- 02 3月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Bernd Edlinger 提交于
Use select to wait for /dev/random in readable state, but do not actually read anything from /dev/random, use /dev/urandom first. Use linux define __NR_getrandom instead of the glibc define SYS_getrandom, in case the kernel headers are more current than the glibc headers. Fixes #8215 Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8251) (cherry picked from commit 38023b87f037f4b832c236dfce2a76272be08763)
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- 26 2月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8347)
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- 25 1月, 2019 1 次提交
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由 Klotz, Tobias 提交于
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7569) (cherry picked from commit 5c8b7b4caa0faedb69277063a7c6b3a8e56c6308)
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- 08 11月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Matthias St. Pierre 提交于
Commit c7504aeb (pr #6432) fixed a regression for applications in chroot environments, which compensated the fact that the new OpenSSL CSPRNG (based on the NIST DRBG) now reseeds periodically, which the previous one didn't. Now the reseeding could fail in the chroot environment if the DEVRANDOM devices were not present anymore and no other entropy source (e.g. getrandom()) was available. The solution was to keep the file handles for the DEVRANDOM devices open by default. In fact, the fix did more than this, it opened the DEVRANDOM devices early and unconditionally in rand_pool_init(), which had the unwanted side effect that the devices were opened (and kept open) even in cases when they were not used at all, for example when the getrandom() system call was available. Due to a bug (issue #7419) this even happened when the feature was disabled by the application. This commit removes the unconditional opening of all DEVRANDOM devices. They will now only be opened (and kept open) on first use. In particular, if getrandom() is available, the handles will not be opened unnecessarily. This change does not introduce a regression for applications compiled for libcrypto 1.1.0, because the SSLEAY RNG also seeds on first use. So in the above constellation the CSPRNG will only be properly seeded if it is happens before the forking and chrooting. Fixes #7419 Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7437) (cherry picked from commit 8cfc19716c22dac737ec8cfc5f7d085e7c37f4d8)
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- 27 10月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Matthias St. Pierre 提交于
In commit 8bf366519661 some renamings andd typo fixes were made while adding back the DRBG-HMAC and DRBG-HASH implementation. Since the commit could not be backported, a lot of unnecessary differences between master and 1.1.1 were introduced. These differences result in tiresome merge conflicts when cherry-picking. To minimize these merge-conflicts, this patch ports all 'non-feature' changes of commit 8bf366519661 (e.g., renamings of private variables, fixes of typographical errors, comment changes) manually back to 1.1.1. The commits a83dc59afa2e (#7399) and 8817215d5c52 (#7456) failed to cherry-pick previously to 1.1.1, with this patch they both cherry-pick without conflicts. Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7505)
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- 17 10月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Matthias St. Pierre 提交于
In pull request #4328 the seeding of the DRBG via RAND_add()/RAND_seed() was implemented by buffering the data in a random pool where it is picked up later by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback. This buffer was limited to the size of 4096 bytes. When a larger input was added via RAND_add() or RAND_seed() to the DRBG, the reseeding failed, but the error returned by the DRBG was ignored by the two calling functions, which both don't return an error code. As a consequence, the data provided by the application was effectively ignored. This commit fixes the problem by a more efficient implementation which does not copy the data in memory and by raising the buffer the size limit to INT32_MAX (2 gigabytes). This is less than the NIST limit of 2^35 bits but it was chosen intentionally to avoid platform dependent problems like integer sizes and/or signed/unsigned conversion. Additionally, the DRBG is now less permissive on errors: In addition to pushing a message to the openssl error stack, it enters the error state, which forces a reinstantiation on next call. Thanks go to Dr. Falko Strenzke for reporting this issue to the openssl-security mailing list. After internal discussion the issue has been categorized as not being security relevant, because the DRBG reseeds automatically and is fully functional even without additional randomness provided by the application. Fixes #7381 Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7382) (cherry picked from commit 3064b55134434a0b2850f07eff57120f35bb269a)
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- 10 10月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Matthias St. Pierre 提交于
Fixes a compiler warning about an unused syscall_random() and cleans up the OPENSSL_RAND_SEED preprocessor logic. Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/779) (cherry picked from commit d90e128be6e584d319931c78cb8f8f68d17b6a34)
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- 19 8月, 2018 3 次提交
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由 Dr. Matthias St. Pierre 提交于
Don't discard partial reads from /dev/*random and retry instead. Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6990)
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由 Dr. Matthias St. Pierre 提交于
Fixes #6978 Don't discard partial reads from syscall_random() and retry instead. Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6990)
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由 Dr. Matthias St. Pierre 提交于
Change return value type to ssize_t and ensure that a negative value is returned only if a corresponding errno is set. Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6990)
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- 01 7月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
Occasionally, e.g. when compiling for elderly glibc, you end up passing -D_GNU_SOURCE on command line, and doing so triggered warning... Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6616)
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- 27 6月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Pauli 提交于
This allows operation inside a chroot environment without having the random device present. A new call, RAND_keep_random_devices_open(), has been introduced that can be used to control file descriptor use by the random seed sources. Some seed sources maintain open file descriptors by default, which allows such sources to operate in a chroot(2) jail without the associated device nodes being available. Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6432)
