Clients will send a "fake" session id and servers must echo it back.
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4701)

The new ServerHello format is essentially now the same as the old TLSv1.2
one, but it must additionally include supported_versions. The version
field is fixed at TLSv1.2, and the version negotiation happens solely via
supported_versions.
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4701)

I noticed that some of the BIO_METHOD structs are placing the name on
the same line as the type and some don't. This commit places the name
on a separate line for consistency (which looks like what the majority
do)

CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4878)

CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4880)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4841)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4841)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4841)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4841)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4841)

IF OPENSSL_init_ssl() is called with the option flag
OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, any SSL config will be handled wrongly
(i.e. there will be an attempt to load libssl_conf.so or whatever
corresponds to that on non-Unix platforms).  Therefore, at least
SSL_add_ssl_module() MUST be called before OPENSSL_init_crypto() is
called.  The base ssl init does that, plus adds all kinds of ciphers
and digests, which is harmless.

Fixes #4788
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4792)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4872)

The check_fatal macro is supposed to only be called if we are already
expecting to be in the fatal state. The macro asserts that we are and
puts us into the fatal state if not.

This issue combined with the problem fixed in the previous commit meant
that the fuzzer detected a crash at a point in the processing when we
should have already been in the fatal state.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4847)

The recent SSL error overhaul left a case where an error occurs but
SSLfatal() is not called.

Credit to OSSfuzz for finding this issue.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4847)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)

The most likely explanation for us ending up at this point in the code
is that we were called by the user application incorrectly - so use an
appropriate error code.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)

Follow up from the conversion to use SSLfatal() in the state machine to
clean things up a bit more.

[extended tests]
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)

We shouldn't call SSLfatal() multiple times for the same error condition.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)

Sometimes at the top level of the state machine code we know we are
supposed to be in a fatal error condition. This commit adds some sanity
checks to ensure that SSLfatal() has been called.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)

This is an initial step towards using SSLfatal() everywhere. Initially in
this commit and in subsequent commits we focus on the state machine code.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)

Typically if a fatal error occurs three things need to happen:

- Put an error on the error queue
- Send an alert
- Put the state machine into the error state

Although all 3 of these things need to be done every time we hit a fatal
error the responsibilities for doing this are distributed throughout the
code. The place where the error goes on the queue, where the alert gets
sent and where the state machine goes into the error state are almost
invariably different. It has been a common pattern to pass alert codes up
and down the stack to get the alert information from the point in the code
where the error is detected to the point in the code where the alert gets
sent.

This commit provides an SSLfatal() macro (backed by an ossl_statem_fatal
function) that does all 3 of the above error tasks. This is largely a drop
in replacement for SSLerr, but takes a couple of extra parameters (the SSL
object, and an alert code).
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4778)

This is a specific 1.1.1 change; do not squash if the chacha
prioritization code is to be backported
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4436)

IFF the client has ChaCha first, and server cipher priority is used,
and the new SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA_FOR_MOBILE option is used,
then reprioritize ChaCha above everything else. This way, A matching
ChaCha cipher will be selected if there is a match. If no ChaCha ciphers
match, then the other ciphers are used.
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4436)

These functions needed updates for the various state machine states that
have been added for TLSv1.3.

Fixes #4795
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4801)

SNI needs to be consistent before we accept early_data. However a
server may choose to not acknowledge SNI. In that case we have to
expect that a client may send it anyway. We change the consistency
checks so that not acknowledging is treated more a like a "wild card",
accepting any SNI as being consistent.
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4738)

We can only send early_data if the SNI is consistent. However it is valid
for the client to set SNI and the server to not use it. This would still be
counted as consistent. OpenSSL client was being overzealous in this check
and disallowing this scenario.
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4738)

It's argued that /WX allows to keep better focus on new code, which
motivates its comeback...
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4721)

It's argued that /WX allows to keep better focus on new code, which
motivates its comeback...

[Keep this commit separate as reminder for time overhaul.]
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4721)

Around 138 distinct errors found and fixed; thanks!
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3459)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4457)

If SSL_read() is called with a zero length buffer, and we read a zero length
record then we should mark that record as read.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4685)

Based on patch from Tomasz Moń:
https://groups.google.com/forum/#!topic/mailing.openssl.dev/fQxXvCg1uQYReviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1008)

We currently increment the SSL_CTX stats.sess_accept field in
tls_setup_handshake(), which is invoked from the state machine well
before ClientHello processing would have had a chance to switch
the SSL_CTX attached to the SSL object due to a provided SNI value.
However, stats.sess_accept_good is incremented in tls_finish_handshake(),
and uses the s->ctx.stats field (i.e., the new SSL_CTX that was switched
to as a result of SNI processing).  This leads to the confusing
(nonsensical) situation where stats.sess_accept_good is larger than
stats.sess_accept, as the "sess_accept" value was counted on the
s->session_ctx.

In order to provide some more useful numbers, increment
s->ctx.stats.sess_accept after SNI processing if the SNI processing
changed s->ctx to differ from s->session_ctx.  To preserve the
property that any given accept is counted only once, make the
corresponding decrement to s->session_ctx.stats.sess_accept when
doing so.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4549)

For client SSL objects and before any callbacks have had a chance
to be called, we can write the stats accesses using the session_ctx,
which makes sense given that these values are all prefixed with
"sess_".

For servers after a client_hello or servername callback has been
called, retain the existing behavior of modifying the statistics
for the current (non-session) context.  This has some value,
in that it allows the statistics to be viewed on a per-vhost level.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4549)