More miscellaneous updates to version negotiation following feedback.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Move these functions into t1_clnt.c, t1_srvr.c and t1_meth.c and take
advantage of the existing tls1_get*_method() functions that all the other
methods are using. Since these now have to support SSLv3 anyway we might
as well use the same set of get functions for both TLS and SSLv3.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Miscellaneous updates following review comments on the version negotiation
rewrite patches.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Following the version negotiation rewrite all of the previous code that was
dedicated to version negotiation can now be deleted - all six source files
of it!!
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Continuing from the previous commit this changes the way we do client side
version negotiation. Similarly all of the s23* "up front" state machine code
has been avoided and again things now work much the same way as they already
did for DTLS, i.e. we just do most of the work in the
ssl3_get_server_hello() function.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

This commit changes the way that we do server side protocol version
negotiation. Previously we had a whole set of code that had an "up front"
state machine dedicated to the negotiating the protocol version. This adds
significant complexity to the state machine. Historically the justification
for doing this was the support of SSLv2 which works quite differently to
SSLv3+. However, we have now removed support for SSLv2 so there is little
reason to maintain this complexity.

The one slight difficulty is that, although we no longer support SSLv2, we
do still support an SSLv3+ ClientHello in an SSLv2 backward compatible
ClientHello format. This is generally only used by legacy clients. This
commit adds support within the SSLv3 code for these legacy format
ClientHellos.

Server side version negotiation now works in much the same was as DTLS,
i.e. we introduce the concept of TLS_ANY_VERSION. If s->version is set to
that then when a ClientHello is received it will work out the most
appropriate version to respond with. Also, SSLv23_method and
SSLv23_server_method have been replaced with TLS_method and
TLS_server_method respectively. The old SSLv23* names still exist as
macros pointing at the new name, although they are deprecated.

Subsequent commits will look at client side version negotiation, as well of
removal of the old s23* code.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Follow the same convention the other OPENSSL_NO_xxx header files
do, and use #error instead of making the header file be a no-op.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

There are header files in crypto/ that are used by the rest of
OpenSSL.  Move those to include/internal and adapt the affected source
code, Makefiles and scripts.

The header files that got moved are:

crypto/constant_time_locl.h
crypto/o_dir.h
crypto/o_str.h
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Remove RFC2712 Kerberos support from libssl. This code and the associated
standard is no longer considered fit-for-purpose.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Currently we set change_cipher_spec_ok to 1 before calling
ssl3_get_cert_verify(). This is because this message is optional and if it
is not sent then the next thing we would expect to get is the CCS. However,
although it is optional, we do actually know whether we should be receiving
one in advance. If we have received a client cert then we should expect
a CertificateVerify message. By the time we get to this point we will
already have bombed out if we didn't get a Certificate when we should have
done, so it is safe just to check whether |peer| is NULL or not. If it is
we won't get a CertificateVerify, otherwise we will. Therefore we should
change the logic so that we only attempt to get the CertificateVerify if
we are expecting one, and not allow a CCS in this scenario.

Whilst this is good practice for TLS it is even more important for DTLS.
In DTLS messages can be lost. Therefore we may be in a situation where a
CertificateVerify message does not arrive even though one was sent. In that
case the next message the server will receive will be the CCS. This could
also happen if messages get re-ordered in-flight. In DTLS if
|change_cipher_spec_ok| is not set and a CCS is received it is ignored.
However if |change_cipher_spec_ok| *is* set then a CCS arrival will
immediately move the server into the next epoch. Any messages arriving for
the previous epoch will be ignored. This means that, in this scenario, the
handshake can never complete. The client will attempt to retransmit
missing messages, but the server will ignore them because they are the wrong
epoch. The server meanwhile will still be waiting for the CertificateVerify
which is never going to arrive.

RT#2958
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Since COMP_METHOD is now defined in comp_lcl.h, it is no
longer possible to create new TLS compression methods without
using the OpenSSL source.  Only ZLIB is supported by default.
Also, since the types are opaque, #ifdef guards to use "char *"
instead of the real type aren't necessary.

The changes are actually minor.  Adding missing copyright to some
files makes the diff misleadingly big.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

If sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null() returns NULL then ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list()
should also return NULL.

Based on an original patch by mrpre <mrpre@163.com>.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Add SSL_use_certiicate_chain file functions: this is works the same
way as SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file but for an SSL structure.