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- 25 6月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
Unlike other ELF systems, HP-UX run-time linker fails to detect symbol availability through weak declaration. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6583)
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- 15 6月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Matthias St. Pierre 提交于
Calling the functions rand_pool_add_{additional,nonce}_data() in crypto/rand/rand_lib.c with no implementation for djgpp/MSDOS causees unresolved symbols when linking with djgpp. Reported and fixed by Gisle Vanem Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6421)
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- 09 6月, 2018 2 次提交
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
If built with no-dso, syscall_random remains "blind" to getentropy. Since it's possible to detect symbol availability on ELF-based systems without involving DSO module, bypass it. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6436)
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
If built with no-dso, DSO_global_lookup leaves "unsupported" message in error queue. Since there is a fall-back code, it's unnecessary distraction. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6436)
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- 03 6月, 2018 4 次提交
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由 Kurt Roeckx 提交于
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> GH: #6405
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由 Kurt Roeckx 提交于
Only Linux and FreeBSD provide getrandom(), but they both also provide getentropy() since the same version and we already tried to call that. Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> GH: #6405
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由 Kurt Roeckx 提交于
This will actually support most OSs, and at least adds support for Solaris and OSX Fixes: #6403 Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> GH: #6405
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由 Kurt Roeckx 提交于
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> GH: #6405
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- 02 5月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
rand_pool_bytes_needed() was constructed in such a way that the smallest acceptable entropy factor was 1 entropy bits per 8 bits of data. At the same time, we have a DRBG_MINMAX_FACTOR that allows weaker source, as small as 1 bit of entropy per 128 bits of data. The conclusion is that rand_pool_bytes_needed() needs to change to support weaker entropy sources. We therefore change the input of entropy per byte to be an entropy factor instead. This entropy factor expresses how many bits of data it takes (on average) to get 1 bit of entropy. Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6150)
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- 24 4月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Kurt Roeckx 提交于
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> GH: #6044
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- 23 4月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Kurt Roeckx 提交于
Reviewed-by: NDr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> GH: #5910
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- 14 4月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Matthias St. Pierre 提交于
Fixes #5849 In pull request #5503 a fallback was added which adds a random nonce of security_strength/2 bits if no nonce callback is provided. This change raised the entropy requirements form 256 to 384 bit, which can cause problems on some platforms (e.g. VMS, see issue #5849). The requirements for the nonce are given in section 8.6.7 of NIST SP 800-90Ar1: A nonce may be required in the construction of a seed during instantiation in order to provide a security cushion to block certain attacks. The nonce shall be either: a) A value with at least (security_strength/2) bits of entropy, or b) A value that is expected to repeat no more often than a (security_strength/2)-bit random string would be expected to repeat. Each nonce shall be unique to the cryptographic module in which instantiation is performed, but need not be secret. When used, the nonce shall be considered to be a critical security parameter. This commit implements a nonce of type b) in order to lower the entropy requirements during instantiation back to 256 bits. The formulation "shall be unique to the cryptographic module" above implies that the nonce needs to be unique among (with high probability) among all DRBG instances in "space" and "time". We try to achieve this goal by creating a nonce of the following form nonce = app-specific-data || high-resolution-utc-timestamp || counter Where || denotes concatenation. The application specific data can be something like the process or group id of the application. A utc timestamp is used because it increases monotonically, provided the system time is synchronized. This approach may not be perfect yet for a FIPS evaluation, but it should be good enough for the moment. This commit also harmonizes the implementation of the get_nonce() and the get_additional_data() callbacks and moves the platform specific parts from rand_lib.c into rand_unix.c, rand_win.c, and rand_vms.c. Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5920)
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- 05 4月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
When these two functions returned zero, it could mean: 1. that an error occured. In their case, the error is an overflow of the pool, i.e. the correct response from the caller would be to stop trying to fill the pool. 2. that there isn't enought entropy acquired yet, i.e. the correct response from the caller would be to try and add more entropy to the pool. Because of this ambiguity, the returned zero turns out to be useless. This change makes the returned value more consistent. 1 means the addition of new entropy was successful, 0 means it wasn't. To know if the pool has been filled enough, the caller will have to call some other function, such as rand_pool_entropy_available(). Fixes #5846 Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5876)
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- 16 3月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Matthias St. Pierre 提交于
Fixes #4403 This commit moves the internal header file "internal/rand.h" to <openssl/rand_drbg.h>, making the RAND_DRBG API public. The RAND_POOL API remains private, its function prototypes were moved to "internal/rand_int.h" and converted to lowercase. Documentation for the new API is work in progress on GitHub #5461. Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5462)
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- 27 2月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 14 2月, 2018 1 次提交
