As it turns out originally published results were skewed by "turbo"
mode. VM apparently remains oblivious to dynamic frequency scaling,
and reports that processor operates at "base" frequency at all times.
While actual frequency gets increased under load.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6406)

OPENSSL_memcmp is a must in GCM decrypt and general-purpose loop takes
quite a portion of execution time for short inputs, more than GHASH for
few-byte inputs according to profiler. Special 16-byte case takes it off
top five list in profiler output.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6312)

On contemporary platforms assembly GHASH processes multiple blocks
faster than one by one. For TLS payloads shorter than 16 bytes, e.g.
alerts, it's possible to reduce hashing operation to single call.
And for block lengths not divisible by 16 - fold two final calls to
one. Improvement is most noticeable with "reptoline", because call to
assembly GHASH is indirect.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6312)

Even though calls can be viewed as styling improvement, they do come
with cost. It's not big cost and shows only on short inputs, but it is
measurable, 2-3% on some platforms.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6312)

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
GH: #6405

Only Linux and FreeBSD provide getrandom(), but they both also provide
getentropy() since the same version and we already tried to call that.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
GH: #6405

This will actually support most OSs, and at least adds support for
Solaris and OSX

Fixes: #6403
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
GH: #6405

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
GH: #6405

Just because an engine implements algorithm methods, that doesn't mean
it also implements the ASN1 method.  Therefore, be careful when looking
for an ASN1 method among all engines, don't try to use one that doesn't
exist.

Fixes #6381
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6383)

(cherry picked from commit 1ac3cd6277f880fac4df313702d5e3b3814e56e2)
(cherry picked from commit 13b578ada3106a4ce9b836f167ee520539f5fa8f)

Found by coverity. This is an artifact left over from the original
decaf import which generated the source code for different curves. For
curve 448 this is dead.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6373)

Issues found by Coverity
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6373)

In `aes_wrap_cipher()`, the minimal out buff length is `(inlen - 8)`.
Since it calls `CRYPTO_128_unwrap_pad()` underneath, it makes sense to
reduce the minimal out length in `CRYPTO_128_unwrap_pad()` to align to
its caller.
Signed-off-by: NYihong Wang <yh.wang@ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6266)

The One&Done attack, which is described in a paper to appear in the
USENIX Security'18 conference, uses EM emanations to recover the values
of the bits that are obtained using BN_is_bit_set while constructing
the value of the window in BN_mod_exp_consttime. The EM signal changes
slightly depending on the value of the bit, and since the lookup of a
bit is surrounded by highly regular execution (constant-time Montgomery
multiplications) the attack is able to isolate the (very brief) part of
the signal that changes depending on the bit. Although the change is
slight, the attack recovers it successfully >90% of the time on several
phones and IoT devices (all with ARM processors with clock rates around
1GHz), so after only one RSA decryption more than 90% of the bits in
d_p and d_q are recovered correctly, which enables rapid recovery of
the full RSA key using an algorithm (also described in the paper) that
modifies the branch-and-prune approach for a situation in which the
exponents' bits are recovered with errors, i.e. where we do not know
a priori which bits are correctly recovered.

The mitigation for the attack is relatively simple - all the bits of
the window are obtained at once, along with other bits so that an
entire integer's worth of bits are obtained together using masking and
shifts, without unnecessarily considering each bit in isolation. This
improves performance somewhat (one call to bn_get_bits is faster than
several calls to BN_is_bit_set), so the attacker now gets one signal
snippet per window (rather than one per bit) in which the signal is
affected by all bits in the integer (rather than just the one bit).
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6276)

32-bit vector rotate instruction was defined from beginning, it
not being used from the start must be a brain-slip...
Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6363)

Reviewed-by: NBernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6363)

OpenSSL 1.1.0 made the X509_LOOKUP_METHOD structure opaque, so
applications that were previously able to define a custom lookup method
are not able to be ported.

This commit adds getters and setters for each of the current fields of
X509_LOOKUP_METHOD, along with getters and setters on several associated
opaque types (such as X509_LOOKUP and X509_OBJECT).
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6152)

Return immediately upon discovery of bad message digest.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6298)

Thanks to Guido Vranken and OSSFuzz for finding this issue.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6355)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6371)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6290)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6290)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6290)

This reverts commit a6f5b116.

The EVP_PKEY_sign() function is intended for pre-hashed input which is
not supported by our EdDSA implementation.

See the discussion in PR 5880
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6284)

We check that the curve name associated with the point is the same as that
for the curve.

Fixes #6302
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6323)

TlsGetValue clears the last error even on success, so that callers may
distinguish it successfully returning NULL or failing. This error-mangling
behavior interferes with the caller's use of GetLastError. In particular
SSL_get_error queries the error queue to determine whether the caller should
look at the OS's errors. To avoid destroying state, save and restore the
Windows error.

Fixes #6299.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6316)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6314)

Per SEC 1, the curve coefficients must be padded up to size. See C.2's
definition of Curve, C.1's definition of FieldElement, and 2.3.5's definition
of how to encode the field elements in http://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf.

This comes up for P-521, where b needs a leading zero.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6314)

Only check the CN against DNS name contraints if the
`X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT` flag is not set, and either the
certificate has no DNS subject alternative names or the
`X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT` flag is set.

Add pertinent documentation, and touch up some stale text about
name checks and DANE.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Don't apply DNS name constraints to the subject CN when there's a
least one DNS-ID subjectAlternativeName.

Don't apply DNS name constraints to subject CN's that are sufficiently
unlike DNS names.  Checked name must have at least two labels, with
all labels non-empty, no trailing '.' and all hyphens must be
internal in each label.  In addition to the usual LDH characters,
we also allow "_", since some sites use these for hostnames despite
all the standards.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Fixes #6327
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6328)

If the lengths of both names is 0 then don't attempt to do a memcmp.

Issue reported by Simon Friedberger, Robert Merget and Juraj Somorovsky.
Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6291)

A previous change of this function introduced a fragility when the
destination happens to be the same as the source.  Such alias isn't
recommended, but could still happen, for example in this kind of code:

    X509_NAME *subject = X509_get_issuer_name(x);

    /* ... some code passes ... */

    X509_set_issuer_name(x, subject);

Fixes #4710
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6280)

Using the ca application to sign certificates with EdDSA failed because it
is not possible to set the digest to "null". This adds the capability and
updates the documentation accordingly.

Fixes #6201
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6286)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6273)

Experiments have shown that the lookup table used by BN_GF2m_mod_arr
introduces sufficient timing signal to recover the private key for an
attacker with access to cache timing information on the victim's host.
This only affects binary curves (which are less frequently used).

No CVE is considered necessary for this issue.

The fix is to replace the lookup table with an on-the-fly calculation of
the value from the table instead, which can be performed in constant time.

Thanks to Youngjoo Shin for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6270)

The Console UI method always set echo on after prompting without
echo.  However, echo might not have been on originally, so just
restore the original TTY settings.

Fixes #2373
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6156)

Fixes #4716
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6173)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
GH: #6208

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
GH: #6208

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>