Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

The X509_ATTRIBUTE structure includes a hack to tolerate malformed
attributes that encode as the type instead of SET OF type. This form
is never created by OpenSSL and shouldn't be needed any more.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

This commit handles BIO_ACCEPT_free BIO_CB_FREE BIO_CONNECT_free
BIO_free BIO_free_all BIO_vfree
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

create an HMAC

Inspired by BoringSSL commit 2fe7f2d0d9a6fcc75b4e594eeec306cc55acd594
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

The justification for RAND_pseudo_bytes is somewhat dubious, and the reality
is that it is frequently being misused. RAND_bytes and RAND_pseudo_bytes in
the default implementation both end up calling ssleay_rand_bytes. Both may
return -1 in an error condition. If there is insufficient entropy then
both will return 0, but RAND_bytes will additionally add an error to the
error queue. They both return 1 on success.
Therefore the fundamental difference between the two is that one will add an
error to the error queue with insufficient entory whilst the other will not.
Frequently there are constructions of this form:

if(RAND_pseudo_bytes(...) <= 1)
	goto err;

In the above form insufficient entropy is treated as an error anyway, so
RAND_bytes is probably the better form to use.

This form is also seen:
if(!RAND_pseudo_bytes(...))
	goto err;

This is technically not correct at all since a -1 return value is
incorrectly handled - but this form will also treat insufficient entropy as
an error.

Within libssl it is required that you have correctly seeded your entropy
pool and so there seems little benefit in using RAND_pseudo_bytes.
Similarly in libcrypto many operations also require a correctly seeded
entropy pool and so in most interesting cases you would be better off
using RAND_bytes anyway. There is a significant risk of RAND_pseudo_bytes
being incorrectly used in scenarios where security can be compromised by
insufficient entropy.

If you are not using the default implementation, then most engines use the
same function to implement RAND_bytes and RAND_pseudo_bytes in any case.

Given its misuse, limited benefit, and potential to compromise security,
RAND_pseudo_bytes has been deprecated.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Ensure RAND_bytes return value is checked correctly, and that we no longer
use RAND_pseudo_bytes.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Start ensuring all OpenSSL "free" routines allow NULL, and remove
any if check before calling them.
This gets DH_free, DSA_free, RSA_free
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Disable loop checking when we retry verification with an alternative path.
This fixes the case where an intermediate CA is explicitly trusted and part
of the untrusted certificate list. By disabling loop checking for this case
the untrusted CA can be replaced by the explicitly trusted case and
verification will succeed.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

If a set of certificates is supplied to OCSP_basic_verify use those in
addition to any present in the OCSP response as untrusted CAs when
verifying a certificate chain.

PR#3668
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Move EVP internals to evp_int.h, remove -Ievp hack from crypto/Makefile
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Move ASN.1 internals used across multiple directories into new internal
header file asn1_int.h remove crypto/Makefile hack which allowed other
directories to include "asn1_locl.h"
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Start ensuring all OpenSSL "free" routines allow NULL, and remove
any if check before calling them.
This gets ASN1_OBJECT_free and ASN1_STRING_free.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Fix compilation failure when SCTP is compiled due to incorrect define.
Reported-by: NConrad Kostecki <ck+gentoobugzilla@bl4ckb0x.de>
URL: https://bugs.gentoo.org/543828

RT#3758
Signed-off-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Thanks to a -I.., the path does work, at least on unix.  However, this
doesn't work so well on VMS.  Correcting the path to not rely on given
-I does work on both.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Remove old ASN.1 COMPAT type. This was meant as a temporary measure
so older ASN.1 code (from OpenSSL 0.9.6) still worked. It's a hack
which breaks constification and hopefully nothing uses it now, if
it ever did.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Remove x_exten.c and x_exten.o from crypto/asn1/Makefile: they've moved now.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Remove {i2d,d2i}_ASN1_BOOLEAN.

Rewrite single occurrence of d2i_ASN1_BOOLEAN in asn1_parse2
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Remove old M_ASN1_ macros and replace any occurences with the corresponding
function.

Remove d2i_ASN1_bytes, d2i_ASN1_SET, i2d_ASN1_SET: no longer used internally.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

In cooperation with Ard Biesheuvel (Linaro) and Sami Tolvanen (Google).
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

This tests the unwrap algorithm with an invalid key. The result should
be rejected without returning any plaintext.
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

crypto/modes/wrap128.c was heavily refactored to support AES Key Wrap
with Padding, and four bugs were introduced into CRYPTO_128_unwrap() at
that time:

- crypto_128_unwrap_raw()'s return value ('ret') is checked incorrectly,
  and the function immediately returns 'ret' in (almost) all cases.
  This makes the IV checking code later in the function unreachable, but
  callers think the IV check succeeded since CRYPTO_128_unwrap()'s
  return value is non-zero.

  FIX: Return 0 (error) if crypto_128_unwrap_raw() returned 0 (error).

- crypto_128_unwrap_raw() writes the IV to the 'got_iv' buffer, not to
  the first 8 bytes of the output buffer ('out') as the IV checking code
  expects.  This makes the IV check fail.

  FIX: Compare 'iv' to 'got_iv', not 'out'.

- The data written to the output buffer ('out') is "cleansed" if the IV
  check fails, but the code passes OPENSSL_cleanse() the input buffer
  length ('inlen') instead of the number of bytes that
  crypto_128_unwrap_raw() wrote to the output buffer ('ret').  This
  means that OPENSSL_cleanse() could potentially write past the end of
  'out'.

  FIX: Change 'inlen' to 'ret' in the OPENSSL_cleanse() call.

- CRYPTO_128_unwrap() is returning the length of the input buffer
  ('inlen') instead of the number of bytes written to the output buffer
  ('ret').  This could cause the caller to read past the end of 'out'.

  FIX: Return 'ret' instead of 'inlen' at the end of the function.

PR#3749
Reviewed-by: NStephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NStephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reported by the LibreSSL project as a follow on to CVE-2015-0209
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

In PKCS#7, the ASN.1 content component is optional.
This typically applies to inner content (detached signatures),
however we must also handle unexpected missing outer content
correctly.

This patch only addresses functions reachable from parsing,
decryption and verification, and functions otherwise associated
with reading potentially untrusted data.

Correcting all low-level API calls requires further work.

CVE-2015-0289

Thanks to Michal Zalewski (Google) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: NSteve Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Fix segmentation violation when ASN1_TYPE_cmp is passed a boolean type. This
can be triggered during certificate verification so could be a DoS attack
against a client or a server enabling client authentication.

CVE-2015-0286
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Fix a bug where invalid PSS parameters are not rejected resulting in a
NULL pointer exception. This can be triggered during certificate
verification so could be a DoS attack against a client or a server
enabling client authentication.

Thanks to Brian Carpenter for reporting this issues.

CVE-2015-0208
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

CVE-2015-0287
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>