Add new function EC_KEY_priv2buf() to allocated and encode private
key octet in one call. Update and simplify ASN.1 and print routines.
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Update EC ASN.1 and print routines to use EC_KEY_oct2priv and
EC_KEY_priv2oct.
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

New functions to return internal pointer for order and cofactor. This
avoids the need to allocate a new BIGNUM which to copy the value to.
Simplify code to use new functions.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

This was done by the following
        find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl
where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script:
        print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@;
        close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $.

And then some hand-editing of other files.
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

New functions EC_POINT_point2buf and EC_KEY_key2buf which encode
a point and allocate a buffer in one call.

New function EC_KEY_oct2key() which sets public key in an EC_KEY
structure from an encoded point.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Continuing from previous commit ensure our style is consistent for malloc
return checks.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
MR #1005

-Wincompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers (the latter did not require
any code changes).
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Add secure heap for storage of private keys (when possible).
Add BIO_s_secmem(), CBIGNUM, etc.
Add BIO_CTX_secure_new so all BIGNUM's in the context are secure.
Contributed by Akamai Technologies under the Corporate CLA.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

After the finale, the "real" final part. :)  Do a recursive grep with
"-B1 -w [a-zA-Z0-9_]*_free" to see if any of the preceeding lines are
an "if NULL" check that can be removed.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Don't check for NULL before calling OPENSSL_free
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

This gets BN_.*free:
    BN_BLINDING_free BN_CTX_free BN_FLG_FREE BN_GENCB_free
    BN_MONT_CTX_free BN_RECP_CTX_free BN_clear_free BN_free BUF_MEM_free

Also fix a call to DSA_SIG_free to ccgost engine and remove some #ifdef'd
dead code in engines/e_ubsec.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Do not check for NULL before calling a free routine.  This addresses:
    ASN1_BIT_STRING_free ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free ASN1_INTEGER_free
    ASN1_OBJECT_free ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free ASN1_PCTX_free ASN1_SCTX_free
    ASN1_STRING_clear_free ASN1_STRING_free ASN1_TYPE_free
    ASN1_UTCTIME_free M_ASN1_free_of
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

RFC5915 requires the use of the I2OSP primitive as defined in RFC3447
for storing an EC Private Key. This converts the private key into an
OCTETSTRING and retains any leading zeros. This commit ensures that those
leading zeros are present if required.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

This gets EC_GROUP_clear_free EC_GROUP_free, EC_KEY_free,
EC_POINT_clear_free, EC_POINT_free
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Start ensuring all OpenSSL "free" routines allow NULL, and remove
any if check before calling them.
This gets ASN1_OBJECT_free and ASN1_STRING_free.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Remove old M_ASN1_ macros and replace any occurences with the corresponding
function.

Remove d2i_ASN1_bytes, d2i_ASN1_SET, i2d_ASN1_SET: no longer used internally.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reported by the LibreSSL project as a follow on to CVE-2015-0209
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Inspired by BoringSSL commit 517073cd4b by Eric Roman <eroman@chromium.org>

CVE-2015-0209
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

The old code implicitly relies on the ASN.1 code returning a \0-prefixed buffer
when the buffer length is 0. Change this to verify explicitly that the ASN.1 string
has positive length.
Reviewed-by: NDr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

When d2i_ECPrivateKey reads a private key with a missing (optional) public key,
generate one automatically from the group and private key.
Reviewed-by: NDr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

This change saves several EC routines from crashing when an EC_KEY is
missing a public key. The public key is optional in the EC private key
format and, without this patch, running the following through `openssl
ec` causes a crash:

-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MBkCAQEECAECAwQFBgcIoAoGCCqGSM49AwEH
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
Reviewed-by: NDr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

PR: 3338

Don't check for binary curves by checking methods: the values will
be different in FIPS mode as they are redirected to the validated module
version.

knock-on work than expected - they've been extracted into a patch
series that can be completed elsewhere, or in a different branch,
before merging back to HEAD.

(need to prevent the removal of trailing zero bits).

cause a denial of service.  (CVE-2006-2940)
[Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller]

Submitted by: David Hartman <david_hartman@symantec.com>

EC_GROUP_new_by_nid -> EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name

	EC_GROUP_get_nid -> EC_GROUP_get_curve_name
	EC_GROUP_set_nid -> EC_GROUP_set_curve_name

("perl util/ck_errf.pl */*.c */*/*.c" still reports many more.)