1. 18 9月, 2015 1 次提交
  2. 17 9月, 2015 4 次提交
  3. 12 9月, 2015 1 次提交
  4. 11 9月, 2015 2 次提交
  5. 09 9月, 2015 1 次提交
    • D
      RT3969: Add OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI · 4d60c7e1
      David Woodhouse 提交于
      This provides support for building in the EDK II reference implementation
      of UEFI. Most UEFI firmware in existence uses OpenSSL for implementing
      the core cryptographic functionality needed for Secure Boot.
      
      This has always previously been handled with external patches to OpenSSL
      but we are now making a concerted effort to eliminate those.
      
      In this mode, we don't actually use the OpenSSL makefiles; we process
      the MINFO file generated by 'make files' and incorporate it into the
      EDK2 build system.
      
      Since EDK II builds for various targets with varying word size and we
      need to have a single prepackaged configuration, we deliberately don't
      hard-code the setting of SIXTY_FOUR_BIT vs. THIRTY_TWO_BIT in
      opensslconf.h. We bypass that for OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI and allow EDK II
      itself to set those, depending on the architecture.
      
      For x86_64, EDK II sets SIXTY_FOUR_BIT and thus uses 'long long' for the
      64-bit type, even when building with GCC where 'long' is also 64-bit. We
      do this because the Microsoft toolchain has 32-bit 'long'.
      Signed-off-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@akamai.com>
      Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
      4d60c7e1
  6. 06 9月, 2015 3 次提交
  7. 05 9月, 2015 2 次提交
  8. 04 9月, 2015 3 次提交
  9. 03 9月, 2015 3 次提交
  10. 02 9月, 2015 5 次提交
  11. 01 9月, 2015 4 次提交
  12. 26 8月, 2015 1 次提交
  13. 17 8月, 2015 1 次提交
  14. 14 8月, 2015 3 次提交
  15. 12 8月, 2015 3 次提交
  16. 11 8月, 2015 1 次提交
  17. 03 8月, 2015 2 次提交
    • M
      Fix make errors for the CCS changes · 496dbe18
      Matt Caswell 提交于
      The move of CCS into the state machine was causing make errors to fail. This
      fixes it.
      Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
      496dbe18
    • M
      Move TLS CCS processing into the state machine · 657da85e
      Matt Caswell 提交于
      The handling of incoming CCS records is a little strange. Since CCS is not
      a handshake message it is handled differently to normal handshake messages.
      Unfortunately whilst technically it is not a handhshake message the reality
      is that it must be processed in accordance with the state of the handshake.
      Currently CCS records are processed entirely within the record layer. In
      order to ensure that it is handled in accordance with the handshake state
      a flag is used to indicate that it is an acceptable time to receive a CCS.
      
      Previously this flag did not exist (see CVE-2014-0224), but the flag should
      only really be considered a workaround for the problem that CCS is not
      visible to the state machine.
      
      Outgoing CCS messages are already handled within the state machine.
      
      This patch makes CCS visible to the TLS state machine. A separate commit
      will handle DTLS.
      Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
      657da85e