1. 17 10月, 2017 1 次提交
  2. 13 10月, 2017 3 次提交
  3. 12 10月, 2017 11 次提交
  4. 11 10月, 2017 4 次提交
  5. 10 10月, 2017 2 次提交
  6. 09 10月, 2017 2 次提交
  7. 07 10月, 2017 1 次提交
  8. 06 10月, 2017 1 次提交
  9. 04 10月, 2017 1 次提交
    • T
      Session resume broken switching contexts · a84e5c9a
      Todd Short 提交于
      When an SSL's context is swtiched from a ticket-enabled context to
      a ticket-disabled context in the servername callback, no session-id
      is generated, so the session can't be resumed.
      
      If a servername callback changes the SSL_OP_NO_TICKET option, check
      to see if it's changed to disable, and whether a session ticket is
      expected (i.e. the client indicated ticket support and the SSL had
      tickets enabled at the time), and whether we already have a previous
      session (i.e. s->hit is set).
      
      In this case, clear the ticket-expected flag, remove any ticket data
      and generate a session-id in the session.
      
      If the SSL hit (resumed) and switched to a ticket-disabled context,
      assume that the resumption was via session-id, and don't bother to
      update the session.
      
      Before this fix, the updated unit-tests in 06-sni-ticket.conf would
      fail test #4 (server1 = SNI, server2 = no SNI).
      Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
      Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
      Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
      Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
      (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1529)
      a84e5c9a
  10. 03 10月, 2017 2 次提交
  11. 02 10月, 2017 2 次提交
  12. 30 9月, 2017 1 次提交
  13. 29 9月, 2017 1 次提交
  14. 28 9月, 2017 3 次提交
  15. 27 9月, 2017 2 次提交
  16. 26 9月, 2017 1 次提交
  17. 23 9月, 2017 1 次提交
    • D
      Guard against DoS in name constraints handling. · 8545051c
      David Benjamin 提交于
      This guards against the name constraints check consuming large amounts
      of CPU time when certificates in the presented chain contain an
      excessive number of names (specifically subject email names or subject
      alternative DNS names) and/or name constraints.
      
      Name constraints checking compares the names presented in a certificate
      against the name constraints included in a certificate higher up in the
      chain using two nested for loops.
      
      Move the name constraints check so that it happens after signature
      verification so peers cannot exploit this using a chain with invalid
      signatures. Also impose a hard limit on the number of name constraints
      check loop iterations to further mitigate the issue.
      
      Thanks to NCC for finding this issue. Fix written by Martin Kreichgauer.
      Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
      Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
      (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4393)
      8545051c
  18. 20 9月, 2017 1 次提交