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由 Kurt Roeckx 提交于
getrandom() is now used on Linux by default when using Linux >= 3.17 and glibc >= 2.25 Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #5314
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- 18 10月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Matthias St. Pierre 提交于
Reseeding is handled very differently by the classic RAND_METHOD API and the new RAND_DRBG api. These differences led to some problems when the new RAND_DRBG was made the default OpenSSL RNG. In particular, RAND_add() did not work as expected anymore. These issues are discussed on the thread '[openssl-dev] Plea for a new public OpenSSL RNG API' and in Pull Request #4328. This commit fixes the mentioned issues, introducing the following changes: - Replace the fixed size RAND_BYTES_BUFFER by a new RAND_POOL API which facilitates collecting entropy by the get_entropy() callback. - Don't use RAND_poll()/RAND_add() for collecting entropy from the get_entropy() callback anymore. Instead, replace RAND_poll() by RAND_POOL_acquire_entropy(). - Add a new function rand_drbg_restart() which tries to get the DRBG in an instantiated state by all means, regardless of the current state (uninstantiated, error, ...) the DRBG is in. If the caller provides entropy or additional input, it will be used for reseeding. - Restore the original documented behaviour of RAND_add() and RAND_poll() (namely to reseed the DRBG immediately) by a new implementation based on rand_drbg_restart(). - Add automatic error recovery from temporary failures of the entropy source to RAND_DRBG_generate() using the rand_drbg_restart() function. Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4328)
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- 30 8月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Pauli 提交于
cryptilib.h is the second. Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4188)
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- 28 8月, 2017 2 次提交
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由 Dr. Matthias St. Pierre 提交于
The DRBG callbacks 'get_entropy()' and 'cleanup_entropy()' are designed in such a way that the randomness buffer does not have to be allocated by the calling function. It receives the address of a dynamically allocated buffer from get_entropy() and returns this address to cleanup_entropy(), where it is freed. If these two calls are properly paired, the address can be stored in a stack local variable of the calling function, so there is no need for having a 'randomness' member (and a 'filled' member) in 'RAND_DRBG'. Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4266)
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由 Dr. Matthias St. Pierre 提交于
With the introduction of RAND_poll_ex(), the `RAND_add()` calls were replaced by meaningless cb(...). This commit changes the 'cb(...)' calls back to 'rand_add(...)' calls by changing the signature as follows: -int RAND_poll_ex(RAND_poll_fn cb, void *arg); +int RAND_poll_ex(RAND_poll_cb rand_add, void *arg); Changed the function typedef name to 'RAND_poll_cb' to emphasize the fact that the function type represents a callback function. Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4266)
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- 03 8月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
If RAND_add wraps around, XOR with existing. Add test to drbgtest that does the wrap-around. Re-order seeding and stop after first success. Add RAND_poll_ex() Use the DF and therefore lower RANDOMNESS_NEEDED. Also, for child DRBG's, mix in the address as the personalization bits. Centralize the entropy callbacks, from drbg_lib to rand_lib. (Conceptually, entropy is part of the enclosing application.) Thanks to Dr. Matthias St Pierre for the suggestion. Various code cleanups: -Make state an enum; inline RANDerr calls. -Add RAND_POLL_RETRIES (thanks Pauli for the idea) -Remove most RAND_seed calls from rest of library -Rename DRBG_CTX to RAND_DRBG, etc. -Move some code from drbg_lib to drbg_rand; drbg_lib is now only the implementation of NIST DRBG. -Remove blocklength Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4019)
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- 23 7月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
Add a new config param to specify how the CSPRNG should be seeded. Illegal values or nonsensical combinations (e.g., anything other than "os" on VMS or HP VOS etc) result in build failures. Add RDSEED support. Add RDTSC but leave it disabled for now pending more investigation. Refactor and reorganization all seeding files (rand_unix/win/vms) so that they are simpler. Only require 128 bits of seeding material. Many document improvements, including why to not use RAND_add() and the limitations around using load_file/write_file. Document RAND_poll(). Cleanup Windows RAND_poll and return correct status More completely initialize the default DRBG. Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3965)
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- 15 7月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
Remove unused rand_hw_xor, MD/EVP indirection Make rand_pseudo same as rand. Cleanup formatting and ifdef control Rename some things: - rand_meth to openssl_rand_meth; make it global - source file - lock/init functions, start per-thread state - ossl_meth_init to ossl_rand_init Put state into RAND_STATE structure And put OSSL_RAND_STATE into ossl_typ.h Use "randomness" instead of "entropy" Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3758)
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- 06 7月, 2017 1 次提交
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
Original text: Check if a random "file" is really a device file, and treat it specially if it is. Add a few OpenBSD-specific cases. This is part of a large change submitted by Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.or Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3700)
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- 30 6月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Ensure things really do get cleared when we intend them to. Addresses an OCAP Audit issue. Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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- 18 5月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 18 3月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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- 27 1月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
This was done by the following find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script: print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@; close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $. And then some hand-editing of other files. Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
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