Update SSL_CONF code to use the new function.
Update docs.
Update ordinals.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

For the various string-compare routines (strcmp, strcasecmp, str.*cmp)
use "strcmp()==0" instead of "!strcmp()"
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

If server requests a certificate, but the client doesn't send one, cache
digested records. This is an optimisation and ensures the correct finished
mac is used when extended master secret is used with client authentication.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Add command line switch entries to table and return SSL_CONF_TYPE_NONE for
them in SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type.

Update docs.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Compiling OpenSSL code with MSVC and /W4 results in a number of warnings.
One category of warnings is particularly interesting - C4701 (potentially
uninitialized local variable 'name' used). This warning pretty much means
that there's a code path which results in uninitialized variables being used
or returned. Depending on compiler, its options, OS, values in registers
and/or stack, the results can be nondeterministic. Cases like this are very
hard to debug so it's rational to fix these issues.

This patch contains a set of trivial fixes for all the C4701 warnings (just
initializing variables to 0 or NULL or appropriate error code) to make sure
that deterministic values will be returned from all the execution paths.

RT#3835
Signed-off-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Matt's note: All of these appear to be bogus warnings, i.e. there isn't
actually a code path where an unitialised variable could be used - its just
that the compiler hasn't been able to figure that out from the logic. So
this commit is just about silencing spurious warnings.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Just as with the OPENSSL_malloc calls, consistently use sizeof(*ptr)
for memset and memcpy.  Remove needless casts for those functions.
For memset, replace alternative forms of zero with 0.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state for DTLS.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state on the client
side.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Ensure all fatal errors transition into the new error state on the server
side.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reusing an SSL object when it has encountered a fatal error can
have bad consequences. This is a bug in application code not libssl
but libssl should be more forgiving and not crash.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: Nmancha security <mancha1@zoho.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: Nmancha security <mancha1@zoho.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

For a local variable:
        TYPE *p;
Allocations like this are "risky":
        p = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TYPE));
if the type of p changes, and the malloc call isn't updated, you
could get memory corruption.  Instead do this:
        p = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*p));
Also fixed a few memset() calls that I noticed while doing this.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Incorrect name used for SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR.
Signed-off-by: Nmancha security <mancha1@zoho.com>
Signed-off-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Add OSSL_NELEM macro to e_os.h to determine the number of elements in an
array.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

After the finale, the "real" final part. :)  Do a recursive grep with
"-B1 -w [a-zA-Z0-9_]*_free" to see if any of the preceeding lines are
an "if NULL" check that can be removed.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

There were a dozen-plus instances of this construct:
   if (0) { label: ..... }
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: Andy Polyakov

Don't check for NULL before calling free functions. This gets:
        ERR_STATE_free
        ENGINE_free
        DSO_free
        CMAC_CTX_free
        COMP_CTX_free
        CONF_free
        NCONF_free NCONF_free_data _CONF_free_data
        A sk_free use within OBJ_sigid_free
        TS_TST_INFO_free (rest of TS_ API was okay)
        Doc update for UI_free (all uses were fine)
        X509V3_conf_free
        X509V3_section_free
        X509V3_string_free
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Don't check for NULL before calling OPENSSL_free
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

This gets BN_.*free:
    BN_BLINDING_free BN_CTX_free BN_FLG_FREE BN_GENCB_free
    BN_MONT_CTX_free BN_RECP_CTX_free BN_clear_free BN_free BUF_MEM_free

Also fix a call to DSA_SIG_free to ccgost engine and remove some #ifdef'd
dead code in engines/e_ubsec.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Sanity check the |len| parameter to ensure it is positive. Thanks to Kevin
Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3 Solutions) for
reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

The return value is checked for 0. This is currently safe but we should
really check for <= 0 since -1 is frequently used for error conditions.
Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

For SSLv3 the code assumes that |header_length| > |md_block_size|. Whilst
this is true for all SSLv3 ciphersuites, this fact is far from obvious by
looking at the code. If this were not the case then an integer overflow
would occur, leading to a subsequent buffer overflow. Therefore I have
added an explicit sanity check to ensure header_length is always valid.
Thanks to Kevin Wojtysiak (Int3 Solutions) and Paramjot Oberoi (Int3
Solutions) for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>