Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Undocumented, unused, unnecessary (replaced by secure arena).
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Add new OIDs for latest GOST updates
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

This was obsolete in 2001.  This is not the same as Gost94 digest.
Thanks to Dmitry Belyavsky <beldmit@gmail.com> for review and advice.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

If a client receives a ServerKeyExchange for an anon DH ciphersuite with the
value of p set to 0 then a seg fault can occur. This commits adds a test to
reject p, g and pub key parameters that have a 0 value (in accordance with
RFC 5246)

The security vulnerability only affects master and 1.0.2, but the fix is
additionally applied to 1.0.1 for additional confidence.

CVE-2015-1794
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

make errors wants things in a different order to the way things are
currently defined in the header files. The easiest fix is to just let it
reorder it.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Especially since after the #ifdef cleanups this is not useful.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

The move of CCS into the state machine was causing make errors to fail. This
fixes it.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

The handling of incoming CCS records is a little strange. Since CCS is not
a handshake message it is handled differently to normal handshake messages.
Unfortunately whilst technically it is not a handhshake message the reality
is that it must be processed in accordance with the state of the handshake.
Currently CCS records are processed entirely within the record layer. In
order to ensure that it is handled in accordance with the handshake state
a flag is used to indicate that it is an acceptable time to receive a CCS.

Previously this flag did not exist (see CVE-2014-0224), but the flag should
only really be considered a workaround for the problem that CCS is not
visible to the state machine.

Outgoing CCS messages are already handled within the state machine.

This patch makes CCS visible to the TLS state machine. A separate commit
will handle DTLS.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Note: some of the RFC4279 ciphersuites were originally part of PR#2464.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

This flag was not set anywhere within the codebase (only read). It could
only be set by an app reaching directly into s->s3->flags and setting it
directly. However that method became impossible when libssl was opaquified.

Even in 1.0.2/1.0.1 if an app set the flag directly it is only relevant to
ssl3_connect(), which calls SSL_clear() during initialisation that clears
any flag settings. Therefore it could take effect if the app set the flag
after the handshake has started but before it completed. It seems quite
unlikely that any apps really do this (especially as it is completely
undocumented).

The purpose of the flag is suppress flushing of the write bio on the client
side at the end of the handshake after the client has written the Finished
message whilst resuming a session. This enables the client to send
application data as part of the same flight as the Finished message.

This flag also controls the setting of a second flag SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER.
There is an interesting comment in the code about this second flag in the
implementation of ssl3_write:

	/* This is an experimental flag that sends the
	 * last handshake message in the same packet as the first
	 * use data - used to see if it helps the TCP protocol during
	 * session-id reuse */

It seems the experiment did not work because as far as I can tell nothing
is using this code. The above comment has been in the code since SSLeay.

This commit removes support for SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED, as well
as the associated SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Removed ability to set ex_data impl at runtime.  This removed these
three functions:
    const CRYPTO_EX_DATA_IMPL *CRYPTO_get_ex_data_implementation(void);
    int CRYPTO_set_ex_data_implementation(const CRYPTO_EX_DATA_IMPL *i);
    int CRYPTO_ex_data_new_class(void);
It is no longer possible to change the ex_data implementation at
runtime.  (Luckily those functions were never documented :)

Also removed the ability to add new exdata "classes."  We don't believe
this received much (if any) use, since you can't add it to OpenSSL objects,
and there are probably better (native) methods for developers to add
their own extensible data, if they really need that.

Replaced the internal hash table (of per-"class" stacks) with a simple
indexed array.  Reserved an index for "app" application.

Each API used to take the lock twice; now it only locks once.

Use local stack storage for function pointers, rather than malloc,
if possible (i.e., number of ex_data items is under a dozen).

Make CRYPTO_EX_DATA_FUNCS opaque/internal.

Also fixes RT3710; index zero is reserved.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Remove support for RSA_NET and Netscape key format (-keyform n).

Also removed documentation of SGC.
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The -show_chain flag to the verify command line app shows information about
the chain that has been built. This commit adds the text "untrusted" against
those certificates that have been used from the untrusted list.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Rewrite ssl3_digest_cached_records handling. Only digest cached records
if digest array is NULL: this means it is safe to call
ssl3_digest_cached_records multiple times (subsequent calls are no op).

Remove flag TLS1_FLAGS_KEEP_HANDSHAKE instead only update handshake buffer
if digest array is NULL.

Add additional "keep" parameter to ssl3_digest_cached_records to indicate
if the handshake buffer should be retained after digesting cached records
(needed for TLS 1.2 client authentication).
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Add secure heap for storage of private keys (when possible).
Add BIO_s_secmem(), CBIGNUM, etc.
Add BIO_CTX_secure_new so all BIGNUM's in the context are secure.
Contributed by Akamai Technologies under the Corporate CLA.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Recent HMAC changes broke ABI compatibility due to a new field in HMAC_CTX.
This backs that change out, and does it a different way.

Thanks to Timo Teras for the concept.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

This is a workaround so old that nobody remembers what buggy clients
it was for. It's also been broken in stable branches for two years and
nobody noticed (see
https://boringssl-review.googlesource.com/#/c/1694/).
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

The return type of BIO_number_read() and BIO_number_written() as well as
the corresponding num_read and num_write members in the BIO structure has
been changed from unsigned long to uint64_t. On platforms where an unsigned
long is 32 bits (e.g. Windows) these counters could overflow if >4Gb is
transferred.

With thanks to the Open Crypto Audit Project for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Also removed a source file that isn't built, and moved
another one to test for eventual fixing.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
MR #588

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

PR#3872
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NStephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
(cherry picked from commit ad0fb7f4988c8a717fe6bcb035304385fbdaef41)

Conflicts:
	crypto/asn1/ameth_lib.c

This is for consistency.
Additionally, have its presence define OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS as well.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when
attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur
potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data.

CVE-2015-1791

This also fixes RT#3808 where a session ID is changed for a session already
in the client session cache. Since the session ID is the key to the cache
this breaks the cache access.

Parts of this patch were inspired by this Akamai change:
https://github.com/akamai/openssl/commit/c0bf69a791239ceec64509f9f19fcafb2461b0d3Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>