The exponent here is one of d, dmp1, or dmq1 for RSA. This value and its
bit length are both secret. The only public upper bound is the bit width
of the corresponding modulus (RSA n, p, and q, respectively).

Although BN_num_bits is constant-time (sort of; see bn_correct_top notes
in preceding patch), this does not fix the root problem, which is that
the windows are based on the minimal bit width, not the upper bound. We
could use BN_num_bits(m), but BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime is public API
and may be called with larger exponents. Instead, use all top*BN_BITS2
bits in the BIGNUM. This is still sensitive to the long-standing
bn_correct_top leak, but we need to fix that regardless.

This may cause us to do a handful of extra multiplications for RSA keys
which are just above a whole number of words, but that is not a standard
RSA key size.
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5154)

(This patch was written by Andy Polyakov. I only wrote the commit
message. Mistakes in the analysis are my fault.)

BN_num_bits, by way of BN_num_bits_word, currently leaks the
most-significant word of its argument via branching and memory access
pattern.

BN_num_bits is called on RSA prime factors in various places. These have
public bit lengths, but all bits beyond the high bit are secret. This
fully resolves those cases.

There are a few places where BN_num_bits is called on an input where the
bit length is also secret. This does *not* fully resolve those cases as
we still only look at the top word. Today, that is guaranteed to be
non-zero, but only because of the long-standing bn_correct_top timing
leak. Once that is fixed, a constant-time BN_num_bits on such inputs
must count bits on each word.

Instead, those cases should not call BN_num_bits at all. In particular,
BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime uses the exponent bit width to pick windows,
but it should be using the maximum bit width. The next patch will fix
this.

Thanks to Dinghao Wu, Danfeng Zhang, Shuai Wang, Pei Wang, and Xiao Liu
for reporting this issue.
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5154)

added macro to create version number
use the macro to build OPENSSL_VERSION_AT_LEAST(maj,min,fix) so that
customers of libssl (such as ruby-openssl) do not need to be so aware of
openssl version numbers.
includes updates to ssl(7) and OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER(3) man page
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5212)

Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5238)

So as not to be mixed up with a device specification...
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5234)

Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)

Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)

Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)

Add SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() for servers to initiate PHA

Add SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() for clients that don't have certificates
initially configured, but use a certificate callback.

Update SSL_CTX_set_verify()/SSL_set_verify() mode:

* Add SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to postpone client authentication until after
the initial handshake.

* Update SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE now only sends out one CertRequest regardless
of when the certificate authentication takes place; either initial handshake,
re-negotiation, or post-handshake authentication.

Add 'RequestPostHandshake' and 'RequirePostHandshake' SSL_CONF options that
add the SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE to the 'Request' and 'Require' options

Add support to s_client:
* Enabled automatically when cert is configured
* Can be forced enabled via -force_pha

Add support to s_server:
* Use 'c' to invoke PHA in s_server
* Remove some dead code

Update documentation

Update unit tests:
* Illegal use of PHA extension
* TLSv1.3 certificate tests

DTLS and TLS behave ever-so-slightly differently. So, when DTLS1.3 is
implemented, it's PHA support state machine may need to be different.
Add a TODO and a #error

Update handshake context to deal with PHA.

The handshake context for TLSv1.3 post-handshake auth is up through the
ClientFinish message, plus the CertificateRequest message. Subsequent
Certificate, CertificateVerify, and Finish messages are based on this
handshake context (not the Certificate message per se, but it's included
after the hash). KeyUpdate, NewSessionTicket, and prior Certificate
Request messages are not included in post-handshake authentication.

After the ClientFinished message is processed, save off the digest state
for future post-handshake authentication. When post-handshake auth occurs,
copy over the saved handshake context into the "main" handshake digest.
This effectively discards the any KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket messages
and any prior post-handshake authentication.

This, of course, assumes that the ID-22 did not mean to include any
previous post-handshake authentication into the new handshake transcript.
This is implied by section 4.4.1 that lists messages only up to the
first ClientFinished.
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)

Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4964)

In a few places we sent an internal_error alert instead of a decode_error.

Fixes #5213
Fixes #5214
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5219)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5224)

The reason to do this is that some output might start with an 'ok',
which TAP catches and takes for TAP output.  The TAP compatible way is
to make all output it shouldn't catch look like comments.

We do this by setting the environment variable HARNESS_OSSL_PREFIX
during tests.  When that is set, apps/openssl uses BIO_f_linebuffer
and sets its prefix to the content of that environment variable.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5224)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5224)

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5229)

This avoids having to enumerate specific modules in apps, or to have
to include them in libtestutil.a.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5222)

Most modules are direct implementations of openssl application
sub-commands, but some constitute a support library, which can be used
by more than one program (and is, incidently, by test/uitest).

For practical purposes, we place the support library modules in a
private, static library.

Finally, there are some modules that don't have direct references in
the rest of the apps code, but are still crucial.  See them as some
kind of extra crt0 or similar for your platform.

Inspiration from David von Oheimb
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5222)

Everything in apps includes apps.h, because that one declares apps
internal library routines.  However, progs.h doesn't declare library
routines, but rather the main commands and their options, and there's
no reason why the library modules should include it.

So, remove the inclusion of progs.h from apps.h and add that inclusion
in all command source files.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5222)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The behavior of resetting the init_lock value to NULL after
freeing it during OPENSSL_cleanup() was added as part of the
global lock commits that were just reverted, but there is desire
to retain this behavior for clarity.

