- 07 8月, 2014 5 次提交
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由 Adam Langley 提交于
Previously, a truncated DTLS fragment in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would cause *ok to be cleared, but the return value would still be the number of bytes read. This would cause |dtls1_get_message| not to consider it an error and it would continue processing as normal until the calling function noticed that *ok was zero. I can't see an exploit here because |dtls1_get_message| uses |s->init_num| as the length, which will always be zero from what I can see. Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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由 Adam Langley 提交于
The |pqueue_insert| function can fail if one attempts to insert a duplicate sequence number. When handling a fragment of an out of sequence message, |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message| would not call |dtls1_reassemble_fragment| if the fragment's length was zero. It would then allocate a fresh fragment and attempt to insert it, but ignore the return value, leaking the fragment. This allows an attacker to exhaust the memory of a DTLS peer. Fixes CVE-2014-3507 Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
In |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, the value of |msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len| was being checked against the maximum handshake message size, but then |msg_len| bytes were allocated for the fragment buffer. This means that so long as the fragment was within the allowed size, the pending handshake message could consume 16MB + 2MB (for the reassembly bitmap). Approx 10 outstanding handshake messages are allowed, meaning that an attacker could consume ~180MB per DTLS connection. In the non-fragmented path (in |dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message|), no check was applied. Fixes CVE-2014-3506 Wholly based on patch by Adam Langley with one minor amendment. Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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由 Adam Langley 提交于
The |item| variable, in both of these cases, may contain a pointer to a |pitem| structure within |s->d1->buffered_messages|. It was being freed in the error case while still being in |buffered_messages|. When the error later caused the |SSL*| to be destroyed, the item would be double freed. Thanks to Wah-Teh Chang for spotting that the fix in 1632ef74 was inconsistent with the other error paths (but correct). Fixes CVE-2014-3505 Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
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- 25 7月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Don't call internal functions directly call them through SSL_test_functions(). This also makes unit testing work on Windows and platforms that don't export internal functions from shared libraries. By default unit testing is not enabled: it requires the compile time option "enable-unit-test". Reviewed-by: NGeoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
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- 20 7月, 2014 2 次提交
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由 Mike Bland 提交于
ssl/ssl_locl.h now comes first to ensure that it will compile standalone. test/testutil.h is considered to be in the same directory as the test file, since the test file will be linked into test/ and built there. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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由 Mike Bland 提交于
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
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- 16 7月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Use same logic when determining when to expect a client certificate for both TLS and DTLS. PR#3452
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- 15 7月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
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- 14 7月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Peter Mosmans 提交于
PR#3440
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- 09 7月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
PR: #3424,#3423,#3422
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- 06 7月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Andy Polyakov 提交于
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- 05 7月, 2014 2 次提交
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由 Ben Laurie 提交于
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
PR#319 (reoponed version).
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- 04 7月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Remove RFC5878 code. It is no longer needed for CT and has numerous bugs
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- 02 7月, 2014 5 次提交
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由 Thijs Alkemade 提交于
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由 Ben Laurie 提交于
(cherry picked from commit 2db3ea29298bdc347f15fbfab6d5746022f05101) Conflicts: ssl/t1_lib.c
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
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- 01 7月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
(cherry picked from commit c97ec5631bb08a2171a125008d2f0d2a75687aaa)
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- 30 6月, 2014 3 次提交
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由 Ben Laurie 提交于
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由 Ben Laurie 提交于
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由 Ben Laurie 提交于
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- 29 6月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
PR#2531
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- 28 6月, 2014 4 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Some state strings were erronously not compiled when no-ssl2 was set. PR#3295
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由 yogesh nagarkar 提交于
PR#3141
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由 Ken Ballou 提交于
PR#3174
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由 PK 提交于
PR#2800
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- 27 6月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Tomas Mraz 提交于
PR#3374
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- 23 6月, 2014 3 次提交
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由 Miod Vallat 提交于
In the ssl_cipher_get_evp() function, fix off-by-one errors in index validation before accessing arrays. Bug discovered and fixed by Miod Vallat from the OpenBSD team. PR#3375
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
This reverts commit abfb989f. Incorrect attribution
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
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- 18 6月, 2014 1 次提交
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- 15 6月, 2014 1 次提交
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Allow CCS after finished has been sent by client: at this point keys have been correctly set up so it is OK to accept CCS from server. Without this renegotiation can sometimes fail. PR#3400
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- 13 6月, 2014 4 次提交
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Based on an original patch by Joel Sing (OpenBSD) who also originally identified the issue.
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
This reverts commit 2f1dffa8. Missing attribution.
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由 Kurt Cancemi 提交于
In the ssl_cipher_get_evp() function, fix off-by-one errors in index validation before accessing arrays. PR#3375
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
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