For librypto to be complete, the stuff in both crypto/ and engines/
have to be built.  Doing 'make test' or 'make apps' from a clean
source tree failed to do so.
Corrected by using the new 'build_libcrypto' in the top Makefile.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

There's a need for a target that will build all of libcrypto, so let's
add 'build_libcrypto' that does this.  For ortogonality, let's also
add 'build_libssl'.  Have both also depend on 'libcrypto.pc' and
'libssl.pc' so those get built together with the libraries.
This makes 'all' depend on fewer things directly.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Except for VMS startup code.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Also removed a source file that isn't built, and moved
another one to test for eventual fixing.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
MR #588

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
MR #588

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Pointed out by Victor Vasiliev (vasilvv@mit.edu) via Adam Langley
(Google).
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Add extension and ciphersuites to trace code.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Check return value when calling ASN1_INTEGER_get to retrieve a certificate
serial number. If an error occurs (which will be caused by the value being
out of range) revert to hex dump of serial number.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

At least in the case of SSLv3 we can't send an extention.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
MR #811

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Remove a comment that suggested further clean up was required.
DH_free() performs the necessary cleanup.

With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Ensure OPENSSL_cleanse() is called on the premaster secret value calculated for GOST.

With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

A BIGNUM can have the value of -0. The function BN_bn2hex fails to account
for this and can allocate a buffer one byte too short in the event of -0
being used, leading to a one byte buffer overrun. All usage within the
OpenSSL library is considered safe. Any security risk is considered
negligible.

With thanks to Mateusz Kocielski (LogicalTrust), Marek Kroemeke and
Filip Palian for discovering and reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

The session object on the client side is initially created during
construction of the ClientHello. If the client is DTLS1.2 capable then it
will store 1.2 as the version for the session. However if the server is only
DTLS1.0 capable then when the ServerHello comes back the client switches to
using DTLS1.0 from then on. However the session version does not get
updated. Therefore when the client attempts to resume that session the
server throws an alert because of an incorrect protocol version.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Make update with manual edit so EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_item uses the same
ordinal as 1.0.2.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

PR#3872
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NStephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ad0fb7f4988c8a717fe6bcb035304385fbdaef41)

Conflicts:
	crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c

Some tool chains (e.g. android) do not define IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE, and so
this build breaks.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

objects.pl only looked for a space to see if the name could be
used as a C identifier.  Improve the test to match the real C
rules.
Signed-off-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Here are the "rules" for handling flags that depend on #ifdef:

- Do not ifdef the enum.  Only ifdef the OPTIONS table.  All ifdef'd
  entries appear at the end; by convention "engine" is last.  This
  ensures that at run-time, the flag will never be recognized/allowed.
  The next two bullets entries are for silencing compiler warnings:
- In the while/switch parsing statement, use #ifdef for the body to
  disable it; leave the "case OPT_xxx:" and "break" statements outside
  the ifdef/ifndef.  See ciphers.c for example.
- If there are multiple options controlled by a single guard, OPT_FOO,
  OPT_BAR, etc., put a an #ifdef around the set, and then do "#else"
  and a series of case labels and a break. See OPENSSL_NO_AES in cms.c
  for example.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

I also re-ordered some of #ifdef's.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

This is for consistency.
Additionally, have its presence define OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS as well.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

The code in bss_dgram.c checks if IP_MTUDISCOVER is defined, where it
should test for IP_MTU_DISCOVER

RT#3888
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when
attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur
potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data.

CVE-2015-1791

This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already
in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache
this breaks the cache access.

Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change:
https://github.com/akamai/openssl/commit/c0bf69a791239ceec64509f9f19fcafb2461b0d3Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

dtls1_get_message has an |mt| variable which is the type of the message that
is being requested. If it is negative then any message type is allowed.
However the value of |mt| is not checked in one of the main code paths, so a
peer can send a message of a completely different type and it will be
processed as if it was the message type that we were expecting. This has
very little practical consequences because the current behaviour will still
fail when the format of the message isn't as expected.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Where we called openssl_cleanse, make sure we do it on all error
paths.  Be consistent in use of sizeof(foo) when possible.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

struct ccs_header_st is not used so it should be removed.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>