Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

in EVP_EncryptUpdate and EVP_DecryptUpdate. It is argued that in
general case it's impossible to provide guarantee that partially[!]
overlapping buffers can be tolerated.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Due to short-circuiting we only need to check "cipher" for NULL once.

PR#699
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate function. If an attacker is
able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to
EVP_EncryptUpdate with a partial block then a length check can overflow
resulting in a heap corruption.

Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the
EVP_EncryptUpdate function all usage is one of two forms.

The first form is like this:
EVP_EncryptInit()
EVP_EncryptUpdate()

i.e. where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called
function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call
must be safe.

The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be
seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no
possibility of an overflow.

Since all instances are one of these two forms, I believe that there can
be no overflows in internal code due to this problem.

It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate()
in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for
EVP_EncryptUpdate(). Therefore I have checked all instances of these
calls too, and came to the same conclusion, i.e. there are no instances
in internal usage where an overflow could occur.

This could still represent a security issue for end user code that calls
this function directly.

CVE-2016-2106

Issue reported by Guido Vranken.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Don't have #error statements in header files, but instead wrap
the contents of that file in #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_xxx
This means it is now always safe to include the header file.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Simplifies calling code.  Also fixed up any !ptr tests that were
nearby, turning them into NULL tests.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

This was done by the following
        find . -name '*.[ch]' | /tmp/pl
where /tmp/pl is the following three-line script:
        print unless $. == 1 && m@/\* .*\.[ch] \*/@;
        close ARGV if eof; # Close file to reset $.

And then some hand-editing of other files.
Reviewed-by: NViktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags was returning the flags of its associated
EVP_CIPHER.  However, EVP_CIPHER_CTX has flags of its own, so this
function is quite confusing and therefore error prone.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Following the method used for EVP_MD_CTX and HMAC_CTX,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup are joined together
into one function, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset, with EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init kept
as an alias.
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup fills no purpose of its own any more and is
therefore removed.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

In such case it would be EVP_CIPHER.cleanup's reponsibility to wipe
EVP_CIPHEX_CTX.cipher_data.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Continuing from previous commit ensure our style is consistent for malloc
return checks.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

There are many places (nearly 50) where we malloc and then memset.
Add an OPENSSL_zalloc routine to encapsulate that.
(Missed one conversion; thanks Richard)
Also fixes GH328
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Especially since after the #ifdef cleanups this is not useful.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

There are header files in crypto/ that are used by a number of crypto/
submodules.  Move those to crypto/include/internal and adapt the
affected source code and Makefiles.

The header files that got moved are:

crypto/cryptolib.h
crypto/md32_common.h
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

If an EVP implementation (such as an engine) fails out early, it's
possible to call EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() which will call
ctx->cipher->cleanup() before the cipher_data has been initialized
via ctx->cipher->init().  Guarantee it's all-bytes-zero as soon as
it is allocated.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Just as with the OPENSSL_malloc calls, consistently use sizeof(*ptr)
for memset and memcpy.  Remove needless casts for those functions.
For memset, replace alternative forms of zero with 0.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

For a local variable:
        TYPE *p;
Allocations like this are "risky":
        p = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(TYPE));
if the type of p changes, and the malloc call isn't updated, you
could get memory corruption.  Instead do this:
        p = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*p));
Also fixed a few memset() calls that I noticed while doing this.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Don't check for NULL before calling OPENSSL_free
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

EVP_.*free; this gets:
        EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free EVP_PKEY_CTX_free EVP_PKEY_asn1_free
        EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_free EVP_PKEY_free EVP_PKEY_free_it
        EVP_PKEY_meth_free; and also EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Causes more problems than it fixes: even though error codes
are not part of the stable API, several users rely on the
specific error code, and the change breaks them. Conversely,
we don't have any concrete use-cases for constant-time behaviour here.

This reverts commit 4aac102f.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

The different -I compiler parameters will take care of the rest...
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Conflicts:
	crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
	crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c
	crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c

Do the final padding check in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex in constant time to
avoid a timing leak from padding failure.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Add support for key wrap algorithms via EVP interface.

Generalise AES wrap algorithm and add to modes, making existing
AES wrap algorithm a special case.

Move test code to evptests.txt

- clear ctx->num in EVP_CipherInit_ex
- adapt e_eas.c changes from http://cvs.openssl.org/chngview?cn=19816
  for eng_aesni.c

Submitted by: Emilia Kasper

the NULL value for the input buffer is sufficient to notice this case.

cipher handles all cipher symantics itself.

Submitted by: Alexei Khlebnikov <alexei.khlebnikov@opera.com>
Reviewed by: steve

OOM checking. Leak in OOM fix. Fall-through comment. Duplicate code
elimination.

an EVP_CIPHER_CTX structure which may have problems with external ENGINEs
who need to duplicate internal handles etc.