All instances of SSLeay (any combination of case) were replaced with
the case-equivalent OpenSSL.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

-Wincompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers (the latter did not require
any code changes).
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Remove support for RSA_NET and Netscape key format (-keyform n).

Also removed documentation of SGC.
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
MR #588

Rather than making include/openssl/foo.h a symlink to
crypto/foo/foo.h, this change moves the file to include/openssl/foo.h
once and for all.

Likewise, move crypto/foo/footest.c to test/footest.c, instead of
symlinking it there.
Originally-by: NGeoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The following compile options (#ifdef's) are removed:
    OPENSSL_NO_BIO OPENSSL_NO_BUFFER OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY
    OPENSSL_NO_EVP OPENSSL_NO_FIPS_ERR OPENSSL_NO_HASH_COMP
    OPENSSL_NO_LHASH OPENSSL_NO_OBJECT OPENSSL_NO_SPEED OPENSSL_NO_STACK
    OPENSSL_NO_X509 OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY

This diff is big because of updating the indents on preprocessor lines.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Sometimes it fails to format them very well, and sometimes it corrupts them!
This commit moves some particularly problematic ones.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD160, OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD merged into OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
OPENSSL_NO_FP_API merged into OPENSSL_NO_STDIO
Two typo's on #endif comments fixed:
	OPENSSL_NO_ECB fixed to OPENSSL_NO_OCB
	OPENSSL_NO_HW_SureWare fixed to OPENSSL_NO_HW_SUREWARE
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Introduce use of DECLARE_DEPRECATED
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Also tweak s3_cbc.c to use new constant-time methods.
Also fix memory leaks from internal errors in RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1

This patch is based on the original RT submission by Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org>,
as well as code from BoringSSL and OpenSSL.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

The original RT request included a patch.  By the time
we got around to doing it, however, the callback scheme
had changed. So I wrote a new function RSA_check_key_ex()
that uses the BN_GENCB callback.  But thanks very much
to Vinet Sharma <vineet.sharma@gmail.com> for the
initial implementation.
Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Add functions to return the "bits of security" for various public key
algorithms. Based on SP800-57.

Extend RSA ASN1 method to support CMS PSS signatures for both sign
and verify.

For signing the EVP_PKEY_CTX parameters are read and the appropriate
CMS structures set up.

For verification the CMS structures are analysed and the corresponding
parameters in the EVP_PKEY_CTX set.

Also add RSA-OAEP support.

For encrypt the EVP_PKEY_CTX parameters are used.

For decrypt the CMS structure is uses to set the appropriate EVP_PKEY_CTX
parameters.

Add OAEP ctrls to retrieve MD and label. Return errors if
an attempt is made to set or retrieve OAEP parameters when
padding mode is not OAEP.

Extend OAEP support. Generalise the OAEP padding functions to support
arbitrary digests. Extend EVP_PKEY RSA method to handle the new OAEP
padding functions and add ctrls to set the additional parameters.

a context.

Check for selftest failures.

Pairwise consistency test for RSA key generation.

Use some EVP macros instead of EVP functions.

Use minimal FIPS EVP where needed.

requests. Add new ASN1 signature initialisation function to handle this
case.

Uses ASN1 module in Martin Kaiser's PSS patch.

test for them!

(Coverity ID 135).

examples. All RFC4134 examples can not be processed.

Submitted by: Matthew D Wood
Reviewed by: Bodo Moeller

cause a denial of service.  (CVE-2006-2940)
[Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller]

Colin Percival (this would have caused more problems than solved,
and isn't really necessary anyway)

(CVE-2006-4339)

Submitted by: Ben Laurie, Google Security Team
Reviewed by: bmoeller, mjc, shenson