ssl3_setup_buffers or pqueue_insert fail. The former will fail if there is a
malloc failure, whilst the latter will fail if attempting to add a duplicate
record to the queue. This should never happen because duplicate records should
be detected and dropped before any attempt to add them to the queue.
Unfortunately records that arrive that are for the next epoch are not being
recorded correctly, and therefore replays are not being detected.
Additionally, these "should not happen" failures that can occur in
dtls1_buffer_record are not being treated as fatal and therefore an attacker
could exploit this by sending repeated replay records for the next epoch,
eventually causing a DoS through memory exhaustion.

Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue and providing initial
analysis and a patch. Further analysis and the final patch was performed by
Matt Caswell from the OpenSSL development team.

CVE-2015-0206
Reviewed-by: NDr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Fix to prevent use of DH client certificates without sending
certificate verify message.

If we've used a client certificate to generate the premaster secret
ssl3_get_client_key_exchange returns 2 and ssl3_get_cert_verify is
never called.

We can only skip the certificate verify message in
ssl3_get_cert_verify if the client didn't send a certificate.

Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
CVE-2015-0205
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

of the crash due to p being NULL. Steve's fix prevents this situation from
occuring - however this is by no means obvious by looking at the code for
dtls1_get_record. This fix just makes things look a bit more sane.
Reviewed-by: NDr Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

separate reads performed - one for the header and one for the body of the
handshake record.

CVE-2014-3571
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

context was also inherited (matches that of the existing SSL_CTX).
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

OpenSSL clients would tolerate temporary RSA keys in non-export
ciphersuites. It also had an option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA which
enabled this server side. Remove both options as they are a
protocol violation.

Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
(CVE-2015-0204)
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Fix bug where an OpenSSL client would accept a handshake using an
ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites with the server key exchange message omitted.

Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.

CVE-2014-3572
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

when its SSL_CTX is updated.

From BoringSSL commit
https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/a5dc545bbcffd9c24cebe65e9ab5ce72d4535e3aReviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

RT3638
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

RT3638
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

MS Server gated cryptography is obsolete and dates from the time of export
restrictions on strong encryption and is only used by ancient versions of
MSIE.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

When parsing ClientHello clear any existing extension state from
SRP login and SRTP profile.

Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NGeoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>

None of this should live in writable memory
Signed-off-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NGeoff Thorpe <geoff@openssl.org>

indent will not alter them when reformatting comments
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

This commit removes all mention of NeXT and NextStep.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Introduce use of DECLARE_DEPRECATED
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

From BoringSSL
- Send an alert when the client key exchange isn't correctly formatted.
- Reject overly short RSA ciphertexts to avoid a (benign) out-of-bounds memory access.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

ssl_locl.h
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

The client_version needs to be preserved for the RSA key exchange.

This change also means that renegotiation will, like TLS, repeat the old
client_version rather than advertise only the final version. (Either way,
version change on renego is not allowed.) This is necessary in TLS to work
around an SChannel bug, but it's not strictly necessary in DTLS.

(From BoringSSL)
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

RT#3625
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

serverinfo_process_buffer: check result of realloc(ctx->cert->key->serverinfo) and don't leak memory if it fails
Signed-off-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>