Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Baroque, almost uncommented code triggers behaviour which is undefined
by the C standard. You might quite reasonably not care that the code was
broken on ones-complement machines, but if we support a ubsan build then
we need to at least pretend to care.

It looks like the special-case code for 64-bit big-endian is going to
behave differently (and wrongly) on wrap-around, because it treats the
values as signed. That seems wrong, and allows replay and other attacks.
Surely you need to renegotiate and start a new epoch rather than
wrapping around to sequence number zero again?
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

DTLSv1_client_method() is deprecated, but it was the only way to obtain
DTLS1_BAD_VER support. The SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT hack doesn't work with
DTLS_client_method(), and it's relatively non-trivial to make it work without
expanding the hack into lots of places.

So deprecate SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT with DTLSv1_client_method(), and make
it work with SSL_CTX_set_{min,max}_proto_version(DTLS1_BAD_VER) instead.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Commit 3eb2aff4 ("Add support for minimum and maximum protocol version
supported by a cipher") disabled all ciphers for DTLS1_BAD_VER.

That wasn't helpful. Give them back.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

DTLS version numbers are strange and backwards, except DTLS1_BAD_VER so
we have to make a special case for it.

This does leave us with a set of macros which will evaluate their arguments
more than once, but it's not a public-facing API and it's not like this is
the kind of thing where people will be using DTLS_VERSION_LE(x++, y) anyway.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

The Change Cipher Spec message in this ancient pre-standard version of DTLS
that Cisco are unfortunately still using in their products, is 3 bytes.

Allow it.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Commit d8e8590e ("Fix missing return value checks in SCTP") made the
DTLS handshake fail, even for non-SCTP connections, if
SSL_export_keying_material() fails. Which it does, for DTLS1_BAD_VER.

Apply the trivial fix to make it succeed, since there's no real reason
why it shouldn't even though we never need it.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The options RC4_CHUNK_LL, DES_PTR, and BF_PTR were removed by Rich
in commit 3e9e810f but were still
sticking around in a coupule configuration entries.

Since they're unused, remove them.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1390)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1389)

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/1389)

Thanks to Shi Lei for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

  into a structure , to avoid any accident .

Plus some few cleanups
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

- Commit a95ce7f builds *.manifest files on windows -- added them to
  .gitignore.

- ignore pod -> html temp file
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

... get_by_fingerprint() and get_by_alias()
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

 of X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ, X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID, X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

- append_ia5
- old_entry_print
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The rationale is that installation from a tarball is a common task
that everyone performs.  For all other builds, we do specialised
tests, and might as well build them directly in the checkout, which
also gives us fuzz corpora.
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

The release scripts expect to see the date "xx XXX xxxx" in CHANGES. At
some point the year got changed from xxxx to 2016. This changes it back.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Because proxy certificates typically come without any CRL information,
trying to check revocation on them will fail.  Better not to try
checking such information for them at all.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The diverse notations used in INSTALL are not as self explanatory as
we might imagine, so let's attempt a consistent notation for mandatory
and optional pieces of a command line, and to explain the meaning of
each notation.

This does away with the bash notation used in one spot, as it isn't
universally understood and will only confuse the unknowing more.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Experience shows that pod2html changes directory during its process
without properly adjusting the given source directory.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>