MacOS seems to define __GLIBC__ but not __GLIBC_PREREQ.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5269)

Remove the timer and TSC additional input code and instead provide a single
routine that attempts to use the "best" timer/counter available on the
system.  It attempts to use TSC, then various OS dependent resources and
finally several tries to obtain the date.  If any of these timer/counters
is successful, the rest are skipped.

No randomness is credited for this.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5231)

If such a timer/counter register is not available, the return value is always
zero.  This matches the assembly implementations' behaviour.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5231)

Patch by @levitte.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5231)

Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5268)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5267)

Signed-off-by: NPatrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5230)

Signed-off-by: NPatrick Steuer <patrick.steuer@de.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5230)

This script kept its own database of disablable algorithms, which is a
maintenance problem, as it's not always perfectly in sync with what
Configure does.  However, we do have all the data in configdata.pm,
produced by Configure, so let's use that instead.

Also, make sure to parse the *err.h header files, as they contain
function declarations that might not be present elsewhere.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5157)

The functions RAND_bytes() and RAND_priv_bytes() are now both based
on a common implementation using RAND_DRBG_bytes() (if the default
OpenSSL rand method is active). This not only simplifies the code
but also has the advantage that additional input from a high precision
timer is added on every generate call if the timer is available.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5251)

When comparing the implementations of drbg_bytes() and RAND_DRBG_bytes(),
it was noticed that the former split the buffer into chunks when calling
RAND_DRBG_generate() to circumvent the size limitation of the buffer
to outlen <= drb->max_request. This loop was missing in RAND_DRBG_bytes(),
so it was adopted from drbg_bytes().
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5251)

This check not only prevented the automatic reinstantiation of the
DRBG, which is implemented in RAND_DRBG_generate(), but also prevented
an error message from being generated in the case of failure.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5251)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5244)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4944)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4944)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4944)

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5243)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5237)

The assumption that the received buffer has to be NUL-terminated was
faulty.

Fault found in #5224
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5239)

BN_from_montgomery_word doesn't have a constant memory access pattern.
Replace the pointer trick with a constant-time select. There is, of
course, still the bn_correct_top leak pervasive in BIGNUM itself.

See also https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/22904 from BoringSSL.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5228)

The exponent here is one of d, dmp1, or dmq1 for RSA. This value and its
bit length are both secret. The only public upper bound is the bit width
of the corresponding modulus (RSA n, p, and q, respectively).

Although BN_num_bits is constant-time (sort of; see bn_correct_top notes
in preceding patch), this does not fix the root problem, which is that
the windows are based on the minimal bit width, not the upper bound. We
could use BN_num_bits(m), but BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime is public API
and may be called with larger exponents. Instead, use all top*BN_BITS2
bits in the BIGNUM. This is still sensitive to the long-standing
bn_correct_top leak, but we need to fix that regardless.

This may cause us to do a handful of extra multiplications for RSA keys
which are just above a whole number of words, but that is not a standard
RSA key size.
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5154)

(This patch was written by Andy Polyakov. I only wrote the commit
message. Mistakes in the analysis are my fault.)

BN_num_bits, by way of BN_num_bits_word, currently leaks the
most-significant word of its argument via branching and memory access
pattern.

BN_num_bits is called on RSA prime factors in various places. These have
public bit lengths, but all bits beyond the high bit are secret. This
fully resolves those cases.

There are a few places where BN_num_bits is called on an input where the
bit length is also secret. This does *not* fully resolve those cases as
we still only look at the top word. Today, that is guaranteed to be
non-zero, but only because of the long-standing bn_correct_top timing
leak. Once that is fixed, a constant-time BN_num_bits on such inputs
must count bits on each word.

Instead, those cases should not call BN_num_bits at all. In particular,
BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime uses the exponent bit width to pick windows,
but it should be using the maximum bit width. The next patch will fix
this.

Thanks to Dinghao Wu, Danfeng Zhang, Shuai Wang, Pei Wang, and Xiao Liu
for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5154)

added macro to create version number
use the macro to build OPENSSL_VERSION_AT_LEAST(maj,min,fix) so that
customers of libssl (such as ruby-openssl) do not need to be so aware of
openssl version numbers.
includes updates to ssl(7) and OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER(3) man page
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5212)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5238)

So as not to be mixed up with a device specification...
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5234)

Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)

Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)

Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)

Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA

Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates
initially configured, but use a certificate callback.

Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode:

* Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after
the initial handshake.

* Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless
of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake,
re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication.

Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that
add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options

Add support to s_client:
* Enabled automatically when cert is configured
* Can be forced enabled via -force_pha

Add support to s_server:
* Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server
* Remove some dead code

Update documentation

Update unit tests:
* Illegal use of PHA extension
* TLSv1.3 certificate tests

DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is
implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different.
Add a TODO and a #error

Update handshake context to deal with PHA.

The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the
ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this
handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included
after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate
Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication.

After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state
for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs,
copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest.
This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages
and any prior post-handshake authentication.

This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any
previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript.
This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the
first ClientFinished.
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)

Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)

In a few places we sent an internal_error alert instead of a decode_error.

Fixes #5213
Fixes #5214
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5219)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5224)

The reason to do this is that some output might start with an 'ok',
which TAP catches and takes for TAP output.  The TAP compatible way is
to make all output it shouldn't catch look like comments.

We do this by setting the environment variable HARNESS_OSSL_PREFIX
during tests.  When that is set, apps/openssl uses BIO_f_linebuffer
and sets its prefix to the content of that environment variable.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5224)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5224)

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5229)

This avoids having to enumerate specific modules in apps, or to have
to include them in libtestutil.a.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5222)

Most modules are direct implementations of openssl application
sub-commands, but some constitute a support library, which can be used
by more than one program (and is, incidently, by test/uitest).

For practical purposes, we place the support library modules in a
private, static library.

Finally, there are some modules that don't have direct references in
the rest of the apps code, but are still crucial.  See them as some
kind of extra crt0 or similar for your platform.

Inspiration from David von Oheimb
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5222)

Everything in apps includes apps.h, because that one declares apps
internal library routines.  However, progs.h doesn't declare library
routines, but rather the main commands and their options, and there's
no reason why the library modules should include it.

So, remove the inclusion of progs.h from apps.h and add that inclusion
in all command source files.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5222)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>