1. 02 1月, 2016 1 次提交
    • V
      Protocol version selection and negotiation rewrite · 4fa52141
      Viktor Dukhovni 提交于
      The protocol selection code is now consolidated in a few consecutive
      short functions in a single file and is table driven.  Protocol-specific
      constraints that influence negotiation are moved into the flags
      field of the method structure.  The same protocol version constraints
      are now applied in all code paths.  It is now much easier to add
      new protocol versions without reworking the protocol selection
      logic.
      
      In the presence of "holes" in the list of enabled client protocols
      we no longer select client protocols below the hole based on a
      subset of the constraints and then fail shortly after when it is
      found that these don't meet the remaining constraints (suiteb, FIPS,
      security level, ...).  Ideally, with the new min/max controls users
      will be less likely to create "holes" in the first place.
      Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
      4fa52141
  2. 20 12月, 2015 1 次提交
  3. 28 11月, 2015 1 次提交
  4. 24 11月, 2015 1 次提交
  5. 06 11月, 2015 2 次提交
  6. 30 10月, 2015 13 次提交
  7. 12 8月, 2015 1 次提交
  8. 03 8月, 2015 2 次提交
    • M
      Move DTLS CCS processing into the state machine · c69f2adf
      Matt Caswell 提交于
      Continuing on from the previous commit this moves the processing of DTLS
      CCS messages out of the record layer and into the state machine.
      Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
      c69f2adf
    • M
      Move TLS CCS processing into the state machine · 657da85e
      Matt Caswell 提交于
      The handling of incoming CCS records is a little strange. Since CCS is not
      a handshake message it is handled differently to normal handshake messages.
      Unfortunately whilst technically it is not a handhshake message the reality
      is that it must be processed in accordance with the state of the handshake.
      Currently CCS records are processed entirely within the record layer. In
      order to ensure that it is handled in accordance with the handshake state
      a flag is used to indicate that it is an acceptable time to receive a CCS.
      
      Previously this flag did not exist (see CVE-2014-0224), but the flag should
      only really be considered a workaround for the problem that CCS is not
      visible to the state machine.
      
      Outgoing CCS messages are already handled within the state machine.
      
      This patch makes CCS visible to the TLS state machine. A separate commit
      will handle DTLS.
      Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
      657da85e
  9. 16 5月, 2015 2 次提交
    • M
      Updates following review comments · d45ba43d
      Matt Caswell 提交于
      Miscellaneous updates following review comments on the version negotiation
      rewrite patches.
      Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
      d45ba43d
    • M
      Server side version negotiation rewrite · 32ec4153
      Matt Caswell 提交于
      This commit changes the way that we do server side protocol version
      negotiation. Previously we had a whole set of code that had an "up front"
      state machine dedicated to the negotiating the protocol version. This adds
      significant complexity to the state machine. Historically the justification
      for doing this was the support of SSLv2 which works quite differently to
      SSLv3+. However, we have now removed support for SSLv2 so there is little
      reason to maintain this complexity.
      
      The one slight difficulty is that, although we no longer support SSLv2, we
      do still support an SSLv3+ ClientHello in an SSLv2 backward compatible
      ClientHello format. This is generally only used by legacy clients. This
      commit adds support within the SSLv3 code for these legacy format
      ClientHellos.
      
      Server side version negotiation now works in much the same was as DTLS,
      i.e. we introduce the concept of TLS_ANY_VERSION. If s->version is set to
      that then when a ClientHello is received it will work out the most
      appropriate version to respond with. Also, SSLv23_method and
      SSLv23_server_method have been replaced with TLS_method and
      TLS_server_method respectively. The old SSLv23* names still exist as
      macros pointing at the new name, although they are deprecated.
      
      Subsequent commits will look at client side version negotiation, as well of
      removal of the old s23* code.
      Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
      32ec4153
  10. 01 5月, 2015 1 次提交
  11. 17 4月, 2015 1 次提交
  12. 26 3月, 2015 4 次提交
  13. 23 3月, 2015 1 次提交
  14. 28 1月, 2015 1 次提交
  15. 22 1月, 2015 2 次提交
  16. 13 1月, 2015 1 次提交
  17. 06 1月, 2015 1 次提交
  18. 03 1月, 2015 1 次提交
  19. 31 12月, 2014 1 次提交
  20. 29 11月, 2014 1 次提交
  21. 28 3月, 2014 1 次提交
    • D
      Security framework. · b362ccab
      Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
      Security callback: selects which parameters are permitted including
      sensible defaults based on bits of security.
      
      The "parameters" which can be selected include: ciphersuites,
      curves, key sizes, certificate signature algorithms, supported
      signature algorithms, DH parameters, SSL/TLS version, session tickets
      and compression.
      
      In some cases prohibiting the use of a parameters will mean they are
      not advertised to the peer: for example cipher suites and ECC curves.
      In other cases it will abort the handshake: e.g DH parameters or the
      peer key size.
      
      Documentation to follow...
      b362ccab