1. 30 8月, 2019 2 次提交
  2. 27 8月, 2019 1 次提交
  3. 24 8月, 2019 2 次提交
  4. 22 8月, 2019 1 次提交
    • R
      openssl dgst, openssl enc: check for end of input · 8be96f23
      Richard Levitte 提交于
      The input reading loop in 'openssl dgst' and 'openssl enc' doesn't
      check for end of input, and because of the way BIO works, it thereby
      won't detect that the end is reached before the read is an error.
      With the FILE BIO, an error occurs when trying to read past EOF, which
      is fairly much ok, except when the command is used interactively, at
      least on Unix.  The result in that case is that the user has to press
      Ctrl-D twice for the command to terminate.
      
      The issue is further complicated because both these commands use
      filter BIOs on top of the FILE BIO, so a naïve attempt to check
      BIO_eof() doesn't quite solve it, since that only checks the state of
      the source/sink BIO, and the filter BIO may have some buffered data
      that still needs to be read.  Fortunately, there's BIO_pending() that
      checks exactly that, if any filter BIO has pending data that needs to
      be processed.
      
      We end up having to check both BIO_pending() and BIO_eof().
      
      Thanks to Zsigmond Lőrinczy for the initial effort and inspiration.
      
      Fixes #9355
      Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
      (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9668)
      
      (cherry picked from commit 8ed7bbb411d2a9e0edef928958ad955e0be3d6dd)
      8be96f23
  5. 20 8月, 2019 2 次提交
    • J
      Correct documented return value for BIO_get_mem_data() · 378d53ec
      Johannes 提交于
      CLA: trivial
      Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
      Reviewed-by: NTomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
      (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9643)
      
      (cherry picked from commit 797a5b7af9d9bbfbcbff4607c10ad5c5595ac785)
      378d53ec
    • P
      Start up DEVRANDOM entropy improvement for older Linux devices. · 3ff98f55
      Pauli 提交于
      Improve handling of low entropy at start up from /dev/urandom by waiting for
      a read(2) call on /dev/random to succeed.  Once one such call has succeeded,
      a shared memory segment is created and persisted as an indicator to other
      processes that /dev/urandom is properly seeded.
      
      This does not fully prevent against attacks weakening the entropy source.
      An attacker who has control of the machine early in its boot sequence
      could create the shared memory segment preventing detection of low entropy
      conditions.  However, this is no worse than the current situation.
      
      An attacker would also be capable of removing the shared memory segment
      and causing seeding to reoccur resulting in a denial of service attack.
      This is partially mitigated by keeping the shared memory alive for the
      duration of the process's existence.  Thus, an attacker would not only need
      to have called call shmctl(2) with the IPC_RMID command but the system
      must subsequently enter a state where no instances of libcrypto exist in
      any process.  Even one long running process will prevent this attack.
      
      The System V shared memory calls used here go back at least as far as
      Linux kernel 2.0.  Linux kernels 4.8 and later, don't have a reliable way
      to detect that /dev/urandom has been properly seeded, so a failure is raised
      for this case (i.e. the getentropy(2) call has already failed).
      Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
      (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9595)
      
      [manual merge]
      3ff98f55
  6. 19 8月, 2019 6 次提交
  7. 18 8月, 2019 1 次提交
  8. 17 8月, 2019 1 次提交
  9. 15 8月, 2019 3 次提交
  10. 14 8月, 2019 4 次提交
  11. 13 8月, 2019 2 次提交
  12. 12 8月, 2019 3 次提交
  13. 09 8月, 2019 5 次提交
  14. 08 8月, 2019 3 次提交
  15. 06 8月, 2019 3 次提交
  16. 01 8月, 2019 1 次提交