An unknown PSK identity could be because its actually a session resumption
attempt. Sessions resumptions and external PSKs are indistinguishable so
the callbacks need to fail gracefully if they don't recognise the identity.

Fixes #7433
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7434)

(cherry picked from commit 2d015189b97c60b67e10aed320230357bf6b200f)

Previously when a ClientHello arrives with a valid cookie using
DTLSv1_listen() we only "peeked" at the message and left it on the
underlying fd. This works fine for single threaded applications but for
multi-threaded apps this does not work since the fd is typically reused for
the server thread, while a new fd is created and connected for the client.
By "peeking" we leave the message on the server fd, and consequently we
think we've received another valid ClientHello and so we create yet another
fd for the client, and so on until we run out of fds.

In this new approach we remove the ClientHello and buffer it in the SSL
object.

Fixes #6934
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7375)

(cherry picked from commit 079ef6bd534d2f708d8013cfcd8ea0d2f600c788)

Rather than using init_buf we use the record layer read and write buffers
in DTLSv1_listen(). These seem more appropriate anyway and will help with
the next commit.
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7375)

(cherry picked from commit 2fc4c77c3f06443f4c476f6f58d83e5e108d1dce)

Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7431)

(cherry picked from commit edcd29efd32c51f298ad5ab438e2d4cc5411e9a9)

Fixes #7428
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7431)

(cherry picked from commit 01666a8c1db3ecfb999e1a8f2c5436d114f95681)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7400)

(cherry picked from commit 03ad7c009e16a233c733098db3169c560142ccd3)

{make|swap|get|set}context are removed in POSIX.1-2008, but glibc
apparently keeps providing it.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7420)

(cherry picked from commit 9d71a24ebf57e7157888af1ca587eafe914bf96f)

The formula used for this is now

kVarianceBlocks = ((255 + 1 + md_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size) + 1

Notice that md_block_size=64 for SHA256, which results on the
magic constant kVarianceBlocks = 6.
However, md_block_size=128 for SHA384 leading to kVarianceBlocks = 4.

CLA:trivial
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7342)

(cherry picked from commit cb8164b05e3bad5586c2a109bbdbab1ad65a1a6f)

Also, some readers of the code find starting the count at 1 for EE
cert confusing (since RFC5280 counts only non-self-issued intermediate
CAs, but we also counted the leaf).  Therefore, never count the EE
cert, and adjust the path length comparison accordinly.  This may
be more clear to the reader.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit dc5831da59e9bfad61ba425d886a0b06ac160cd6)

At the bottom of https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#page-12 and
top of https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#page-13 (last paragraph
of above https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-3.3), we see:

   This specification covers two classes of certificates: CA
   certificates and end entity certificates.  CA certificates may be
   further divided into three classes: cross-certificates, self-issued
   certificates, and self-signed certificates.  Cross-certificates are
   CA certificates in which the issuer and subject are different
   entities.  Cross-certificates describe a trust relationship between
   the two CAs.  Self-issued certificates are CA certificates in which
   the issuer and subject are the same entity.  Self-issued certificates
   are generated to support changes in policy or operations.  Self-
   signed certificates are self-issued certificates where the digital
   signature may be verified by the public key bound into the
   certificate.  Self-signed certificates are used to convey a public
   key for use to begin certification paths.  End entity certificates
   are issued to subjects that are not authorized to issue certificates.

that the term "self-issued" is only applicable to CAs, not end-entity
certificates.  In https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.9
the description of path length constraints says:

   The pathLenConstraint field is meaningful only if the cA boolean is
   asserted and the key usage extension, if present, asserts the
   keyCertSign bit (Section 4.2.1.3).  In this case, it gives the
   maximum number of non-self-issued intermediate certificates that may
   follow this certificate in a valid certification path.  (Note: The
   last certificate in the certification path is not an intermediate
   certificate, and is not included in this limit.  Usually, the last
   certificate is an end entity certificate, but it can be a CA
   certificate.)

