The MAX_CURVELIST macro defines the total number of in-built SSL/TLS curves
that we support. However it has not been updated as new curves are added.

Fixes #5232
Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6065)

In 1.0.2 and below we always send the same client_version in a reneg
ClientHello that we sent the first time around, regardless of what
version eventually gets negotiated. According to a comment in
statem_clnt.c this is a workaround for some buggy servers that choked if
we changed the version used in the RSA encrypted premaster secret.

In 1.1.0+ this behaviour no longer occurs. This restores the original
behaviour.

Fixes #1651
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6059)

The spec does not prohib certs form using compressed points. It only
requires that points in a key share are uncompressed. It says nothing
about point compression for certs, so we should not fail if a cert uses a
compressed point.

Fixes #5743
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6055)

This dead code should have been removed as part of #5874 but got missed.

Found by Coverity.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6049)

In 1.0.2 you could configure automatic ecdh params by using the
ECDHParameters config directive and setting it to the value
"+Automatic" or just "Automatic". This is no longer required in 1.1.0+
but we still recognise the "+Automatic" keyword for backwards compatibility.
However we did not recognise just "Automatic" without the leading "+" which
is equally valid. This commit fixes that omission.

Fixes #4113
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6035)

DTLS was not correctly returning the number of pending bytes left in
a call to SSL_pending(). This makes the detection of truncated packets
almost impossible.

Fixes #5478
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6020)

In 1.1.0 and before calling SSL_in_init() from the info_callback
at SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE would return 0. This commit fixes it so
that it does again for 1.1.1. This broke Node.

Fixes #4574
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6019)

This will be necessary to enable Wireshark to decrypt QUIC 0-RTT data.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5702)

NSS 3.34 and boringssl have support for "EXPORTER_SECRET"
(https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1287711) which is needed
for QUIC 1-RTT decryption support in Wireshark.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5702)

Fixes #5934
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5983)

If SSL_set_bio() is called with a NULL wbio after a failed connection then
this can trigger an assertion failure. This should be valid behaviour and
the assertion is in fact invalid and can simply be removed.
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5966)

The first session ticket sent by the server is actually tacked onto the
end of the first handshake from a state machine perspective. However in
reality this is a post-handshake message, and should be preceeded by a
handshake start event from an info callback perspective.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5874)

Fixes #5721
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5874)

We cannot provide a certificate status on a resumption so we should
ignore this extension in that case.

Fixes #1662
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5896)

./config no-autoload-config
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5959)

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5990)

The GOST engine needs to be loaded before we initialise libssl. Otherwise
the GOST ciphersuites are not enabled. However the SSL conf module must
be loaded before we initialise libcrypto. Otherwise we will fail to read
the SSL config from a config file properly.

Another problem is that an application may make use of both libcrypto and
libssl. If it performs libcrypto stuff first and OPENSSL_init_crypto()
is called and loads a config file it will fail if that config file has
any libssl stuff in it.

This commit separates out the loading of the SSL conf module from the
interpretation of its contents. The loading piece doesn't know anything
about SSL so this can be moved to libcrypto. The interpretation of what it
means remains in libssl. This means we can load the SSL conf data before
libssl is there and interpret it when it later becomes available.

Fixes #5809
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5818)

Configuration of TLSv1.3 ciphersuites wasn't working in some cases.

Fixes #5740
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5855)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5799)

Almost all *alloc failures now set an error code.
Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5842)

Reviewed-by: NDr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Fixes: #4641
GH: #4665

We have been unable to trace the contributor of that code to gain their
agreement for the licence change so the code has to be removed.

This commit reverts that contribution. The contribution had no functional
impact so the original way of doing things is still valid. However the
surrounding code has changed significantly so that the exact code as it
was orignally cannot be used. This commit uses the original code as a basis,
but rewrites it to use the PACKET API.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5808)

We should use the old EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key() instead.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5808)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5808)

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5780)

If a server has been configured to use an ECDSA certificate, we should
allow it regardless of whether the server's own supported groups list
includes the certificate's group.

Fixes #2033
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5601)

Based on the description in https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5757,
this re-implements the "allow NULL to be passed" behavior of a number of
xxx_free routines.  I also fixed up some egregious formatting errors
that were nearby.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5761)

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5729)

This removes some code because we cannot trace the original contributor
to get their agreement for the licence change (original commit e03ddfae).

After this change there will be numerous failures in the test cases until
someone rewrites the missing code.

All *_free functions should accept a NULL parameter. After this change
the following *_free functions will fail if a NULL parameter is passed:

BIO_ACCEPT_free()
BIO_CONNECT_free()
BN_BLINDING_free()
BN_CTX_free()
BN_MONT_CTX_free()
BN_RECP_CTX_free()
BUF_MEM_free()
COMP_CTX_free()
ERR_STATE_free()
TXT_DB_free()
X509_STORE_free()
ssl3_free()
ssl_cert_free()
SSL_SESSION_free()
SSL_free()

[skip ci]
Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5757)

The alpn_selected value in the session should be NULL before we first
populate it if this is a new session. We assert to make sure it is.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5715)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5675)

Add missing guards around STRP-related fields
Remove two unneeded global variables: my 2'cents to #4679
Merge definition and instantiation of srpsrvparm global.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4908)

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5706)

For DTLS/SCTP we were waiting for a dry event during the call to
tls_finish_handshake(). This function just tidies up various internal
things, and after it completes the handshake is over. I can find no good
reason for waiting for a dry event here, and nothing in RFC6083 suggests
to me that we should need to. More importantly though it seems to be
wrong. It is perfectly possible for a peer to send app data/alerts/new
handshake while we are still cleaning up our handshake. If this happens
then we will never get the dry event and so we cannot continue.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5084)

At a couple of points in a DTLS/SCTP handshake we need to wait for a dry
event before continuing. However if an alert has been sent by the peer
then we will never receive that dry event and an infinite loop results.

This commit changes things so that we attempt to read a message if we
are waiting for a dry event but haven't got one yet. This should never
succeed, but any alerts will be processed.

Fixes #4763
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5084)

Fixes regression from #5667.
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5701)

The sid_ctx is something of a "certificate request context" or a
"session ID context" -- something from the application that gives
extra indication of what sort of thing this session is/was for/from.
Without a sid_ctx, we only know that there is a session that we
issued, but it could have come from a number of things, especially
with an external (shared) session cache.  Accordingly, when resuming,
we will hard-error the handshake when presented with a session with
zero-length sid_ctx and SSL_VERIFY_PEER is set -- we simply have no
information about the peer to verify, so the verification must fail.

In order to prevent these future handshake failures, proactively
decline to add the problematic sessions to the session cache.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5175)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5689)

Place the session ticket AES and HMAC keys into secure memory.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2351)

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5667)