Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

RT#1466
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

RT#4302
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Multiple digest options to the ocsp utility are allowed: e.g. to use
different digests for different certificate IDs. A digest option without
a following certificate is however illegal.

RT#4215
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Update pkcs8 utility to use 256 bit AES using SHA256 by default.

Update documentation.
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

RT#4224
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

RT#4538
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Date:   Tue Mar 15 15:19:44 2016 +0100

This commit updates the documentation of cms, ocsp, s_client,
s_server, and verify to reflect the new "-no_check_time"
option introduced in commit d35ff2c0
on 2015-07-31.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Suppress CT callbacks with aNULL or PSK ciphersuites that involve
no certificates.  Ditto when the certificate chain is validated via
DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3) TLSA records.  Also skip SCT processing
when the chain is fails verification.

Move and consolidate CT callbacks from libcrypto to libssl.  We
also simplify the interface to SSL_{,CTX_}_enable_ct() which can
specify either a permissive mode that just collects information or
a strict mode that requires at least one valid SCT or else asks to
abort the connection.

Simplified SCT processing and options in s_client(1) which now has
just a simple pair of "-noct" vs. "-ct" options, the latter enables
the permissive callback so that we can complete the handshake and
report all relevant information.  When printing SCTs, print the
validation status if set and not valid.
Signed-off-by: NRob Percival <robpercival@google.com>
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

A new X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level() function sets the
authentication security level.  For verification of SSL peers, this
is automatically set from the SSL security level.  Otherwise, for
now, the authentication security level remains at (effectively) 0
by default.

The new "-auth_level" verify(1) option is available in all the
command-line tools that support the standard verify(1) options.

New verify(1) tests added to check enforcement of chain signature
and public key security levels.  Also added new tests of enforcement
of the verify_depth limit.

Updated documentation.
Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This commit adds the general verify options of ocsp, verify,
cms, etc. to the openssl timestamping app as suggested by
Stephen N. Henson in [openssl.org #4287]. The conflicting
"-policy" option of "openssl ts" has been renamed to
"-tspolicy". Documentation and tests have been updated.

CAVE: This will break code, which currently uses the "-policy"
option.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

MR: #1595

Document the new split_send_frag, max_pipelines and read_buf options.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Thanks to Colin Percival for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NBen Laurie <ben@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

RC4 based ciphersuites in libssl have been disabled by default. They can
be added back by building OpenSSL with the "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers"
Configure option at compile time.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Thanks to Viktor for additional review.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

The ocsp utility is something of a jack-of-all-trades; most anything
related to the OCSP can be done with it.  In particular, the manual
page calls out that it can be used as either a client or a server
of the protocol, but there are also a few things that it can do
which do not quite fit into either role, such as encoding an OCSP
request but not sending it, printing out a text form of an OCSP
response (or request) from a file akin to the asn1parse utility,
or performing a lookup into the server-side revocation database
without actually sending a request or response.  All three of these
are documented as examples in the manual page, but the documentation
prior to this commit is somewhat misleading, in that when printing
the text form of an OCSP response, the code also attempts to
verify the response, displaying an error message and returning
failure if the response does not verify.  (It is possible that
the response would be able to verify with the given example, since
the default trust roots are used for that verification, but OCSP
responses frequently have alternate certification authorities
that would require passing -CAfile or -CApath for verification.)

Tidy up the documentation by passing -noverify for the case of
converting from binary to textual representation, and also
change a few instances of -respin to -reqin as appropriate, note
that the -url option provides the same functionality as the -host
and -path options, clarify that the example that saves an OCSP
response to a file will also perform verification on that response,
and fix a couple grammar nits in the manual page.

Also remove an always-true conditional for rdb != NULL -- there
are no codepaths in which it could be initialized at the time of
this check.
Signed-off-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Change the default keysize to 2048 bits, and the minimum to 512 bits.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Update ciphers documentation as well (based on -04 rev of ID).
Signed-off-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

RT: #4206, GH: #642

Have apps/openssl display the result along with OPENSSLDIR

As part of this, add ENGINESDIR in util/mk1mf.pl
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This was a developer debugging feature and was never a useful public
interface.

Added all missing X509 error codes to the verify(1) manpage, but
many still need a description beyond the associated text string.

Sorted the errors in x509_txt.c by error number.
Reviewed-by: NStephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Man, there were a lot of renamings :)
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

As documented both SSL_get0_dane_authority() and SSL_get0_dane_tlsa()
are expected to return a negative match depth and nothing else when
verification fails.  However, this only happened when verification
failed during chain construction.  Errors in verification of the
constructed chain did not have the intended effect on these functions.

This commit updates the functions to check for verify_result ==
X509_V_OK, and no longer erases any accumulated match information
when chain construction fails.  Sophisticated developers can, with
care, use SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_V_OK) to "peek" at TLSA
info even when verification fail.  They must of course first check
and save the real error, and restore the original error as quickly
as possible.  Hiding by default seems to be the safer interface.

Introduced X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH code to signal failure to find
matching TLSA records.  Previously reported via X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED.

This also changes the "-brief" output from s_client to include
verification results and TLSA match information.

Mentioned session resumption in code example in SSL_CTX_dane_enable(3).
Also mentioned that depths returned are relative to the verified chain
which is now available via SSL_get0_verified_chain(3).

Added a few more test-cases to danetest, that exercise the new
code.

Resolved thread safety issue in use of static buffer in
X509_verify_cert_error_string().

Fixed long-stating issue in apps/s_cb.c which always sets verify_error
to either X509_V_OK or "chain to long", code elsewhere (e.g.
s_time.c), seems to expect the actual error.  [ The new chain
construction code is expected to correctly generate "chain
too long" errors, so at some point we need to drop the
work-arounds, once SSL_set_verify_depth() is also fixed to
propagate the depth to X509_STORE_CTX reliably. ]
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

dgst: using digest instead of specific digest commands
the digest list specified in man dgst may be inaccurate, hence using
digest and referring to the list in digest-commands

'sha' as a digest name is no longer supported

dgst,pkeyutl cmds help cleanup
- In dgst, pkeyutl cmds, some options help was missing.
- fixed a minor typo in openssl.pod, that fixes make install.
- digest-commands was showing ‘sha’, which is not a supported digest
anymore.
Signed-off-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

opt_valtype 0 is same as '-' while printing cmd usage
asn1parse/ca/ciphers help cleanup
Signed-off-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Allow initial engine names as first parameters before flags.
Also add engine param to help summary

Wrote manpage
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>