Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3670)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3670)

Provides consistent output and approach.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3496)

We are quite inconsistent about which alerts get sent. Specifically, these
alerts should be used (normally) in the following circumstances:

SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR = The peer sent a syntactically incorrect message
SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER = The peer sent a message which was syntactically
correct, but a parameter given is invalid for the context
SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE = The peer's messages were syntactically and
semantically correct, but the parameters provided were unacceptable to us
(e.g. because we do not support the requested parameters)
SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR = We messed up (e.g. malloc failure)

The standards themselves aren't always consistent but I think the above
represents the best interpretation.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3480)

add_key_share() is a helper function used during key_share extension
construction. It is expected to be a simple boolean success/fail return.
It shouldn't be using the new EXT_RETURN type but it was partially converted
anyway. This changes it back.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3488)

We already did this on an ad-hoc per extension basis (for some extensions).
This centralises it and makes sure we do it for all extensions.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3418)

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3436)

If an HRR gets sent without a key_share (e.g. cookie only) then the code
fails when it should not.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3414)

Ensure that there are ciphersuites enabled for the maximum supported
version we will accept in a ClientHello.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3316)

The old custom extensions API was not TLSv1.3 aware. Extensions are used
extensively in TLSv1.3 and they can appear in many different types of
messages. Therefore we need a new API to be able to cope with that.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3139)

This move prepares for the later addition of the new custom extensions
API. The context codes have an additional "SSL_" added to their name to
ensure we don't have name clashes with other applications.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3139)

The macro SSL_get_server_tmp_key() returns information about the temp key
used by the server during a handshake. This was returning NULL for TLSv1.3
and causing s_client to omit this information in its connection summary.

Fixes #3081
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3114)

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3066)

In OpenSSL 1.1.0 the padding extension MUST be last because it calculates
the length of everything that has been written into the ClientHello to
determine whether it needs to be padded or not. With TLSv1.3 that isn't
possible because the specification requires that the PSK extension is last.
Therefore we need to fix the padding extension to take account of any PSK
extension that will be later added.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2968)

Don't include a PSK that does not have the right hash for the selected
ciphersuite following an HRR.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2895)

As per draft-19
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2895)

tls1_get_curvelist() does not read from its third parameter, so
the assignments prior to function call were dead code and can be removed.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2952)

Instead of making a positive comparison against the invalid value
that our server would send, make a negative check against the only
value that is not an error.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2953)

No need to break out of the loop and repeat the loop termination
condition when we can just return.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2949)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
GH: #2850

We do not allow the generation of TLSv1.3 cookies. But if we receive one
in an HRR we will echo it back in the ClientHello.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2839)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)

Check that we actually resumed the session, and that we selected the first
identity.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2737)

In 1.1.0 changing the ciphersuite during a renegotiation can result in
a crash leading to a DoS attack. In master this does not occur with TLS
(instead you get an internal error, which is still wrong but not a security
issue) - but the problem still exists in the DTLS code.

The problem is caused by changing the flag indicating whether to use ETM
or not immediately on negotiation of ETM, rather than at CCS. Therefore,
during a renegotiation, if the ETM state is changing (usually due to a
change of ciphersuite), then an error/crash will occur.

Due to the fact that there are separate CCS messages for read and write
we actually now need two flags to determine whether to use ETM or not.

CVE-2017-3733
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

For converting the 2 byte group id into an unsigned int.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2341)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2341)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2341)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2341)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2341)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2301)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2259)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2259)

If we have deserialized the SSL_SESSION then in some circumstances the
session->cipher value is NULL. We were patching up in some places but not
in others. We should just do it as part of loading the SSL_SESSION.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2259)

Don't attempt to add a TLS1.3 session to a TLS1.2 ClientHello session
ticket extensions. Similarly don't add a TLS1.2 session to a TLS1.3
psk extension.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2259)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2259)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2259)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2259)