- 03 10月, 2016 3 次提交
-
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
ssl_set_handshake_header2() was only ever a temporary name while we had to have ssl_set_handshake_header() for code that hadn't been converted to WPACKET yet. No code remains that needed that so we can rename it. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Remove the old ssl_set_handshake_header() implementations. Later we will rename ssl_set_handshake_header2() to ssl_set_handshake_header(). Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
This is no longer needed now that all messages use WPACKET Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
- 02 10月, 2016 1 次提交
-
-
由 Dr. Stephen Henson 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
- 30 9月, 2016 5 次提交
-
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
A convenience macro was using the wrong underlying function. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
A couple of the WPACKET_sub_memcpy* macros were mis-named. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
- 29 9月, 2016 15 次提交
-
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
In plain PSK we don't need to do anymore construction after the preamble. We weren't detecting this case and treating it as an unknown cipher. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
WPACKET_allocate_bytes() requires you to know the size of the data you are allocating for, before you create it. Sometimes this isn't the case, for example we know the maximum size that a signature will be before we create it, but not the actual size. WPACKET_reserve_bytes() enables us to reserve bytes in the WPACKET, but not count them as written yet. We then subsequently need to acall WPACKET_allocate_bytes to actually count them as written. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
This was a temporary function needed during the conversion to WPACKET. All callers have now been converted to the new way of doing this so this function is no longer required. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Merge declarations of same type together. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Some functions were being called from both code that used WPACKETs and code that did not. Now that more code has been converted to use WPACKETs some of that duplication can be removed. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
If we have a handshake fragment waiting then dtls1_read_bytes() was not correctly setting the value of recvd_type, leading to an uninit read. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
- 28 9月, 2016 2 次提交
-
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
The conversion to WPACKET broke the construction of the renegotiation extension. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
- 26 9月, 2016 3 次提交
-
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
commit c536b6be introduced a bug that causes a reachable assert. This fixes it. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
The buffer to receive messages is initialised to 16k. If a message is received that is larger than that then the buffer is "realloc'd". This can cause the location of the underlying buffer to change. Anything that is referring to the old location will be referring to free'd data. In the recent commit c1ef7c97 (master) and 4b390b6c (1.1.0) the point in the code where the message buffer is grown was changed. However s->init_msg was not updated to point at the new location. CVE-2016-6309 Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
If we request more bytes to be allocated than double what we have already written, then we grow the buffer by the wrong amount. Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>
-
- 23 9月, 2016 2 次提交
-
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
We actually construct a HelloVerifyRequest in two places with common code pulled into a single function. This one commit handles both places. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
If the underlying BUF_MEM gets realloc'd then the pointer returned could become invalid. Therefore we should always ensure that the allocated memory is filled in prior to any more WPACKET_* calls. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
- 22 9月, 2016 9 次提交
-
-
由 Rich Salz 提交于
Change code so when switching on an enumeration, have case's for all enumeration values. Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
-
由 Dmitry Belyavsky 提交于
Russian GOST ciphersuites are vulnerable to the KCI attack because they use long-term keys to establish the connection when ssl client authorization is on. This change brings the GOST implementation into line with the latest specs in order to avoid the attack. It should not break backwards compatibility. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
If while calling SSL_peek() we read an empty record then we go into an infinite loop, continually trying to read data from the empty record and never making any progress. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in a Denial Of Service attack. CVE-2016-6305 GitHub Issue #1563 Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
If a server sent multiple NPN extensions in a single ClientHello then a mem leak can occur. This will only happen where the client has requested NPN in the first place. It does not occur during renegotiation. Therefore the maximum that could be leaked in a single connection with a malicious server is 64k (the maximum size of the ServerHello extensions section). As this is client side, only occurs if NPN has been requested and does not occur during renegotiation this is unlikely to be exploitable. Issue reported by Shi Lei. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP. Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected. I have also checked other extensions to see if they suffer from a similar problem but I could not find any other issues. CVE-2016-6304 Issue reported by Shi Lei. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Richard Levitte 提交于
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
This issue is very similar to CVE-2016-6307 described in the previous commit. The underlying defect is different but the security analysis and impacts are the same except that it impacts DTLS. A DTLS message includes 3 bytes for its length in the header for the message. This would allow for messages up to 16Mb in length. Messages of this length are excessive and OpenSSL includes a check to ensure that a peer is sending reasonably sized messages in order to avoid too much memory being consumed to service a connection. A flaw in the logic of version 1.1.0 means that memory for the message is allocated too early, prior to the excessive message length check. Due to way memory is allocated in OpenSSL this could mean an attacker could force up to 21Mb to be allocated to service a connection. This could lead to a Denial of Service through memory exhaustion. However, the excessive message length check still takes place, and this would cause the connection to immediately fail. Assuming that the application calls SSL_free() on the failed conneciton in a timely manner then the 21Mb of allocated memory will then be immediately freed again. Therefore the excessive memory allocation will be transitory in nature. This then means that there is only a security impact if: 1) The application does not call SSL_free() in a timely manner in the event that the connection fails or 2) The application is working in a constrained environment where there is very little free memory or 3) The attacker initiates multiple connection attempts such that there are multiple connections in a state where memory has been allocated for the connection; SSL_free() has not yet been called; and there is insufficient memory to service the multiple requests. Except in the instance of (1) above any Denial Of Service is likely to be transitory because as soon as the connection fails the memory is subsequently freed again in the SSL_free() call. However there is an increased risk during this period of application crashes due to the lack of memory - which would then mean a more serious Denial of Service. This issue does not affect TLS users. Issue was reported by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.). CVE-2016-6308 Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
A TLS message includes 3 bytes for its length in the header for the message. This would allow for messages up to 16Mb in length. Messages of this length are excessive and OpenSSL includes a check to ensure that a peer is sending reasonably sized messages in order to avoid too much memory being consumed to service a connection. A flaw in the logic of version 1.1.0 means that memory for the message is allocated too early, prior to the excessive message length check. Due to way memory is allocated in OpenSSL this could mean an attacker could force up to 21Mb to be allocated to service a connection. This could lead to a Denial of Service through memory exhaustion. However, the excessive message length check still takes place, and this would cause the connection to immediately fail. Assuming that the application calls SSL_free() on the failed conneciton in a timely manner then the 21Mb of allocated memory will then be immediately freed again. Therefore the excessive memory allocation will be transitory in nature. This then means that there is only a security impact if: 1) The application does not call SSL_free() in a timely manner in the event that the connection fails or 2) The application is working in a constrained environment where there is very little free memory or 3) The attacker initiates multiple connection attempts such that there are multiple connections in a state where memory has been allocated for the connection; SSL_free() has not yet been called; and there is insufficient memory to service the multiple requests. Except in the instance of (1) above any Denial Of Service is likely to be transitory because as soon as the connection fails the memory is subsequently freed again in the SSL_free() call. However there is an increased risk during this period of application crashes due to the lack of memory - which would then mean a more serious Denial of Service. This issue does not affect DTLS users. Issue was reported by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.). CVE-2016-6307 Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Certain warning alerts are ignored if they are received. This can mean that no progress will be made if one peer continually sends those warning alerts. Implement a count so that we abort the connection if we receive too many. Issue reported by Shi Lei. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-