It created the cert structure in SSL_CTX or SSL if it was NULL, but they can
never be NULL as the comments already said.
Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Other curves don't have this problem.
Reviewed-by: NKurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: NEmilia Käsper <emilia@openssl.org>

Td4 and Te4 are arrays of u8. A u8 << int promotes the u8 to an int first then shifts.
If the mathematical result of a shift (as modelled by lhs * 2^{rhs}) is not representable
in an integer, behaviour is undefined. In other words, you can't shift into the sign bit
of a signed integer. Fix this by casting to u32 whenever we're shifting left by 24.

(For consistency, cast other shifts, too.)

Caught by -fsanitize=shift

Submitted by Nick Lewycky (Google)
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Allocate and free ASN.1 string types directly instead of going through
the ASN.1 item code.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

According to RFC 5649 section 4.1 step 1) we should not add padding
if plaintext length is multiply of 8 ockets.

This matches pseudo-code in http://dx.doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-38F
on page 15, section 6.3 KWP, algorithm 5 KWP-AE, step 2.

PR#3675
Reviewed-by: NStephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Remove DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF and DECLARE_PKCS12_STACK_OF these haven't been
used internally in OpenSSL for some time.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

When printing out an ASN.1 structure if the type is an item template don't
fall thru and attempt to interpret as a primitive type.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

In the RSA_X931_derive_ex a call to BN_CTX_new is made. This can return
NULL on error. However the return value is not tested until *after* it is
derefed! Also at the top of the function a test is made to ensure that
|rsa| is not NULL. If it is we go to the "err" label. Unfortunately the
error handling code deref's rsa.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

If SSL_check_chain is called with a NULL X509 object or a NULL EVP_PKEY
or the type of the public key is unrecognised then the local variable
|cpk| in tls1_check_chain does not get initialised. Subsequently an
attempt is made to deref it (after the "end" label), and a seg fault will
result.
Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Fixed assorted missing return value checks in c3_cpols.c
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The return value from ASN1_STRING_new() was not being checked which could
lead to a NULL deref in the event of a malloc failure. Also fixed a mem
leak in the error path.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The return value from ASN1_STRING_new() was not being checked which could
lead to a NULL deref in the event of a malloc failure. Also fixed a mem
leak in the error path.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

The call to asn1_do_adb can return NULL on error, so we should check the
return value before attempting to use it.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

ASN1_primitive_new takes an ASN1_ITEM * param |it|. There are a couple
of conditional code paths that check whether |it| is NULL or not - but
later |it| is deref'd unconditionally. If |it| was ever really NULL then
this would seg fault. In practice ASN1_primitive_new is marked as an
internal function in the public header file. The only places it is ever
used internally always pass a non NULL parameter for |it|. Therefore, change
the code to sanity check that |it| is not NULL, and remove the conditional
checking.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

Calling EVP_DigestInit_ex which has already had the digest set up for it
should be possible. You are supposed to be able to pass NULL for the type.
However currently this seg faults.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

In the event of an error |rr| could be NULL. Therefore don't assume you can
use |rr| in the error handling code.
Reviewed-by: NAndy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>

[and respect error return value in ssltest.c]
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Suggested by John Foley <foleyj@cisco.com>.
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NDr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>

Configure would load the glob "Configurations*".  The problem with
this is that it also loads all kinds of backups of those
configurations that some editors do, like emacs' classic
'Configurations~'.  The solution is to give them an extension, such as
'.conf', and make sure to end the glob with that.

Also, because 'Configurations.conf' makes for a silly name, and
because a possibly large number of configurations will become clutter,
move them to a subdirectory 'Configurations/', and rename them to
something more expressive, as well as something that sets up some form
of sorting order.  Thus:

    Configurations	->	Configurations/10-main.conf
    Configurations.team	->	Configurations/90-team.conf

Finally, make sure that Configure sorts the list of files that 'glob'
produces, and adapt Makefile.org.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Cleanse various intermediate buffers used by the PRF.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Ensure all malloc failures return -1.

Reported by Adam Langley (Google).
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

BIO_debug_callback() no longer assumes the hexadecimal representation of
a pointer fits in 8 characters.
Signed-off-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Fix security issue where under certain conditions a client can complete a
handshake with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are:
- Client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded, and the
user has not seeded manually
- A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not
SSL_client_methodv23)
- A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data
from the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random
(e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA)

If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will
have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore
the output may be predictable.

For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will
succeed on an unpatched platform:

openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA

CVE-2015-0285
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>

Since commit 741c9959 ("DTLS revision."), we put the wrong protocol
version into our ClientHello for DTLS1_BAD_VER. The old DTLS
code which used ssl->version was replaced by the more generic SSL3 code
which uses ssl->client_version. The Cisco ASA no longer likes our
ClientHello.

RT#3711
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Commit 9cf0f187 in HEAD, and 68039af3 in 1.0.2, removed a version check
from dtls1_buffer_message() which was needed to distinguish between DTLS
1.x and Cisco's pre-standard version of DTLS (DTLS1_BAD_VER).

Based on an original patch by David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
RT#3703
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

New function ASN1_STRING_clear_free which cleanses an ASN1_STRING
structure before freeing it.

Call ASN1_STRING_clear_free on PKCS#8 private key components.
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Signed-off-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: NTim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>

Run make errors on master
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Make the output from mkerr.pl consistent with the newly reformatted code.
Reviewed-by: NRichard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

crypto/crypto-lib.com - catch up with the OCSP changes
test/maketest.com and test/tests.com - catch up with the addition of test_evp_extra
Reviewed-by: NRich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>

Reviewed-by: NMatt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>