- 30 11月, 2016 1 次提交
-
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
This updates the record layer to use the TLSv1.3 style nonce construciton. It also updates TLSProxy and ossltest to be able to recognise the new layout. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
- 23 11月, 2016 2 次提交
-
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
After the client processes the server's initial flight in TLS1.3 it may respond with either an encrypted, or an unencrypted alert. We needed to teach TLSProxy about this so that it didn't issue spurious warnings. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
- 10 11月, 2016 1 次提交
-
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
- 07 11月, 2016 1 次提交
-
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Prior to TLS1.3 we check that the received record version number is correct. In TLS1.3 we need to ignore the record version number. This adds a test to make sure we do it correctly. Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
- 03 11月, 2016 1 次提交
-
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
We should fail if we receive an unrecognised record type Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
-
- 02 11月, 2016 1 次提交
-
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Now that ossltest knows about a TLS1.3 cipher we can now do TLS1.3 in TLSProxy Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-
- 16 8月, 2016 1 次提交
-
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
Test that we handle a TLS ClientHello in an SSLv2 record correctly. Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
-
- 20 4月, 2016 1 次提交
-
-
由 Rich Salz 提交于
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-
- 14 8月, 2015 1 次提交
-
-
由 Richard Levitte 提交于
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-
- 12 8月, 2015 1 次提交
-
-
由 Matt Caswell 提交于
This commit provides a set of perl modules that support the testing of libssl. The test harness operates as a man-in-the-middle proxy between s_server and s_client. Both s_server and s_client must be started using the "-testmode" option which loads the new OSSLTEST engine. The test harness enables scripts to be written that can examine the packets sent during a handshake, as well as (potentially) modifying them so that otherwise illegal handshake messages can be sent. Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-