- 28 2月, 2016 3 次提交
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
We don't want recipes for the same files generated more than once Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Ben Laurie 提交于
Linux target that does that. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Ben Laurie 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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- 27 2月, 2016 20 次提交
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由 FdaSilvaYY 提交于
Signed-off-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com> Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Kurt Roeckx 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> MR: #2083
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由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Reformat EC_POINT_new.pod and add parentheses to function names. Clarify the octet form. Add documentation for EC_POINT_oct2buf(). Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
The ubsec engine is now considered obsolete and therefore has been removed. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Rob Percival 提交于
Reviewed-by: NBen Laurie <ben@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Rob Percival 提交于
Reviewed-by: NBen Laurie <ben@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Rob Percival 提交于
Reviewed-by: NBen Laurie <ben@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Rob Percival 提交于
Signed-off-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
This reverts commit acae59bb. Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
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由 Emilia Kasper 提交于
They're too slow. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
Since the configs were remade into hash tables, this isn't needed any more. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Dmitry-Me 提交于
Signed-off-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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由 J Mohan Rao Arisankala 提交于
In EC_KEY_priv2buf(), check for pbuf sanity. If invoked with NULL, gracefully returns the key length. Signed-off-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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由 J Mohan Rao Arisankala 提交于
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 J Mohan Rao Arisankala 提交于
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 J Mohan Rao Arisankala 提交于
- In error paths, EVP_MD_CTX allocated by the callee is not released. - Checking method before accessing Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 David Woodhouse 提交于
We are using strcmp() as the cmp_func, where in the EDK2 environment strcmp actually ends up being the external AsciiStrCmp() function — an EFI library function defined with the Microsoft ABI. This means that we can't just assign function pointers to it, since in GCC-hosted builds the ABI of any function *not* explicitly marked EFIAPI is the native SysV ABI. Arguably this stupidity ought to be resolved on the UEFI side, but in the general case that would mean that we need to provide ABI-compatible wrappers for *all* the "standard" functions, just in case they're used like this. And in fact we already have a workaround here for DEC C. So instead of playing games with casting function pointers, it's nicer just to use a simple function to wrap the strcmp() call. That cleans up the DEC C workaround, *and* it works around the UEFI bogosity at the same time. Signed-off-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
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- 26 2月, 2016 16 次提交
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
mkdef.pl was issuing the following error: Use of uninitialized value within %tag in numeric eq (==) at util/mkdef.pl line 560, <IN> line 92 This was because it was treating a __cplusplus "#ifdef" check as a "tag" but then skipping over the corresponding "#endif". Therefore after processing a file it still had "left over" tags from processing the previous file. It was also getting confused by "#if" checks that didn't match is pre-defined styles. Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
build.info needed a slight update, one more include directory. Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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由 Alessandro Ghedini 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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由 Richard Levitte 提交于
They now default to " " as separator, but that can be overridden by having a hash with parameters as last argument. The only currently recognised parameter is `separator'. The special separator `undef' will force the result to become a list rather than a concatenated string. Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Matt Caswell 提交于
The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string in the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length of a string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings. Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to an OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of a memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can also occur. These issues will only occur on certain platforms where sizeof(size_t) > sizeof(int). E.g. many 64 bit systems. The first issue may mask the second issue dependent on compiler behaviour. These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed as command line arguments. Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl. CVE-2016-0799 Issue reported by Guido Vranken. Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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由 FdaSilvaYY 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 FdaSilvaYY 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
Simplifies calling code. Also fixed up any !ptr tests that were nearby, turning them into NULL tests. Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
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由 Rob Percival 提交于
Reviewed-by: NBen Laurie <ben@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Adam Eijdenberg 提交于
Reviewed-by: NBen Laurie <ben@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
Fixes github issue 463. Building the app without OPENSSL_NO_SOCK isn't supported, so only do OPENSSL_NO_OCSP. Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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- 25 2月, 2016 1 次提交
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由 Rich Salz 提交于
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
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