This makes it clear that exclusion of self-issued certificates from
the path length count applies only to some *intermediate* CA
certificates.  A leaf certificate whether it has identical issuer
and subject or whether it is a CA or not is never part of the
intermediate certificate count.  The handling of all leaf certificates
must be the same, in the case of our code to post-increment the
path count by 1, so that we ultimately reach a non-self-issued
intermediate it will be the first one (not zeroth) in the chain
of intermediates.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ed422a2d0196ada0f5c1b6e296f4a4e5ed69577f)

Replace ECDH_KDF_X9_62() with internal ecdh_KDF_X9_63()
Signed-off-by: NAntoine Salon <asalon@vmware.com>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NNicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7345)

(cherry picked from commit ffd89124bdfc9e69349492c3f15383bb35520a11)

Commit ffb46830 introduced the 'rand_serial' option. When it is used,
the 'serialfile' does not get initialized, i.e. it remains a NULL pointer.
This causes a crash when the NULL pointer is passed to the rotate_serial()
call.

This commit fixes the crash and unifies the pointer checking before
calling the rotate_serial() and save_serial() commands.

Fixes #7412
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7417)

(cherry picked from commit aeec793b4bee929cef8ae35ec4b5a783a6e1d7ed)

When looking at configured macro definitions, we must look at both
what comes from the config target AND what comes from user
configuration.

Fixes #7396
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7402)

(cherry picked from commit 92ebf6c4c21ff4b41ba1fd69af74b2039e138114)

Reviewed-by: NPaul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7405)

(cherry picked from commit 61bef9bde09dc6099a7c59baa79898e3b003fec3)

CLA: trivial

Discovered via #7410 @ https://travis-ci.org/openssl/openssl/jobs/442003489#L440Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7403)

(cherry picked from commit 83e4533a71c5c78278e9763552a5e5f1806473ee)

In pull request #4328 the seeding of the DRBG via RAND_add()/RAND_seed()
was implemented by buffering the data in a random pool where it is
picked up later by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback. This buffer
was limited to the size of 4096 bytes.

When a larger input was added via RAND_add() or RAND_seed() to the DRBG,
the reseeding failed, but the error returned by the DRBG was ignored
by the two calling functions, which both don't return an error code.
As a consequence, the data provided by the application was effectively
ignored.

This commit fixes the problem by a more efficient implementation which
does not copy the data in memory and by raising the buffer the size limit
to INT32_MAX (2 gigabytes). This is less than the NIST limit of 2^35 bits
but it was chosen intentionally to avoid platform dependent problems
like integer sizes and/or signed/unsigned conversion.

Additionally, the DRBG is now less permissive on errors: In addition to
pushing a message to the openssl error stack, it enters the error state,
which forces a reinstantiation on next call.

Thanks go to Dr. Falko Strenzke for reporting this issue to the
openssl-security mailing list. After internal discussion the issue
has been categorized as not being security relevant, because the DRBG
reseeds automatically and is fully functional even without additional
randomness provided by the application.

Fixes #7381
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7382)

(cherry picked from commit 3064b55134434a0b2850f07eff57120f35bb269a)

Reviewed-by: NNicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7365)

(cherry picked from commit 5f9f67b9d494e26941aa8d66d28a6a993c557643)

The PR #7329 left some indentation slightly off.  This fixes it.
Reviewed-by: NPaul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7360)

(cherry picked from commit 5b639d4cb3b9a33536e2ebadf6a03149ea26ba32)

Hash can be longer than EC group degree and it will be truncated.

CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: NPaul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7329)

(cherry picked from commit b770a80f6d0b08659cd03f26388b45512adb84f3)

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7306)

(cherry picked from commit 734af93a278a7a06710167219e1f05e525c9dd49)

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7308)

(cherry picked from commit 7f1d923aa9dc55dd23a7741e4341ec421c683941)

We don't need to use secure clean for public key.

CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7363)

(cherry picked from commit c033101db39c93cf41d80dfee4357f2617ede1a0)

Reviewed-by: NNicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7377)

(cherry picked from commit 628ee796389b555ddb5fc28355e16e9417ab1724)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NNicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7123)

(cherry picked from commit d1c008f66bad435b18aa45aa59f72bed7c682849)

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7085)

(cherry picked from commit 7d0effeacbb50b12bfc24df7614d7cf5c8686f51)

Negative displacement in memory references was not originally specified,
so that for maximum coverage one should abstain from it, just like with
any other extension. [Unless it's guarded by run-time switch, but there
is no switch in keccak1600-s390x.]
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7239)

(cherry picked from commit fc97c882f443060dffd8eb56a6b8784e52096c86)

Fixes #7385
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7385)

(cherry picked from commit 990fe909949a58398b3a0cbbdc52b9bbb9cefaa0)

The example code in EVP_DigestInit.pod generates warnings if users try
to compile it.

[skip ci]
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7362)

(cherry picked from commit 19ac1bf2de07214ee7ee6d2e118fa3aa8e5850f3)

Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7378)

(cherry picked from commit c2e33a05b1eb9dda988aebdeaa529973d7c22142)

Fixes a compiler warning about an unused syscall_random()
and cleans up the OPENSSL_RAND_SEED preprocessor logic.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/779)

(cherry picked from commit d90e128be6e584d319931c78cb8f8f68d17b6a34)

Should be 2018 instead of 20018.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7364)

Historically (i.e., OpenSSL 1.0.x), the openssl applications would
allow for empty subject attributes to be passed via the -subj argument,
e.g., `opensl req -subj '/CN=joe/O=/OU=local' ...`.  Commit
db4c08f0 applied a badly needed rewrite
to the parse_name() helper function that parses these strings, but
in the process dropped a check that would skip attributes with no
associated value.  As a result, such strings are now treated as
hard errors and the operation fails.

Restore the check to skip empty attribute values and restore
the historical behavior.

Document the behavior for empty subject attribute values in the
corresponding applications' manual pages.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7349)

(cherry picked from commit 3d362f190306b62a17aa2fd475b2bc8b3faa8142)

CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7356)

(cherry picked from commit 4fef4981f8cc614559b86a06532b0eeac6ffd0d9)

We passed that ioctl a pointer to the whole session_op structure,
which wasn't quite right.

Notified by David Legault.

Fixes #7302
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7304)

(cherry picked from commit 470096e576941566fd094f2fd793dc2948804ea8)

Fixes #7322
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7351)

(cherry picked from commit 8529b156421805415bc7b17758255394de580c61)

Check that different return values passed to the BIO callback are
correctly handled.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7344)

(cherry picked from commit 52d78cc5ebc1d4fc021cabbcb09f4efb4c6ae82d)

The BIO callback handling incorrectly wrote over the return code passed
to the callback, meaning that an incorrect result was (eventually) returned
to the caller.

Fixes #7343
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7344)

(cherry picked from commit d97ce8d9a0619c1d9d1222dc1b44dbebb58dd966)

Only a few clashing ones remain
Reviewed-by: NPaul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7331)

(cherry picked from commit b44882a0bd0717e0aab84f5dc3ef81ab673155e9)

BIO_s_log() is declared for everyone, so should return NULL when not
actually implemented.  Also, it had explicit platform limitations in
util/mkdef.pl that didn't correspond to what was actually in code.
While at it, a few other hard coded things that have lost their
relevance were removed.

include/openssl/ocsp.h had a few duplicate declarations.
Reviewed-by: NPaul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7331)

(cherry picked from commit 7e09c5eaa57295f87453286ffe25277c2f2bc73f)

Check some return values on some functions.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7335)

(cherry picked from commit 434893af2bd4c1fa72655f8e5262c8a432713968)