It is unclear that the library would actually remain usable in
any form after OPENSSL_cleanup(), since the required re-initialization
occurs under a CRYPTO_ONCE check that cannot be reset at cleanup time.
That said, a NULL dereference is probably more friendly behavior
in these treacherous waters than using freed memory would be.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5089)

Conceptually, this is a squashed version of:

    Revert "Address feedback"

    This reverts commit 75551e07.

and

    Revert "Add CRYPTO_thread_glock_new"

    This reverts commit ed6b2c79.

But there were some intervening commits that made neither revert apply
cleanly, so instead do it all as one shot.

The crypto global locks were an attempt to cope with the awkward
POSIX semantics for pthread_atfork(); its documentation (the "RATIONALE"
section) indicates that the expected usage is to have the prefork handler
lock all "global" locks, and the parent and child handlers release those
locks, to ensure that forking happens with a consistent (lock) state.
However, the set of functions available in the child process is limited
to async-signal-safe functions, and pthread_mutex_unlock() is not on
the list of async-signal-safe functions!  The only synchronization
primitives that are async-signal-safe are the semaphore primitives,
which are not really appropriate for general-purpose usage.

However, the state consistency problem that the global locks were
attempting to solve is not actually a serious problem, particularly for
OpenSSL.  That is, we can consider four cases of forking application
that might use OpenSSL:

(1) Single-threaded, does not call into OpenSSL in the child (e.g.,
the child calls exec() immediately)

For this class of process, no locking is needed at all, since there is
only ever a single thread of execution and the only reentrancy is due to
signal handlers (which are themselves limited to async-signal-safe
operation and should not be doing much work at all).

(2) Single-threaded, calls into OpenSSL after fork()

The application must ensure that it does not fork() with an unexpected
lock held (that is, one that would get unlocked in the parent but
accidentally remain locked in the child and cause deadlock).  Since
OpenSSL does not expose any of its internal locks to the application
and the application is single-threaded, the OpenSSL internal locks
will be unlocked for the fork(), and the state will be consistent.
(OpenSSL will need to reseed its PRNG in the child, but that is
an orthogonal issue.)  If the application makes use of locks from
libcrypto, proper handling for those locks is the responsibility of
the application, as for any other locking primitive that is available
for application programming.

(3) Multi-threaded, does not call into OpenSSL after fork()

As for (1), the OpenSSL state is only relevant in the parent, so
no particular fork()-related handling is needed.  The internal locks
are relevant, but there is no interaction with the child to consider.

(4) Multi-threaded, calls into OpenSSL after fork()

This is the case where the pthread_atfork() hooks to ensure that all
global locks are in a known state across fork() would come into play,
per the above discussion.  However, these "calls into OpenSSL after
fork()" are still subject to the restriction to async-signal-safe
functions.  Since OpenSSL uses all sorts of locking and libc functions
that are not on the list of safe functions (e.g., malloc()), this
case is not currently usable and is unlikely to ever be usable,
independently of the locking situation.  So, there is no need to
go through contortions to attempt to support this case in the one small
area of locking interaction with fork().

In light of the above analysis (thanks @davidben and @achernya), go
back to the simpler implementation that does not need to distinguish
"library-global" locks or to have complicated atfork handling for locks.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NMatthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5089)

They aren't needed if all they do is set bio->init = 1 and zero other
fields that are already zeroed
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5223)

Without this, every BIO implementation is forced to have a create
method, just to set bio->init = 1.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5223)

Some older glibc versions require the `-lrt` linker option for
resolving the reference to `clock_gettime'. Since it is not desired
to add new library dependencies in version 1.1.1, the call to
clock_gettime() is replaced by a call to gettimeofday() for the
moment. It will be added back in version 1.2.
Signed-off-by: NDr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5199)

INSTALL: Mention 'aria' algorithm for no-<alg>
Signed-off-by: NPeter Meerwald-Stadler <pmeerw@pmeerw.net>
Reviewed-by: NPaul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5215)

Fixes #5207 (another PR)
Reviewed-by: NBen Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5210)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5207)

Fixes #5203
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5207)

If a server receives an unexpected ClientHello then we may or may not
accept it. Make sure all such decisions are made in the state machine
and not in the record layer. This also removes a disparity between the
TLS and the DTLS code. The TLS code was making this decision in the
record layer, while the DTLS code was making it later.

Finally it also solves a problem where a warning alert was being sent
during tls_setup_handshake() and the function was returning a failure
return code. This is problematic because it can be called from a
transition function - which we only allow fatal errors to occur in.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5190)

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5197)

For proper escaping, we need the direct perl variable values, not a
make variable reference.
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5196)

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5196)

This message will ONLY be visible in OpenSSL 1.1.1, it will not show
in 1.1.1a or any other release or update.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5185)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5185)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5185)

The additional possibility is:

perl configdata.pm --options            Display the features, both
                                        enabled and disabled, and
                                        display defined macro and
                                        skipped directories where
                                        applicable.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5185)

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5185)

The "make variable" information displayed by Configure was selective
and incomplete, and possibly undesirable (too verbose).

Instead, we make configdata.pm and have the user run it to get the
information they desire, and also make it possible to have it perform
a reconfiguration.

Possibilities so far:

perl configdata.pm --dump               Displays everything (i.e. the
                                        combined output from
                                        --command-line, --environment,
                                        --make-variables and
                                        --build-parameters.
perl configdata.pm --command-line       Displays the config command
                                        line.
perl configdata.pm --envirnoment        Displays the recorded
                                        environment variables.
perl configdata.pm --make-variables     Displays the configured "make
                                        variables".
perl configdata.pm --build-parameters   Displays the build file and
                                        the template files to create
                                        it.
perl configdata.pm --reconfigure        Re-runs the configuration with
                                        the recorded environment
                                        variables.

--verbose can be used to have --reconfigure be a bit more verbose.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5185)

It's already in opensslconf.h, which is included where this is relevant.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5188)