-id, and don't bother to
update the session.

Before this fix, the updated unit-tests in 06-sni-ticket.conf would
fail test #4 (server1 = SNI, server2 = no SNI).
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1529)

This allows the caller to guarantee that there is sufficient space for a
number of insertions without reallocation.

The expansion ratio when reallocating the array is reduced to 1.5 rather than 2.

Change bounds testing to use a single size rather than both INT_MAX and
SIZE_MAX.  This simplifies some of the tests.

Switch the stack pointers to data from char * to void *
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4386)

The pub_key field for DH isn't actually used in DH_compute_key at all.
(Note the peer public key is passed in as as BIGNUM.) It's mostly there
so the caller may extract it from DH_generate_key. It doesn't
particularly need to be present if filling in a DH from external
parameters.

The check in DH_set0_key conflicts with adding OpenSSL 1.1.0 to Node.
Their public API is a thin wrapper over the old OpenSSL one:
https://nodejs.org/api/crypto.html#crypto_class_diffiehellman

They have separate setPrivateKey and setPublicKey methods, so the public
key may be set last or not at all. In 1.0.2, either worked fine since
operations on DH objects generally didn't use the public key.  (Like
with OpenSSL, Node's setPublicKey method is also largely a no-op, but so
it goes.) In 1.1.0, DH_set0_key prevents create a private-key-only DH
object.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4384)

This guards against the name constraints check consuming large amounts
of CPU time when certificates in the presented chain contain an
excessive number of names (specifically subject email names or subject
alternative DNS names) and/or name constraints.

Name constraints checking compares the names presented in a certificate
against the name constraints included in a certificate higher up in the
chain using two nested for loops.

Move the name constraints check so that it happens after signature
verification so peers cannot exploit this using a chain with invalid
signatures. Also impose a hard limit on the number of name constraints
check loop iterations to further mitigate the issue.

Thanks to NCC for finding this issue. Fix written by Martin Kreichgauer.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4393)

Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4368)

Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4368)

1. make app pkey methods cleanup internal
2. add EVP_PKEY_meth_remove

Fixes travis-ci failure in #4337
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4356)

A new method is added to EVP_PKEY_METH as:

    int (*check) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);

and to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD as:

    int (*pkey_check) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);

This is used to check the validity of a specific key.

The order of calls is:
EVP_PKEY_check -> pmeth.check -> ameth.pkey_check.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4337)

It is otherwise unclear what all the magic numbers mean.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4349)

The instructions don't work.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4349)

"Early callback" is a little ambiguous now that early data exists.
Perhaps "ClientHello callback"?
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4349)

The extensions not sent when TLS 1.2 is not used caused the message
length to be 109, which is less than the 127 threshold needed
to activate the F5 workaround.  Add another 20 bytes of dummy ALPN
data do push it over the threshold.

Also, fix the definition of the (unused) local macro indicating
the threshold.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4346)

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4011)

clienthellotest tries to fill out the size of the ClientHello by adding
extra ciphersuites in order to test the padding extension. This is
unreliable because they are very dependent on configuration options. If we
add too much data the test will fail! We were already also adding some dummy
ALPN protocols to pad out the size, and it turns out that this is sufficient
just in itself, so drop the extra ciphersuites.
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4331)

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4332)

[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4327)

Some URIs get "mistreated" (converted) by the MSYS run-time.
Unfortunately, avoiding this conversion doesn't help either.

    http://www.mingw.org/wiki/Posix_path_conversion

Fixes #4314
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4322)

Ironically enough not all installations get Module::Load::Conditional
installed by default... [It's a bit half-hearted, because such
installations are likely to lack more stuffi that is needed, but
nevertheless, it proved to be helpful.]
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4323)

If the server_name extension is long enough to require two bytes to
hold the length of either field, the test suite would not decode
the length properly.  Using the PACKET_ APIs would have avoided this,
but it was desired to avoid using private APIs in this part of the
test suite, to keep ourselves honest.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4318)

The include search path was not picking up files in the root of
the tree.

[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4316)

Move struct timeval includes into e_os.h (where the Windows ones were).
Enaure that the include is guarded canonically.

Refer #4271
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4312)

Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3926)

Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3926)

Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3926)

If there is no SNI in the session then s_client no longer sends the SNI
extension. Update the tests to take account of that
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3926)

Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3926)

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4264)

AEAD cipher mode implementation is based on that used for AES:

  https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5116

TLS GCM cipher suites as specified in:

  https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6209Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4287)